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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to review the creation and progress of the four 
Virginia waterways improvement companies which had their origins in the 1780s: the 
Potowmack Company, the James River Company, the Upper Appomattox Company, and 
the Dismal Swamp Canal Company. Primary research focused on company journals and 
family papers, legislative petitions, the annual reports of the Virginia Board of Public 
Works, and contemporary periodicals.
This study reveals that Virginians’ approach to waterways improvements was 
simultaneously classical and liberal. The improvement advocates clung to an Opposition 
belief that a healthy republican polity depended on the existence of a class of small land 
owners who embodied the civic virtue a republic required of its citizenry. However, they 
also demonstrated a liberal understanding that commerce was the most effective means 
for cultivating in each individual the industriousness, frugality, and community concern 
on which virtuous behavior rested. Waterways improvements held out the promise of 
making undeveloped western land a more inviting option for prospective farmers, while 
extending commerce and its benefits out along with them.
Actually clearing the rivers, or in the case of the Dismal Swamp Canal Company, 
creating an entirely new waterway, proved far more difficult and expensive than the 
improvement advocates anticipated. The scale of waterways improvements prompted 
Virginia’s leaders to provide an increasingly greater role for central authority, but only 
when situated in the state government, and to blur the distinction between public and 
private investment.
Once completed, the improved waterways dramatically increased traffic, as 
anticipated, but there were unanticipated consequences as well. The improvements 
inspired regional competition to capture the benefits of economic growth. White 
Virginians were deeply troubled by the increased number of black boatmen who were 
suspected of perpetrating crimes and abetting runaway slaves. And the companies 
appeared more interested in profits than well-maintained navigation.
If measured purely by profitability and corporate longevity, the companies were, 
by and large, failures. But such an evaluation is too simplistic. They were generally 
successful vehicles for advancing the state’s internal improvement policy.
Lawrence Jeffrey Perez 
Department of History 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia 
Advisor: John Selby 
“BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL IN TER EST’: 
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THE RIVER
The copious stream of Powhatan descends—
Whose crystal wave beneath the burden bends 
Of every varied product of the sod,
That make the merchant rich — or pays the planters’ toil...
COMMERCE OF RICHMOND 
Hence Richmond draws support, augments in size,
And drains from half the State, those rich supplies 
Which Commerce wafts to Eastern ports afar;
To Europe’s seats of trade, or scenes of war—
Hence grows the Merchant’s wealth, whose ample stores 
Can scarce contain the double tide that pours,
While Commerce joins with Agriculture’s toil 
The Mountain’s produce to the Ocean’s spoil.
THE CANAL, LOCKS, &c.
Proud work o f Art, whose scientific skill,
To Commerce’s wish, bends Nature’s pliant will;
With gentle hand leads on her passive course,
And now exerts and now restrains her force;
Now bids revolve the wheel’s enormous power,
That wakes the complex scene of wheat and flour.
From, “"A Christmas Ode, Descriptive of Richmond 
And Its Inhabitants," Richmond Enquirer, December 28, 1811.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 1796 Benjamin Latrobe and six others began a journey from the 
western reaches of the Appomattox River. The expedition would determine if the river 
would be a useful connection for those settling the interior of Virginia.
When Latrobe’s expedition began the river was about one foot higher than 
expected, rendering it easily navigable and the passage quite pleasant. Latrobe 
immediately was taken by the beauty of the terrain he encountered along the river, which 
he described as largely uninhabited.
Soon, however, the group encountered a large collection of river debris which 
they passed around with some difficulty. “Hammocks,” as they were called, presented 
only an occasional challenge -- milldams became more persistent obstacles as Latrobe 
and his party traveled farther down river into more populated areas. Frequent portages to 
circumvent the milldams slowed the expedition’s progress, as did frequent shallows. 
Nevertheless, Latrobe considered the river to have been clear for the most part.
The rapids at Trailors and Broad falls just above Petersburg forced Latrobe to 
temper that opinion. He attributed his success at running the rapids as much to dumb 
luck as to the skill of the man at the steering oar. Even so, Latrobe was proud to point out 
that the expedition's boat was the first ever to conquer the falls and complete the entire 
journey. Latrobe had traveled from the sparsely settled southwestern piedmont of 
Virginia, to a thriving market center on the edge of the tidewater. The entire voyage, this 
unprecedented expedition from the fringe of civilization, began just one hundred thirty 
miles from Petersburg, and took all of four days.1
2
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3In our own lifetimes, we have witnessed an electronic "communication 
revolution" that has overcome the limitations of physical distance. For us, access is 
presumed — our goal is to accelerate the speed at which data is transmitted. For 
individuals of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the term 
"communication" possessed a far more palpable quality. The word connoted the 
establishment of physical, sustainable access to a particular location. Two hundred years 
ago, the conquest of physical distance posed so daunting a challenge that, as in Latrobe’s 
case, success was noteworthy.
Virginia’s rivers held out substantial promise to create an extensive 
“communication.” The James River began at the junction of the Jackson and Cow 
Pasture rivers in the Blue Ridge Mountains, less than fifty miles to the east o f the 
Greenbrier-Great Kanawha River system which fed into the Ohio. The James River itself 
flowed three hundred thirty-five miles from its origin to its mouth, with two-thirds of its 
course above the fall line at Richmond. Below Richmond, the river maintained a mean 
depth of fourteen feet, which could accommodate ships of two hundred fifty tons.2 The 
Potomac River also presented much promise for development into an extensive trade 
network. That river traveled two hundred eighty-seven miles from its headwaters on the 
North Branch, approximately one hundred seventy-five of which were above tidewater.
In the tidewater, the Potomac's depth for all but the last few miles was never less then 
twenty-three feet, allowing an easy course for the largest ships of the day, which had a 
draft of at most twenty-two feet.3
In 1783 Patrick Henry declared that Virginia's rivers flowed east and west through
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4every quarter of the state, "as if the finger of Heaven were marking out the course of your 
settlements, inviting you to enterprise, and pointing the way to wealth."4 But, as Latrobe 
quickly discovered, the western extents of these rivers as Patrick Henry might have 
viewed them on a map were far longer than their practical navigation. Latrobe had been 
fortunate to undertake his voyage on the Appomattox when the river was high, but he 
recognized the river was capricious and had to be taken on its own terms. When enough 
water did pass through the river, natural obstacles and milldams slowed progress. Latrobe 
ended his journey with the rapids that had hampered Petersburg’s economic development. 
As a means of communication, the Appomattox was better than no river at all, though not 
by much. But it was enough to provide Petersburg with a sufficient agricultural base that, 
coupled with access to the Chesapeake, offered the city a promising future.
The falls of the James River formed an all but insurmountable barrier between 
upriver and Richmond. Above the falls the river contained many shallows and was 
syncopated by treacherous rapids. Anyone attempting to travel the Potomac faced minor 
rapids at Seneca, Shenandoah, and House’s Falls and had to overcome the Little and Great 
Falls, as well. The total change in elevation for the trip was almost two thousand feet — 
over four times what the Erie Canal would have to surmount in crossing New York.5 
Neither the James nor the Potomac rivers could be navigated upriver except for the two 
months or so following the spring thaw, which produced floods or "freshets" that were a 
threat in themselves. As for navigation of the Appomattox River, all Thomas Jefferson 
found notable was that it ceased at Petersburg.6
Boat technology also limited the utility of the rivers. Canoes, with their shallow
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5draft and high maneuverability, proved entirely satisfactory for the needs of the 
indigenous peoples of Virginia and were quickly embraced by European settlers who 
knew a good thing when they saw one. Canoes, however, possessed extremely limited 
cargo capacity and tended to tip over when heavily loaded.
Two canoes lashed together, however, offered a dramatic improvement. In 1756 
the Reverend James Maury (a teacher of Thomas Jefferson) credited the innovation to the 
Reverend Robert Rose of Saint Anne’s Parish, who was a friend and executor of 
Governor Spotswood. As early as 1726 Maury descended the James to Richmond from a 
point about fifty miles from the city. An early advocate of river transportation, the 
Reverend Rose devised rolling "hogsheads," or large barrels, of tobacco crosswise onto 
two canoes bound together. This arrangement could hold eight or nine hogsheads while 
maintaining a draft of only a few inches. For the return trip, Maury observed that two 
men in the canoes could pole upstream in one day as far as four men in a conventional 
boat in two days.7
As the cultivation of tobacco and wheat expanded, the two-canoe method could 
not handle the increasing volume of traffic, necessitating another advance in river 
transport technology. Thomas Jefferson recorded in April 1775 that he had witnessed the 
first launching of a new type of craft, the James River "batteau," and credited Benjamin 
and Anthony Rucker of Amherst County with its design. Jefferson described this first 
batteau as fifty feet long, four feet wide, with a draft of only thirteen and one-half inches. 
It carried eleven hogsheads o f tobacco.8
The batteaux were widely adopted, and adapted, throughout Virginia. Generally
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6speaking, batteaux were open craft forty to fifty feet long and four to five feet wide that 
drew only about two feet of water. They carried up to twelve hogsheads of tobacco, or 
seventy-five to eighty barrels of flour. They required only three men to navigate, with 
two using poles to propel the boat and one steering by a rear-mounted oar/rudder. In 
1796 Isaac Weld reported these craft could make the trip from Lynchburg to Richmond in 
ten days.9
So ubiquitous had these craft become, that when the heirs of the Ruckers secured 
a patent in 1821, the Lynchburg Virginian disputed their claim, considering the design too 
common to attribute to a particular source. By August of that same year, the editors of 
the paper had changed their tune, conceding that the batteau had been designed by the 
Ruckers and that it "was a species of boat essentially different from any before that time 
used on the waters of America."10 That Thomas Jefferson himself was willing to testify 
on behalf of the heirs clearly influenced the editors’thinking.11
With the development of the James River batteau, the technology at hand had 
reached its limit. The logical next step was to make the rivers more conducive to the 
passage of batteaux. While laws had been passed throughout the history of the colony to 
remove obstructions, Virginia’s rivers, as Latrobe had discovered on the Appomattox, 
remained fraught with obstacles to navigation. Considering the difficult geography of the 
rivers, the necessary improvements would not be easy and would require substantial 
commitments of resources and labor.
After the Revolution, members of Virginia’s General Assembly hoped to remove 
the impediments to river navigation of the sort Latrobe encountered. Four such
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7companies had their origins in the 1780s and will be the focus of this dissertation: the 
Potowmack Company, the James River Company, the Upper Appomattox Company, and 
the Dismal Swamp Canal Company.
In creating these companies were Virginians forward looking, or were they 
endeavoring to reclaim the past? Lance Banning and Joyce Appleby in companion 
articles in the William and Mary Quarterly address the motivations of Virginians who 
came to be known as Jeffersonian Republicans. Appleby is unyielding in her assertion 
that Jefferson and Jeffersonian Republicans had forsaken classical republicanism and 
embraced a liberalism that was utterly forward looking and marked by its “liberation from 
reverence for the past...”12 According to Appleby these liberals placed their faith in 
providing freedom to “...men as individuals rather than as members of a polity.” This 
freedom most notably manifested itself in the operation of a free market economy which 
empowered individuals to act on their own behalf and collectively serve society better 
than the arbitrary exercise of power by the government.13
Banning is steadfast in asserting the existence of sufficient documentary evidence 
supporting the position that Jeffersonian Republicans continued to rely upon the rhetoric 
o f the English Country Opposition. Opposition thought emphasized both the importance 
of inculcating virtuous behavior among the citizenry and the fear of the deleterious 
effects of commercialization. But Banning notes the Country Opposition did not 
outrightly reject commerce but feared the “financialism, mercantilism and all-absorbing 
luxury” that could result from it. In addition, Banning recognizes the Americanization of 
eighteenth-century opposition thought, particularly the rejection of class and rank. He
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8presents a more nuanced interpretation than Appleby in that he accepts that Jeffersonian 
Republicans possessed a more liberal, more commercial outlook than previous 
generations, but asserts they continued to embrace English Country Opposition 
ideological heritage and employ it to inform their political activity.14 Banning captures 
the balancing act between Virginians’ more classical fear of commercial excess and their 
liberal faith in the beneficial effects of an expanded commerce: “In America...this new 
order was commonly defined as one that had escaped or rejected major political, 
commercial, industrial, and financial changes that had overtaken contemporary 
England.” 15
Virginians’ approach to waterways improvements was, as Banning suggests, 
simultaneously liberal and classical. The improvement advocates clung to an Opposition 
ideal of a virtuous citizenry, but recognized the pursuit o f a more comfortable life through 
participation in commerce would act as the catalyst for the development of 
republicanism.16 The quest to enhance the quality of life resulted not in the dissolution of 
the citizenry, but instead provided potent incentive to behave in a frugal, responsible 
manner.
Where both Banning and Appleby are lacking is in their treatment of Virginians’ 
agrarian impulses. The historians become so taken with debating the extent to which 
Jeffersonian Republicans were progressive, they overlook the importance to Virginia’s 
leaders of sustaining their agrarian society. Indeed, waterways improvement advocates 
constantly asserted the value of better navigation for Virginia’s development as an 
agrarian republic. In stressing Jeffersonian Republicans’ liberal orientation, Appleby
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9references the Jeffersonian Republicans’ belief that trade and the economy formed “a 
system operating independently of politics, and, like the physical universe, taking its cues 
from nature.”17 Appleby fails to consider the possibility that Virginians perceived their 
agrarian, hierarchical society as quite “natural,” and completely consistent with their 
liberal world view. She is on the mark, however, in noting from the 1780s onward, 
Virginia’s leaders proved quite adept at devising new relationships between government, 
citizenry, and economy in order to respond and adapt to new circumstances.
The first chapter of this study will review how Virginians adapted their 
understanding of the value of territory to the new political and economic environment of 
the 1780s. These efforts provide insight into Virginians' understanding of the practicable 
size of a republic and the role of commerce in an agrarian state. Fundamental to this new 
understanding was a realization that territory was only valuable so long as it could be 
easily settled, practically governed, and sufficiently integrated into the state’s commercial 
network. Commercial access to improved waterways would enhance the quality of life of 
western settlers, while providing them with ample incentive to engage in the industrious 
behavior Virginia’s leaders considered fundamental to civic virtue. Moreover, extended 
navigation would afford a constant supply of land to ensure agrarian predominance over 
Virginia society.
If improving the rivers was central to Virginia’s vision for the future, the means 
for achieving so herculean an effort had to be identified and implemented. Who would 
organize the resources and labor in a manner most likely to result in success? Chapter 
two will survey the General Assembly’s innovative chartering of private companies to
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improve the waterways. In addressing the problem of internal improvements, Virginia’s 
leaders had to contemplate the proper role of government in promoting private enterprise, 
and the extent to which the government should mandate local changes to further regional 
benefits.
Actually clearing the rivers, or in the case of the Dismal Swamp Canal Company, 
creating an entirely new waterway, proved far more daunting than the improvement 
advocates anticipated. Chapter three will examine the efforts of the companies to 
overcome such impediments to the projects as natural obstacles, labor shortages, and 
technical shortcomings. In addition, as the companies began to effect improvements, 
their operation had unanticipated consequences. The growth in traffic exacerbated 
regional competition to capture the benefits of the economic growth. And white 
Virginians were deeply troubled that the improved rivers promoted the creation of a 
highly mobile class o f slaves and freed blacks — the boatmen. Chapter four will review 
these consequences and how waterways improvements fit into Virginians’ responses to 
domestic commercial competition and to international crises, most notably the Embargo 
and the War of 1812. Chapter five will examine the fates of these four companies. By 
the 1820s, the companies created in the 1780s with so much fanfare and with such high 
expectations had ceased to exist in their original corporate form, with the exception of the 
Dismal Swamp Canal Company.
I will conclude with a consideration of the companies’ overall effectiveness. If 
measured purely by profitability and corporate longevity, the companies were by and 
large failures. But such an evaluation is too simplistic. If judged by their impact on
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Virginia, the companies were on the whole successful vehicles of the state’s internal 
improvement policy. The companies did improve the navigation of the waterways with 
which they were charged. The entrepots associated with the waterways enjoyed dramatic 
growth, and, as foreseen in the 1780s, much of that growth resulted from trade with the 
West. Despite the economic growth, increased access to western land afforded by the 
rivers permitted Virginia to retain the traditional “agrarian” quality sought by Madison, 
Jefferson and Washington. While Virginia’s leaders embraced liberalism’s emphasis on 
economic empowerment, into the 1820s they reinforced a hierarchical political structure 
that permitted the few to dominate the many. And despite liberalism’s suspicion o f 
government, throughout the period under investigation Virginia’s leaders expanded the 
state government’s role in the funding and operation of waterways improvements.
For sources, I relied heavily on legislative petitions, which residents submitted 
directly to the General Assembly. The petitions provide the best available enunciation of 
public sentiment in a region. Contemporary newspapers were informative, not only for 
the stories they printed, but for the advertisements which provided insight into the 
perceived movement of the slaves and the impact of the river systems on localities. I was 
able to review the accounting books for the James River and Appomattox companies, 
which offered considerable insight into the day-to-day operations of the companies as 
well as the business decisions made by the managers. The annual reports of the Board of 
Public Works also offered summaries of the improvements. A particularly useful 
dissertation at the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill, "Internal Improvements in 
Virginia, 1775-1860," by Philip M. Rice also filled in many of the details.
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The sources suggest an ostensible consensus on the value of moving forward with 
a system of waterways improvements. But when the consensus is peeled back, one finds 
a host of competing economic and regional interests, mounting social stress, and a 
palpable racial anxiety. This is a story of the price of progress.
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CHAPTER I
"...ALREADY FULL LARGE FOR VIGOROUS GOVERNMENT.
The 1776 constitution of the new state of Virginia began with an accusatory list of 
abuses suffered under the King, but concluded with a territorial claim based on the grant 
graciously bestowed upon the colony of Virginia by the same, purportedly tyrannical 
English crown.1 The new state also took from its British antecedent a hunger for territory. 
It asserted a claim to a huge piece of the North American continent, encompassing the 
Old Northwest, the present states of Kentucky and West Virginia, and the southwestern 
portion of Pennsylvania. To reinforce the state’s sovereignty over this far-flung domain, 
the new constitution stipulated any parties wishing to separate and establish a new 
government in any part of the state’s western domain had first to obtain the assent of the 
Virginia legislature.2 Yet in the closing years of the Revolution, Virginia’s political 
establishment not only relinquished the state’s vast claims north o f the Ohio River; it also 
laid the groundwork for the admission of Kentucky as the fourteenth member of the 
Confederation. What inspired Virginia’s leaders to so radically reevaluate Virginia’s 
territorial designs and so willingly divest themselves of the Virginia empire that had been 
within their grasp?
The eagerness of the Virginia government to shed the Northwest Territory and 
Kentucky demonstrated a new two-fold understanding of territorial management. First, 
the autonomy of Virginia was held sacred and was to be secured at any cost, even the 
surrender of all land claimed beyond the Ohio River. But easing the blow was the
15
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realization of the impossibility of governing so large an area. As a result of this new 
understanding, Virginia leaders rendered the state significantly smaller —  a considerably 
different impulse from the imperial designs they harbored at the beginning of the 
Revolution. What had changed over the course of the war and the peace of the early 
Confederation period to alter Virginians' perspective so drastically? The answer is a new 
understanding of the relationship of the land to moral growth of the polity, and a 
heightened awareness of the possibilities of internal improvements as a catalyst for proper 
republican behavior.
In the years of the Revolution and immediately thereafter, Virginia’s leaders 
feared the Old Dominion could not avoid the moral dissipation they associated with 
England. George Washington noted that the interest in fine European manufactured 
goods could not be restrained, and though it produced convenience and wealth, it also 
brought "luxury, effeminacy and corruptions."3 The Virginians’ fears reflected the 
thinking of such European thinkers as the English preacher John Brown, who posited that 
the British economy had reached the third and last stage of commercial development. In 
the first stage, commerce provides necessities, and in the second, conveniences. But in 
the third stage, commercial development produces vast economic disparities as small 
workshops disappear and manufacturing consolidates. The wealthy owners of huge 
factories become avaricious and enamored of the luxuries and ostentation they can now 
afford, and the country produces them in ever larger quantities. The established elements 
of society thus lose the capacity to participate virtuously in the government. At the same 
time, overpopulation renders land ownership the luxury of a few, and the less fortunate
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
17
are relegated to the fate of landless, poorly paid factory laborers. Their situation renders 
them ill-equipped to represent their interests in the government, and they are manipulated 
by their employers.4
In this third phase, government plays an active and insidious role in the economy. 
Through the creation of the Bank of England and monopolies, the British government had 
become intimately involved with economic development. Along with economic growth 
came new wealth and an urban merchant class which "Country" opposition polemicists, 
most notably John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, warned was using its money to 
influence the king’s ministers. It was frequently alleged by these writers that ministers, 
enriched by merchant bribes, sought even more power by bribing Parliament, the 
protector of the people’s rights. The only outcome, according to the country opposition, 
would be the ultimate enslavement of the people.
While the country opposition was always a minority opinion in Britain, its rhetoric 
provided American colonists with a perspective by which to comprehend the new taxes 
and the royal appointments placed in the colonial custom houses and governor’s chairs.
To the colonists, royal policies, influenced by British merchants, would inevitably cripple 
colonial legislatures and destroy representative government. The Revolution, then, was 
partly an attempt to free colonists from the clutches of corrupted British government.
From the same perspective, the years following independence were an attempt to frame a 
government that would perpetuate virtuous "republican" behavior, which most 
understood to be incompatible with large-scale manufactures.5
In the 1780s Virginia’s leaders wondered if their state was also doomed to
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experience the consequences of commercial development. What they saw all around 
them compelled a disturbing conclusion. The citizenry was certainly fond of the luxuries 
characteristic of the third, or commercial, stage of economic development. Jefferson, 
who in his Notes on the State o f Virginia spoke so passionately of the superiority of an 
agrarian society, observed with resignation the taste of his neighbors for foreign luxuries: 
"Our citizens have had too full a taste of the comforts furnished by the arts and 
manufactures to be debarred the use of them."6 And Virginians were certainly behaving 
no better than other residents of the union, forsaking public responsibilities and patriotism 
for personal gain. Legislators, rather than epitomizing republican self-sacrifice, were 
accused of representing particular economic interests.7 "Republican virtue" seemed to be 
in short supply. Was the Old Dominion doomed to the squalor and corruption that had 
sapped Britain’s moral reserves?
Perhaps not. Virginia had something that England lacked — land. Despite the 
substantial divestment of the Northwest Territory and the resolve to allow Kentucky to 
separate, Virginia was by no means land poor. The Piedmont, the Shenandoah Valley, 
and the land beyond the Alleghenies to the Ohio River remained within Virginia's bounds 
and was far from fully exploited.8 The historian Charles Ambler has described Virginia 
in the 1790s as two inclined planes separated by a central valley. The tidewater and 
piedmont form the first or eastern plane. During the colonial period this part of the state 
was populated, but there was still land to be had in the western piedmont. The Allegheny 
highlands, the Cumberland plateau and the Ohio Valley made up the other inclined plane, 
with the Shenandoah Valley in the middle. While the terrains of these western parts of
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Virginia were certainly more rugged than in the East, the land was quite fertile, especially 
near the many river and creek bottoms, and much of it still unoccupied.9
Unlike their British counterparts who had not the least chance of acquiring 
property and had no choice but to toil in the factories, eastern laborers could look to 
Virginia’s western frontier and a seemingly unlimited opportunity to become landholding 
farmers. Madison expected landholding to be so irresistible an attraction that craftsmen 
would direct their profits into acreage rather than manufacturing and its attendant evils.
As a result o f western migration, labor would remain a precious commodity in the East, 
bolstering wages and leveling the economic inequities prevalent in Britain. Madison 
anticipated Virginia’s frontier would bleed off surplus labor, dampening the interest of 
anyone in manufacturing by depriving them of the workers they would need.10
While the availability of western land would serve to avert the danger of moral 
dissipation in the East, how would it affect the moral character of the individuals who 
spilled out onto the frontier? Historian Drew McCoy notes the warning of eighteenth- 
century thinkers that subsistence agriculture had as debilitating effect on civil behavior as 
the advanced stage of commercial development. "If mankind confined themselves to the 
use of the bare necessaries of life," argued the British political economist William 
Temple, "labouring one hour in a day in each family would procure them all: Where, 
then, and how could universal industry be excited?" He concluded in 1758 that "a 
simplicity of living and universal industry are incompatible and repugnant to each 
other."11
Virginia’s political elite were also concerned that individuals who moved west did
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so because of their failure to succeed in the east. Once removed from the civilizing 
influence of the government and eastern society, these inherently inferior westerners 
seemed to revert to savagery. Although they decried Indian attacks on women and 
children as inhuman, westerners exercised the same brutality against natives, and, during 
the Revolutionary War, against white British soldiers as well. The question of whom 
they may turn on next played prominently on the minds of eastern legislators.12
Simply providing land for farmers was not enough. A means had to be found to 
allow the western expansion necessary for the perpetuation of a predominantly agrarian 
economy, and yet provide incentives for settlers to remain "civilized." The Virginia 
government’s response was to promote the very kind of commercial expansion which had 
precipitated social and political malaise in Britain, but which in Virginia would 
complement western agricultural development. Among settlers who might otherwise 
merely practice subsistence agriculture, the chance to acquire consumer items through 
trade with the coast would instill the discipline of the marketplace. Commerce rewarded 
energetic individuals who practiced diligence, industry and frugality — precisely the 
"virtuous" qualities leaders like Jefferson and Madison considered the bulwark of 
republican behavior.13
Not only did commerce serve as the impetus for virtue, but it operated through 
motivations that were purely internal. There was no need for increased government 
intervention to ensure proper republican behavior. As Joyce Appleby has observed, 
"Where politics achieved stability by imposing its structure of power, the economy 
appeared to elicit voluntary participation as it wove ever more extensive networks of free
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exchange."14 Commerce could thus provide greater economic "liberty," but only for the 
individuals who internalized standards of proper citizenship, fundamental to which was 
participation in the political process.IS
The reliance on commerce to foster republican citizenship came at the expense of 
an older faith in agrarian autonomy. Thomas Jefferson most fervently believed in the 
redemptive qualities of the soil. He asserted "husbandmen" were the best citizens: "They 
are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their 
country and wedded to it’s liberty and interests by the most lasting bands."16 But the 
planter elite had not risen to its lofty social position by subsistence farming. Tobacco 
provided the Virginia dynasties with the wealth to assert their social primacy. And 
without the international British trade network to market the crop, tobacco was just an 
inedible weed.17 Jefferson had to accept that the growth of Virginia’s economy did not 
depend solely on virtuous husbandmen, but also on those individuals tempted away from 
the utopian experience of farming to engage in commerce.18
In accepting a more pronounced role for commerce, Jefferson understood well that 
he was unleashing economic forces that could destroy the society he sought to preserve. 
He continued to fear that large-scale domestic manufacturing would doom Virginia to 
Britain’s fate. "Artificers," as Jefferson called manufacturers, were "the panderers of vice 
and the instruments by which the liberties of a country are generally overturned." It is not 
clear where Jefferson drew the line between artisans and artificers. Apparently those who 
performed vital local functions on a small scale were acceptable. Jefferson himself 
endeavored to produce nails on his plantation.19
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In explaining the relationship of farming, commerce and manufacture, Jefferson 
clearly drew upon the Country opposition’s suspicions of large-scale manufacturing and 
the luxury goods it produced. After the Revolution Jefferson fervently hoped a 
distinction between cottage production and heavy industry would provide the antidote for 
the growing infatuation among the people with foreign luxury items. He called for 
Virginia specifically, and the Union generally, to emulate the policy o f China, focusing on 
agricultural production and relying on other nations for finished goods. Indeed, Jefferson 
remained persuaded that Europeans needed the foodstuffs of the United States far more 
than Americans needed European goods that were for them discretionary purchases.20 It 
was the abundance of western land in America that made this perception possible.
Settlers seemed more than willing to adopt this new commercial orientation.
They gladly abandoned subsistence for the conveniences made available to them by 
participating in the trade network. An analysis of the probated estates in southwestern 
Virginia between 1745 and 1786 reveals that settlers lacked the tools necessary to be the 
kind of jack-of-all-trades often associated with frontiersmen. Not all settlers were 
interested in hunting, inasmuch as fewer than half the estates’ inventories included rifles, 
muskets, pistols or guns of any kind. Even the usual characterization o f settlers as 
buckskin-clad pioneers is an overstatement. The inventories enumerate many items of 
apparel that one might not expect to find on the frontier, such as knee buckles, silk 
handkerchiefs, and silver shoe buckles.21 This consumer activity suggests settlers sought 
to participate in broader market exchange, and not just engage in local barter. They were 
aware of what these luxuries cost, and to what extent their own labors would permit their
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acquisition. These settlers may not have been merchants pursuing profits, but they were 
seeking to do more than provide their families with what was locally available. An 
effective commercial network permitted them to set their sights not on goods produced by 
a neighbor and exchanged for a couple of chickens, but on items imported through a 
coastal port for a specific amount of money.22 Once establishment of a commercial 
network was recognized as a priority, land was no longer important in its own right, but 
valuable to the extent it could be developed and integrated into the network.
A review of the two largest land issues, the Northwest Cession and the separation 
movement in Kentucky, reveals that illusions of empire fell before pragmatic assessments 
of just how far Virginia’s administrative, political and economic influence could be 
extended. Such considerations led to an awareness of the extent to which the state’s 
resources would accommodate the improvements to the landscape necessary for an 
extensive and reliable transportation network. Rather than dwelling on the Virginia 
constitution’s initial emphasis on a vast dominion, the state government came to assert a 
claim only over territory that could be practically managed and whose inhabitants could 
reasonably be expected to join Virginia’s polity. Lands too distant to integrate into 
Virginia’s political system and economic network were judged not worth holding, 
especially if valuable concessions could be extracted from the federal government for 
surrendering them. In making these calculations, Virginia’s leaders ascertained the 
practical length of their reach and acted accordingly. But by what standard did they 
measure their reach? It is no coincidence that the area remaining after the state’s
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substantial divestitures corresponded with the courses of Virginia’s waterways, the 
development of which (including their access to the Ohio River basin) the General 
Assembly aggressively pursued in the 1780s.
Concern for better "communication" thus underlay the change in the philosophy of 
political economy that permitted post-Revolutionary Virginians to relinquish their faith in 
agrarian autonomy and to pin their hope for the future on commercial acquisitiveness, 
which would always be restrained, it was assumed, by the availability of land. This 
delicate balance between commerce and western emigration, it was believed, hinged upon 
western access to tidewater markets. Without improvements to the river networks, 
neither the old nor the new model for Virginia’s social, political and economic 
development would be possible.
The explanations for the participation of Virginia’s leaders in so risky an 
enterprise as the American Revolution are many. But unarguably a prominent motivation 
was the protection of the Commonwealth’s land claims. By rebelling against Great 
Britain and its efforts to contain western migration, Virginia’s leaders hoped to secure the 
free use of the entire expanse granted in the colony’s charter of 1609. Virginia emerged 
from the Revolution a powerful, autonomous state that could defend its territorial claims 
against all challengers, whether they be Britain, other American states, or the Continental 
Congress itself.23
Whatever Virginians’ imperial designs may originally have been, before the end of 
the war they were subjugated to the imperatives of defense against British invasion. As 
the British moved through the South in 1780 and 1781, Virginians began to appreciate the
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defensive value of a stronger Continental union that could allocate collective resources to 
the state’s advantage.24 Defensive considerations overcame the hostility harbored against 
such states as Maryland, whose competing claims to the Ohio Valley had led it to hold up 
the ratification of the Articles of Confederation for years. Virginia’s cession of the 
Northwest Territory and the likely creation of frontier border states between Virginia and 
hostile Indian nations offered an attractive strategy for the Commonwealth: the new 
states would bear the brunt of the attacks and absorb the costs of defense.25
As Virginia's leaders looked ahead to the war’s successful conclusion, the 
prospect of dominion over a huge expanse of territory confronted practical considerations 
of governing. Reflecting the widely held assumption that a republic was an inherently 
fragile form of government, Richard Henry Lee wondered about "the difficulty of 
republican laws and government piercing so far from the seat of government." For Lee, 
the Ohio River seemed a reasonable western boundary.26 That still encompassed too 
much territory for Jefferson, who advocated cession of all territory west of the longitude 
passing through present-day Charleston, West Virginia. That option, he thought, would 
ensure homogeneity of interests, opinions and habits within Virginia.
Jefferson believed that if Virginia maintained its current borders the different 
priorities of the trans-Appalachian settlers would estrange them from the eastern 
government. He concluded that only "a stronger, more centralized government than 
desirable for republicanism" could administer a state with such disparate and widely 
separated regions. Better to cede the West than to surrender to greed and threaten all 
Virginia with tyranny. Besides, Jefferson observed, the territorial cession he proposed
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
26
retained within Virginia’s borders the state’s most valuable natural resources, not the least 
of which was its network of rivers.27
By the end of the Revolution, Virginia’s political leadership by and large 
recognized that, as House of Delegates member Joseph Jones put it, "Virginia...is already 
full large for vigorous government." Jones’use of the word "vigorous" merits emphasis, 
for it reveals an awareness of the distinction between the simple possession of territory 
and the successful extension of republican government. But Jones did not expect 
Virginia to surrender such valuable territory without obtaining concessions from the 
Continental government regarding state sovereignty. He recommended to Jefferson that 
the state "moderate her desires, and cede to the United States, upon certain conditions, her 
territory beyond the Ohio."28
At the same time that Virginians were warming to a possible cession of land to the 
Union, competing territorial interests had so inflamed interstate relations they continued 
to endanger Virginia's ratification of the Articles of Confederation. Virginians were well 
aware that companies controlled by out-of-staters had purchased titles from indigenous 
tribes within Virginia's old borders. These land companies now desired Congress to 
assert authority over the disputed territory in order to gain recognition of Indian land 
claims.29 For Virginians to acquiesce suggested that a state's borders were for Congress 
to establish and that a state’s sovereignty was not absolute.
George Mason was particularly concerned that any Congressional intrusion upon 
Virginia's sovereignty would justify land grabbing by the out-of-state companies. In 
December of 1779 he authored a remonstrance from the Virginia General Assembly
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objecting to Congress’ willingness to entertain petitions from the land companies seeking
to set up a government in the northwest without Virginia’s assent. Mason wrote,
Should Congress assume a Jurisdiction and arrogate to themselves a Right 
of Adjudication not only unwarranted by, but expressly contrary to the 
fundamental principal [sic] of Confederation...it would be a Violation of 
Public Faith, introduce a most dangerous precedent, which might hereafter 
be urged to deprive of Territory or subvert the Sovereignty and 
Government of any one or more o f the United States and establish in 
Congress a power which in process of Time must degenerate into 
intolerable Despotism.30
Mason did not save all his ire for Congress. He characterized the efforts of the 
land companies as "factious, illegal & dangerous Schemes." If they should prove 
successful, Mason cautioned, "the Revolution, instead of securing, as was intended, our 
Rights and Libertys, will only change the Name & place of Residence of our Tyrants."31 
If not stopped, he warned, the land companies’efforts to use Congress to their own ends 
"must end either in the Dissolution of the federal Union, or the Destruction of American 
liberty."32
When Virginia finally ceded the Northwest in 1781, it did so on the condition that 
Congress not recognize any land company predating the cession. Predictably, Maryland, 
invoking the requirement of unanimity under the Articles of Confederation, blocked 
Virginia’s terms for the cession of the Northwest. Marylanders sought the "liberal," 
meaning unconditional, surrender of state claims to the West.33 Through 1783 
Maryland’s veto held, during which time Virginians were not enthralled with having to 
bear the expense of asserting their jurisdiction over territory they wanted to cede. They 
wanted to focus their resources on improvable territory.
Congress broke the deadlock on September 13, 1783, by adopting a committee
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report calling on Virginia to cede without conditions on the understanding that Congress 
would itself invalidate the private land purchases.34 The Virginia legislature complied 
with Congress’ terms in December and rescinded its previous conditions. Congressional 
approval of the Northwest Cession became official on March 1, 1784.
By accepting Virginia’s authority to cede the Northwest Territory, Congress both 
implicitly recognized the state’s sovereignty over the rest of its holdings and established 
its own authority under the Articles of Confederation to adjudicate disputes over land 
claims between states. For their part, Virginians conceded Continental authority to define 
what territory a state may claim as its own, a concession made easier by Congress’ 
disallowance of the claims of the big losers in the Northwest cession -- the private land 
companies. With Virginia’s autonomy over its remaining territory protected, the state 
government turned to the business of reinforcing Virginia’s territorial integrity.35
The Italian traveler, Luigi Castiglioni, decided to rely on an inhabitant’s account 
of Kentucky rather than go there himself, "both out of a fear of being surprised by the 
Indians and because of the hardships and discomforts of a long journey in a country still 
uncompletely cultivated."36 Kentucky was a territory of unlimited, though as yet 
unrealized, possibilities. After the experience of the Northwest, Virginia’s leaders were 
well aware of the daunting task of maintaining and improving such distant land. And 
having learned with the Northwest Cession that securing favorable terms could be more 
valuable than the land itself, Virginia’s leaders were willing to accept Kentucky’s 
separation — on certain conditions.
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While the Northwest Territory was largely unpopulated at the time of Virginia's 
cession, the population boom in Kentucky district predated the emergence of a separation 
movement. In 1775 Harrodsburg and Boonesborough had become the first permanent 
white settlements. The Revolutionary War initially retarded emigration to Kentucky, 
with fewer than 200 residents located there by 1778. Louisville in 1780 consisted of just 
three streets and a cluster of cabins, but this newest village boasted the only store on the 
lower Ohio River, a portent o f what was to come.37
That anyone even tried to get to Kentucky is a testament to the desirability o f the 
land and the determination of those first settlers to reap its fruits. Those not daunted by 
the war faced disheartening transportation options. Prospective settlers could take a road 
from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, where they boarded boats for a trip down the Ohio as far 
as the falls at Louisville. The other choice was to take the road through the Shenandoah 
Valley and the frighteningly narrow Cumberland Gap in the extreme southwest comer of 
present-day Virginia, and then head roughly northwest, with the trail ending again at 
Louisville.38 This latter route came to be known as the Wilderness Road.
Neither route was clearly superior to the other — settlers faced a choice between 
two evils. Those who traveled to Pittsburgh might have to wait several months before the 
river level was high enough to carry a boat.39 When the passage did begin, the anxiety of 
the long wait was soon replaced by the fear Indians would find the slow-moving craft a 
target too inviting to resist. The delay and danger was enough to convince settlers from 
Maryland and Pennsylvania, for whom the Ohio River route was more convenient, to opt 
for the Wilderness Road.40 Settlers did not have to wait to use the Wilderness Road, but,
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as it was no more than a narrow pack trail with often steep inclines, travel in the winter 
was inadvisable.41
On the return from Kentucky, the choice of routes was reduced to one. Forcing 
boats up the Ohio River was arduous and slow and rendered the boats even more 
vulnerable to Indian attack. The Wilderness Road offered the only viable way east with 
promise of safety — Kentucky newspapers carried advertisements for those wishing to 
return to meet at specified times and places to travel in larger groups.4*
Despite the hardships, prospective settlers could not resist the potential that 
Kentucky offered. "Among all those settlements begun to the west o f the mountains," 
noted a contemporary observer, "none hastens more swiftly to completion or is more 
attentively regarded by the whole of America, than the new colony of Kentucky."43 
Between 1783 and 1790 the population of Kentucky ballooned from 5,000 to 73,000.44
By 1786 Louisville still had only three streets, but it now contained three hundred 
people and one hundred buildings. There were schools, stores, churches, distilleries and 
horse races, among other semblances of European civilization. This cultural advance had 
leapfrogged the sparsely populated trans-Allegheny region, rendering Kentucky "rather 
like an island of population far away from shore, only to be reached by a long, rough, 
perilous passage." The Kentucky border lay five hundred miles from the Atlantic coast 
and three hundred miles from the crest of the Alleghenies. At the same time, states such 
as New York and Pennsylvania had yet to experience significant movement into their 
western sections.45 Kentucky's population explosion coupled with its isolation created a 
set of administrative problems that quickly tested Virginia's resolve to maintain
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sovereignty over the district.
The first problem Virginia faced was the demand of the tide of immigrants for 
arbitration of land disputes in the region. In 1777 the Virginia legislature tried to 
intervene by giving free titles to the few who settled in Kentucky before June 1, 1776. 
Since the act made no mention of the state’s intention to charge for subsequent grants, the 
law resulted in confusion by creating the impression that free land would be available for 
post-1776 settlers as well.46
The land laws of 1779 endeavored to strike a compromise between the state’s 
desperate need in the midst of war for revenue from land sales and current settlers’ 
demands for "squatters’rights." Any claimant who settled in Kentucky between June 1, 
1776, and January 1, 1778, was entitled to four hundred acres. If the claimant made 
improvements, he could preempt and purchase one thousand acres adjoining the four- 
hundred-acre homestead. Settlers arriving between January 1, 1778, and January I, 1779, 
were not entitled to a homestead, but could preempt four hundred acres. Legislation also 
authorized the creation of a land office in Richmond to facilitate the staking of claims.47
The Virginia legislature had more than the convenience of the Kentucky settlers in 
mind when it passed the 1779 land acts. In a maneuver identical to the land companies’ 
asserting Indian claims in the Northwest, Philadelphia interests urged Congress to claim 
jurisdiction over Kentucky and negate Virginia land warrants. Once again, the Virginia 
government resisted congressional trampling on state sovereignty, and equally important, 
endeavored to protect the state’s only means of paying bounties to veterans of the French 
and Indian and Revolutionary wars.48 The government’s strategy was to ease procedures
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for claiming land to make settlers beholden to the state of Virginia for their stake. By 
popular demand, the state would then be able to press its sovereignty in the face of 
external challenges.49
The land acts of 1779 procured just the result that Virginia leaders wanted — the 
physical possession of the land by thousands of settlers reinforced Virginia's claim on 
Kentucky.50 But these settlers caused new complications. The pioneers who had shared 
hardships so willingly became the residents who sued one another with great frequency, 
creating a need for a court closer to Kentucky than Richmond. But the eastern-dominated 
government was interested in neither the autonomy a new court would afford the western 
part of the state nor the expenses associated with maintaining another court.
Kentuckians sensed foot-dragging in Richmond and were not above using the 
current uncertainty about sovereignty in Kentucky as leverage. A May 1782 petition for a 
new court begins by voicing great concern over the legislature's failure to act on a petition 
delivered six months earlier requesting courts of assize for Kentucky. The petition then 
notes rather menacingly a congressional committee resolution denying Virginia's claim to 
land "Northwest of the Allegany [sic] mountains." The resolution was unclear as to 
whether or not it referred to Kentucky, but the petitioners saw an opportunity in 
presuming that it did. They asserted if Virginia had no right to the land Kentuckians 
possessed, it must be vested in Kentuckians themselves.51
Having gained the legislators' attention with a heavy-handed threat to Virginia 
sovereignty, the petitioners then presented their case for courts based on familiar 
republican principles of representation. The petitioners stressed they considered
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themselves Virginians and that they wished the protection and privileges entitled to them 
as Virginia citizens. However, if they were not to be afforded the legal protection granted 
other Virginians, they requested "an information of what they can expect."52 If they were 
to be relegated to some inferior status they wanted an admission to that fact. The 
petitioners implied they would then take appropriate action — a powerful suggestion in 
the midst of a revolution initiated in part when Parliament failed to respond to similar 
protests over representation that Virginians and the other members of the Union had 
raised. Those who drafted the petition also clearly recognized the irony that Virginians, 
driven in part to revolution by British efforts to control access to the West, were 
themselves endeavoring to control western development at the expense of the freedom- 
loving Americans who had moved into Kentucky. The goal of the petition was to force 
Virginia's legislators to face the unpalatable truth that their actions were no more 
justifiable than the British.53
The Virginia legislature responded to the petition by creating a district court for 
Kentucky in 1782. To the chagrin of Kentuckians, the new district court judges and staff 
were to be paid by a tax levied on suits brought before the court. For Kentucky residents, 
this arrangement amounted to double taxation by eastern legislators who did not want 
state resources to flow westward. Not only did Kentuckians have to pay Virginia taxes 
that subsidized other district courts, they had to support their own court directly. 
Moreover, Kentuckians feared that if the levies on suits did not generate enough revenue, 
prospective judges would be discouraged by the low salary, ultimately forcing the court to 
close.54
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The Virginia legislature further disaffected Kentucky residents by imposing a 
statewide semi-annual tax of five shillings per one hundred acres on land exceeding 
fourteen hundred acres.55 The legislature responded to complaints and amended the act to 
direct more of the revenue to Kentucky and expand the qualifications for exemption from 
the tax.56 However, the amended tax bill engendered even more heated protest despite its 
lenience, owing perhaps to more strict enforcement than of the initial levy.57 The new tax 
had the result of antagonizing two economically disparate elements in Kentucky: out-of- 
state speculators who were particularly subject to the tax, and residents who resented the 
treatment Kentucky received from the tidewater-dominated government.58
Legal access and even fair taxation are of small consequence when life and limb 
are threatened. The truce with the British after the battle of Yorktown did not bring peace 
to Kentucky. The threat of attack by Indian allies of the British lingered without relief.
In April 1784, Levi Todd informed the governor that while the British had concluded a 
peace, "our natural enemies have began the season with their accustomed fierceness and 
barbarity in...almost every part of the Kentucky Country."59
Added to the dread of Indian attack was Kentuckians’suspicion that Virginia’s 
policy was based on a determination to minimize expensive military expeditions. By 
Virginia law, no Kentucky militia officer could retaliate for an Indian attack on his own 
initiative.60 Kentuckians believed the Virginia state government had decided not to 
absorb the expense of aggressively defending its claim to Kentucky, forcing the settlers to 
desert their farms for the forts at the main settlements.61 Whether or not this perception 
was accurate, the Kentucky settlers were of the opinion that their only legal recourse
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against Indian attack under Virginia law was to "sitt still and tamely submit to their 
Cruelties."62
Imbued with the same understanding of the physical limitations of republican 
government as their eastern brethren, not to mention fear for their lives, many 
Kentuckians soon concluded that there was no way to extend Virginia government to 
their settlements. The state government’s actions did little to allay their fears. Between 
1780 and 1784 the Kentucky district sent at least four petitions to Congress and five to 
the Virginia legislature complaining about the land laws and the court taxes and asking to 
become a separate state. Finally, in November 1784, a district-wide convention, 
ostensibly called to discuss the Indian threat, became a forum for discussion of 
separation.63
A petition to the Virginia legislature from a subsequent convention in August 
1785 provides a typical argument for separation, emphasizing again the temporal 
limitations of a republican government. Virginia’s attempt to hold Kentucky, it declared, 
had produced "expanding and irremedial grievances," resulting from Kentucky’s 
"sequestered and remote situation from the seat of government with the intervention of a 
mountainous desert of two hundred miles, always dangerous and passable only at 
particular seasons." Kentucky’s situation thus precluded "every idea of a connection on 
republican principles." The only viable option as far as the memorialists were concerned 
was a connection to the "Federal Union" rather than to Virginia.64
The convention delegates might have anticipated resistance to separation, but by 
1785 most of the Virginia political establishment saw Kentucky’s independence as a
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foregone conclusion.65 Richard Henry Lee, who had earlier advocated the cession of the 
Northwest, asserted to Madison, "no good exception could be made to a separation."
With the cost of Indian defense clearly prominent in his thinking, Lee declared that for 
the foreseeable future, if not always, Kentucky would be a drain on state coffers rather 
than a producer of revenue. By being amenable to separation, he argued, the Virginia 
assembly would persuade Kentuckians to apply for separation through Virginia, thereby 
affirming the state’s sovereignty as well as providing an opportunity to negotiate 
favorable terms.66
Madison agreed with Lee that "it is the interest of the Country [Virginia] to 
embrace the first descent [sic] opportunity of parting with Kentucky." Madison’s 
reasoning, too, reflected the experience of the Northwest Cession negotiations. He noted 
that a separation affirming Virginia sovereignty would establish a useful precedent in 
future dealings with Congress. Significantly, however, Madison also recognized the issue 
affected the entire confederation because it granted a role for Congress in the separation.67 
Madison was comfortable making this assertion because Congress, by recognizing 
Virginia’s sovereignty as part of the Northwest Cession agreement, had proved that on 
such matters it could be trusted. A new notion of federal-state relations was emerging in 
Madison’s thinking, one that accepted the legitimacy, even the indispensability, of a 
vigorous central authority.
James Monroe placed a greater premium on the defense of Virginia’s sovereignty 
and opposed Kentucky statehood. Madison endeavored to convince him that separation 
was inevitable and that Virginia would do better to participate in the process and control
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its terms. Madison reported to Monroe that the Kentucky delegates to the Virginia 
legislature at the Fall 1785 session were instructed to propose a separation and 
conveyance of the district to Congress so that Kentucky could be admitted to the 
Confederation. Reflecting his experience with the Northwest Cession, Madison expected 
the proposal to pass easily and stressed that it would "set a useful example to other 
western settlements which may choose to be lopped off from other states." With the 
Northwest Cession a fact, Madison explained he did not want any contradictory 
precedents, such as an attempt by Kentucky to act directly through Congress. By using 
such visceral language to describe the actions of westerners, Madison stressed that 
frontier settlers’ desire, as he put it, to be "lopped off' might lead to alliance with Britain 
or Spain if they deemed it necessary to achieve their autonomy. If instead Virginia 
sponsored Kentucky's statehood, the General Assembly could avoid unwelcome 
precedents and create a mechanism to keep the growing western population tied to the 
eastern governments.68
At the fall 1785 session, the Virginia legislature followed Madison's logic in the 
terms it offered to sponsor separation. The new state would have to take on a proportion 
of the Old Dominion's debt, guarantee free navigation of the Mississippi River, and base 
private rights on Virginia law. To ensure the creation of a proper republican neighbor, 
Kentuckians were to elect delegates by county to a constitutional convention in 
September 1786, and if the convention accepted Virginia’s terms, and if Congress 
consented before June 1787, Virginia would surrender authority any time after September 
1, 1787. Most important, Kentucky was not to interfere with Virginia land warrants or
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with the disposition of undistributed lands that Virginia had already appropriated for 
military awards. The Virginia government sought to bestow upon Kentucky statehood 
(and all the costs of governance) while guaranteeing for itself lands that would no longer 
be within its borders.69
Kentuckians were hardly monolithic in their response to Virginia’s offer. 
"Partisans," who were supporters of the out-of-state land company interests, endorsed 
separation through Congress, but not on Virginia’s terms. Others critical of both 
Congress and Virginia called for immediate independence, while those whose land claims 
originated with Virginia supported the proposal. Nine conventions met before final 
approval of Virginia’s terms in July 1790. The Kentucky district at last became the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky on June 1, 1792.70
Early in 1784, the Spanish endeavored to discourage American western expansion 
by closing the Mississippi River to American traffic. Madison was exasperated by the 
foolishness of the act. He had every expectation the Spanish would ultimately suffer as a 
result of the policy, but feared that in the interim they would deprive America of an 
agrarian future. Madison explained to Jefferson that the bountiful lands to the west 
guaranteed for at least a generation that any American who so desired could become a 
landed farmer, ensuring what Madison would later call a "Republican Distribution of 
Citizens." The western lands thus precluded the concentration of "supernumerary hands" 
necessary for expansion o f domestic manufacture. A society o f farmers would rely for its 
finished or manufactured items on external sources, namely Spain and its European
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antagonists.71
Madison pointed out that without the Mississippi to ship produce, western lands 
were less attractive, and consequently the demand for eastern lands increased, 
overpopulation occurred and land prices became prohibitively high. The result would be 
the rise of the landless poor necessary for the development of domestic manufacture, and 
with Americans manufacturing their own goods, a decline in their need for European 
goods. Thus Spain’s foolhardiness in closing the Mississippi would cost it a valuable 
market for trade, and doom Americans to the same problems already associated with the 
manufacturing poor in European countries.72
Madison’s letter reveals a clear understanding of what would produce a viable 
agrarian economy. His assertion that westward migration would not occur without a 
route to markets presumed that settlers would be entrepreneurial. Madison did not view 
frontiersmen as desiring strict self-sufficiency, but seeking connections to markets. He 
anticipated a vigorous commerce with Europe — trade with which he was comfortable so 
long as land remained plentiful enough to attract those whose wealth came from trade to 
become landholders. Indeed, the craving for the finer things in life would encourage the 
industriousness among Virginians upon which republican behavior depended.
A dependable transportation network permitting the reliable exchange of goods 
was essential for the commercial development and population expansion which Madison 
and Jefferson considered fundamental to the creation of an agrarian republic in Virginia. 
Now that the Virginia government had divested the state of those regions beyond its 
capacity to administer, the creation of such a network for the remainder was feasible.
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss ion  of th e  copyrigh t ow ner.  F u r th e r  rep roduction  prohibited w ithout pe rm iss ion .
40
Virginia had become a manageable empire that could contemplate development of a 
communication network capable of extending the benefits of commerce across the state.73
Some Virginians even imagined that if their own transportation network was 
aggressively developed, it could render the Mississippi River irrelevant. Instead of 
flowing south to New Orleans, western produce would travel to eastern ports, from which 
European goods would travel back to the settlers. This perspective stood at the center of 
a heated dispute over the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty. Just two years after Madison denounced 
closing the Mississippi, he and other Virginians saw the treaty as an opportunity to 
expand traffic through Virginia. In August of 1785 Washington observed that the trade 
lost by the closing of the Mississippi River was less important than the trade of the Ohio 
Valley above the falls (the present site of Louisville) to the Atlantic ports. Washington 
asserted the flow of goods through Virginia rivers and ports was cheaper than through 
New Orleans. Washington’s indifference to the closing of the Mississippi was shared by 
Richard Henry Lee, Jefferson, Madison and probably a majority of eastern Virginians. 
Merchants and wheat farmers among this group were more than willing to sacrifice the 
Mississippi trade to ensure their wartime access to Spanish ports.74
Western settlers were not nearly so sanguine regarding Virginia’s internal 
improvements and strenuously opposed abandoning the Mississippi. In a November 1786 
petition to the House of Delegates, "the delegates from the Western Waters" stressed the 
prosperity and welfare of the inhabitants there depended on the Mississippi. They denied 
any other route was viable and insisted they had as much right to navigate the Mississippi 
as other Virginians to sail on the James or Potomac rivers. Clearly familiar with the
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priorities of eastern advocates of waterways improvement, they claimed never to have 
heard of a treaty "which shut the doors of commerce to one part of a community and 
deprived it of its natural rights for the benefit of the other." The petitioners equated 
ratification of the treaty with legislating away the right to jury trial.75
On the grounds of "equal rights" the House of Delegates adopted a resolution 
opposing the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty, noting "that the common right of navigating the river 
Mississippi...ought to be considered as the bountiful gift of nature to the United States" 
and that the sacrifice of the rights "of any one part to the supposed or real interest of 
another part" would be "a direct contravention of the end for which the federal 
government was instituted." Despite the resolution, Patrick Henry, who up to that time 
had advocated increasing the powers of Congress, was so enraged by the indifference of 
Washington and the Lees to western interests that he became a leader of those opposed to 
ratification of the federal Constitution.76
Although internal improvements could heat up regional antagonisms, advocates 
continued to believe that the rewards would transcend individual regions and bind 
Virginians together through the wealth in which they would all share. Jefferson observed 
that canoes and batteaux could pass easily from Westham just west of Richmond to 
within ten miles of the Blue Ridge, and that as much as one ton of freight had been 
carried over the mountain by water.77 He boasted that all Virginians had to do was make 
a few improvements to the river systems with which God had blessed them: "These 
works will spread the field of our commerce westwardly and southwardly beyond any 
thing ever yet done by man."78
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"...BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL INTEREST.”
Jefferson might have envisioned great results from waterways improvements, but 
there was little in Virginia’s past to indicate the plan would ever be realized. Virginia’s 
colonial and Revolutionary legislative record on river improvements reveals a string of 
well-intentioned though ultimately futile gestures. Either a lack of financial or labor 
resources, or both, doomed all but the most limited efforts. The initiatives of the 
Revolutionary era attempted to rectify flaws in colonial statutes, but were only marginally 
successful. Of those, the most successful provided for projects endeavoring not to extend 
the rivers’western reaches, but simply to clear tidewater navigation of obstacles.
The local orientation of Virginia’s pre-Revolutionary political culture explains 
much of the failure to complete river improvements. The colonial government deferred 
to county courts on most local matters, including internal improvements. For example, 
road construction and maintenance were traditionally the duty of county surveyors.1 
Waterways were tended in a similar fashion. The first recorded colonial law regarding 
river improvement in 1679 empowered counties to clear rivers of logs and trees.2 
Apparently this statute did not sufficiently ensure river navigation, for another statute 
passed the next year complained that "loggs, trees, roots of trees, and other rubbish hath 
occasioned and endangered the loss of several sloops, boats, tobaccoes, and 
merchandising goods, in carriage thereof to and from the ships." The county courts were 
ordered to appoint surveyors annually to clear the rivers. A fine of five hundred pounds
48
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of tobacco was levied for the deliberate felling of trees into the river for the purpose of 
creating calm areas, or traps, where fish would congregate, facilitating their capture in 
nets. The legislature thought this practice grievous enough to mandate a thousand pound 
fine for a second offense.3 A 1705 statute suggests pollution of the most extreme sort is 
hardly a modem invention. The law set a fine of ten English pounds for emptying ship 
ballast into the river or for casting corpses overboard. The law stipulated "that when any 
negro, or other person whatsoever" died aboard ship, the body must be buried ashore.4
As Virginia’s population expanded westward, the colonial government often 
designated rivers as borders of new counties, complicating the issue of responsibility for 
river clearance. A 1722 law clarified that all counties sharing a river must contribute to 
its maintenance. For the first time, the law authorized counties to impose a levy to pay 
workmen for river clearance. Overly aggressive fishermen continued to be a problem, for 
again river "hedges" were ordered destroyed. Violators were to be fined ten pounds of 
tobacco for every week the hedges remained intact.5
A 1745 statute suggests Virginians no longer perceived rivers as purely local 
conveniences, and began thinking of them instead as regional assets that required 
specialized treatment. The law specified the clearance of particular rivers instead of 
rivers in general. The law authorized the county courts of Henrico, Prince George, 
Amelia, Goochland, and Albemarle counties to clear the Appomattox and the James. The 
law also levied a tax in the aforementioned counties and made each responsible for 
collection of its proportion.6
Not surprisingly, taxes proved an unpopular method of financing river
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improvements, particularly since all county residents did not use the rivers equally. In 
1752, the burgesses adopted a new approach toward financing by focusing the cost on 
those most interested in the projects. A new law appointed trustees, rather than county 
surveyors, to manage the clearance of the Appomattox and Pamunkey rivers. The trustees 
had the authority to collect "subscriptions" in order to finance the cost of the 
improvement. These subscriptions were donations which carried absolutely no 
expectation of repayment. Everyone who would benefit from the project was expected to 
contribute, regardless of county of residency. The trustee/subscription approach 
superseded the supervisory authority of the county courts, who by this time had proved 
unreliable managers of river clearance.7 The burgesses passed similar legislation in 1765 
to benefit the James River, its northern branch (also known as the Fluvanna River) and 
the Chickahominy River.8
In 1769 George Washington embarked upon his first effort to secure legislative 
backing for improving the Potomac River. Washington’s interest in the western reaches 
o f the Potomac began in 1752 when, under the orders of Lieutenant Governor Robert 
Dinwiddie, he had marched to the Ohio River to warn the French against encroaching on 
the area that is now western Pennsylvania. So they could reach their objective, 
Washington ordered his troops to widen the Indian path known as Nemacolin’s Trail, 
which tracked a course roughly from Fort Cumberland to Fort Duquesne. In so doing he 
created the first military highway over the Alleghenies. In 1755, with the French and 
Indian war heating up, General Braddock ordered this same road widened to 
accommodate his force marching against the French at Fort Duquesne. It was known
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thereafter as Braddock’s Road.9 Such efforts to secure adequate supply lines for western 
campaigns impressed upon colonists the importance of establishing reliable transportation 
to the Blue Ridge and beyond.
The French and Indian War also demonstrated to Virginians the unique 
topographical advantages their colony offered and sparked a heightened interest in 
exploiting its rivers. The Potomac River, offered access to Braddock’s Road, and hence a 
route through the Alleghenies. In 1769 Washington and Richard Henry Lee drafted 
legislation to open and extend the navigation of the Potomac from Fort Cumberland (the 
terminus of the Cumberland Road) to the tidewater.10 Passed in 1772, the act called for a 
subscription as the means for raising capital. Unlike previous legislation, the subscribers 
were permitted to elect officers to manage the project. Further, the law prescribed a 
lottery, a familiar method of raising funds for such local endeavors as schools.
Subscribers were to receive ten lottery tickets for every one hundred British pounds 
invested.11 In order to soothe regional jealousies, the colonial government passed similar 
legislation for opening the falls of the James River, noting that many persons had already 
subscribed large sums of money for this purpose — no doubt a reference to the 1765 
James River law, from which no improvements resulted.12
In 1772 the colonial government first authorized the construction of an artificial 
canal for trade. To afford Williamsburg access to the tidewater rivers, the law provided 
for a canal connecting the James and York rivers through the city. The project, according 
to the act, "will be of great advantage to the said city, and to the trade carried on in the 
said rivers.”13 The canal, had it been built, would certainly have offered great
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convenience for Williamsburg residents but would probably have had little effect on 
overall river traffic.
With two efforts under British administration to clear the James River having 
failed, the General Assembly of the new state of Virginia took on the task with newfound 
vigor, for the hope of Virginia’s leaders to instill in western farmers the industrious, 
virtuous behavior required of the citizens in a republic depended upon a well-developed 
transportation network. In 1783 the General Assembly appointed trustees to oversee 
opening the river’s western extremities. This initiative was more ambitious than its 
predecessors in proposing to clear the James through the "South Mountain" near 
Buchanan and eventually provide river transportation into the Blue Ridge. The law 
initially called for clearing the river in Bedford "from the land of Nicholas Davies...to the 
mouth of the Cow Pasture River."14
While significant as an early attempt to improve the western reaches of Virginia's 
water transportation network, the 1783 law still provided financing through the 
conventional, pre-Revolutionary form of subscriptions. The law, however, projected a 
new relationship between those who depended on the river for their livelihood and those 
who financed its improvement. Instead of subscriptions amounting to donations for the 
public benefit, as before, the 1783 statute provided a mechanism for generating revenue 
to repay subscribers by requiring a fee from "every person who shall bring any hemp, 
tobacco, or flour, by water from either of the counties of Rockbridge, Botetourt, 
Montgomery, Washington or Greenbrier, through the Blue-Ridge."15 The trustees were to 
use the revenue from this toll to repay, with interest, those who subscribed to the project.
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The new law offered a profit motive for investing that was not tied to the 
parochial interests of those living near the river. While those who used the river were 
still expected to contribute to its development, the trustees now solicited investments 
from individuals who lived nowhere near the rivers, but who might recognize the 
potential of improved river transportation. This new financial incentive remained limited 
in scope, lacking an economic or social imperative that would connect river 
improvements to the fate of Virginia as a whole. That connection would be made most 
effectively by George Washington.
On September 1, 1784, George Washington embarked on a journey that took him 
from the comfortable surroundings of Mount Vemon to the extreme northwestern part of 
Virginia beyond the Allegheny Mountains.16 This was no easy trip. Washington spent 
six weeks almost constantly on horseback, traveling into what was still a dangerous 
frontier. He rode from Mount Vemon to Leesburg, through Snicker’s Gap and on to 
Cumberland, Maryland. He crossed the Youghiogheny River and traveled up to 
Perryopolis and northwest to Canonsburg. He rode south to Morgantown, then turned 
southeast to Fort Pendleton, and down to the Rockingham County court house. 
Washington then made his way east to the Culpeper court house and finally back to 
Mount Vemon. Washington had originally intended to travel even farther west to the 
Great Kanawha River, but reports o f Indian attacks discouraged this plan.17
Ostensibly, Washington made this tour to inspect the management of his 
considerable land holdings in the area.18 But one could certainly understand a man of
R e p ro d u c e d  with pe rm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner .  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited w ithout perm iss ion .
5 4
Washington’s stature delegating this arduous and hazardous mission to a subordinate. 
Why did Washington insist on personally leading the expedition? The general was not 
just interested in checking up on tenants and affirming land titles. He was applying his 
experience as a licensed surveyor and an experienced military trailblazer to a mission he 
considered of the greatest importance — reconnoitering the best means of connecting the 
Potomac to the Ohio River.19 Since he considered the future of Virginia tied to the 
successful identification of a route to the West, it is not surprising that Washington 
trusted no one else with the mission.
Washington had already embraced the notion that commercial development was 
necessary for Virginia's survival, and he long endorsed river improvements as a tool to 
this end, as witnessed by his support of the 1772 legislation to enhance the James and 
Potomac rivers.20 Correspondence from Jefferson just a few months before the trip 
indicates that the two had been discussing the merits of easier access to the interior. 
Washington was disappointed that the recent agreement in which Virginia accepted a new 
northern boundary relinquished a block of territory containing Pittsburgh and a large 
portion of Braddock's Road to Pennsylvania. Clearly the General had anticipated using 
this route to connect the Potomac to the Ohio. Jefferson did his best to put the agreement 
in a positive light:
...It [the new boundary] will preserve to us all the upper parts of the Yohogany & 
Cheat-rivers within which much will be done to open these which are the true 
doors to the Western commerce...Nature then has declared in favor of the 
Potowmac and thro' that channel offers to pour into our lap the whole commerce 
of the Western World.21
Jefferson had asked Washington to exert his political influence in order to secure
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a tax levy for opening the navigation of the upper branches of the Ohio and Potomac. But 
Washington emerged from the wilderness with a vision of Virginia far more expansive 
and dramatic than Jefferson’s tax scheme. As soon as Washington returned from his 
cartographic exploration, he dashed off a long letter to Governor Benjamin Harrison, in 
which he surveyed Virginia’s future. Washington outlined a new relationship between 
private citizens, the state government, and the regions of the state that would sustain a 
new program of internal improvements. That letter marks the beginning of the modem 
era of internal improvements in Virginia.
Washington's idea of a river route to the West was hardly new. As early as 1716, 
a member of Governor Spotswood's expedition across the Blue Ridge, the Reverend 
James Maury, had observed how close the sources of eastward and westward flowing 
streams, such as the James and Greenbrier rivers, were to each other and suggested it 
should be possible to connect them. In 1768, Colonel William Byrd HI hawked lots in the 
then frontier settlement of Richmond by predicting that with removal of obstructions 
from the James and its rapids at Richmond navigation would soon be "both safe and easy 
for upwards of two hundred miles above the said Falls and a communication opened to 
the western frontier...." The route would bring "the immense treasures of that valuable 
country" right into the laps of those shrewd enough to buy Byrd's Richmond lots.22 Byrd 
was correct in his prediction about improvements to the river and their effect on 
Richmond, but not about the timing. He was off by about forty years.
Washington's proposals were not the result o f the kind of theoretical cerebrations 
that preoccupied Jefferson and other political philosophers who called Virginia home.
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Instead, the letter to Harrison reveals Washington to have been one of the great applied 
political scientists of his day. Washington wanted the navigation of Virginia’s main rivers 
to be extended westward to the Ohio River. Like Jefferson and Madison, Washington 
believed the combination of easy access to western lands and increased domestic 
commerce would provide the state with economic security and at the same time offset the 
undesirable consequences of wealth that social critics warned against. He advocated a 
more intimate economic relationship between private citizens and the state government, 
in which the state would not only authorize projects, but underwrite them as well. Not 
trusting his fellow Virginians to voluntarily subscribe to river improvement, Washington 
outlined a plan for a private, for-profit company, in which the state would be a 
shareholder.
Washington’s letter to Harrison, who lived on the James, linked that river to the 
Potomac as offering the shortest and most expeditious routes to the "extensive country 
back of us."23 If Harrison convinced the General Assembly to invest in the improvement 
of these waterways, Washington smoothly suggested, the achievement would "mark your 
administration as an important era in the annals of this country.24 The task of selling the 
scheme should not be difficult, Washington impressed upon Harrison, for Virginia was 
clearly the most centrally located state in the Confederation and the best situated to attract 
western trade. "All the trade of the northwestern parts of the united territory must pass," 
he declared, and the James and Potomac rivers were 168 miles nearer to Detroit than the 
tidewater o f the St. Lawrence, and 176 miles closer than the Hudson at Albany. 
Pennsylvanians might be contemplating a route westward via a canal connecting the
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Schuykill to the Susquehanna, but Washington dismissed the project, for he had 
personally observed too many obstructions on the Susquehanna.25
Despite what to Washington was abundant evidence of Virginia’s geographic 
advantage, he knew the state’s political climate well enough to recognize potential 
objections to his vision. Washington candidly surveyed the most prominent objections in 
his letter and set out to refute them. He noted that regional rivalries and "unfortunate 
jealousy," not felled trees, would be the greatest obstacle to river improvements. 
Washington shrewdly anticipated the beggar-thy-neighbor rivalry between the northern 
and central parts o f the state and opted to promote the James River, the main waterway 
for central and southern Virginia, along with the Potomac River, which was his genuine 
passion. Washington turned the sectionalism for which Virginia was known to his 
advantage by inducing competition between major parts of the state for river 
improvements.26
Having dispensed with what he expected to be the primary obstacle, regional 
rivalries, Washington took on other possible criticisms. For those who argued that 
Virginians were already heavily enough taxed, Washington stated in the letter that he 
refused to honor their complaints with a direct response as they demonstrated a short­
sightedness he could not abide.27 Instead he stressed throughout the letter the long-term 
economic, political and strategic value of the projects.
Washington also recognized that some would wonder whether Virginians 
possessed "a sufficient spirit of commerce" to undertake such a plan of river 
improvements, and exploit the opportunities it would provide. After all, the prominence
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of Virginia’s planter class was based upon the perception they did not have to exert 
themselves to create the wealth which subsidized their well-heeled lifestyle. An observer 
of the day noted: “If a [man]...has Money, Negroes and Land enough he is a compleat 
Gentleman.” The landed gentry did not work for a living, but those involved in overseas 
commerce were designated “merchants,” a respectable title but hardly genteel. 
Washington conceded that Virginia's "commercial spirit" was not beyond question, but 
blurred the distinction between merchant and the landed gentry. He noted that planters 
like himself had operated a vast trans-Atlantic trading network for years, holding their 
own with merchants. How could anyone assume they would not recognize a good deal, 
like Washington’s plan for river improvements, when they saw one?28
Washington also raised the specter of competition from other states. As 
previously mentioned, he considered a Pennsylvania waterway to be most difficult, if not 
impossible, because of obstructions in the Susquehanna. He would not rule it out 
entirely, however, because Pennsylvanians being "possessed of the spirit of commerce ... 
may achieve almost anything." And, as soon as the British removed their northwestern 
garrisons, Washington anticipated the same effort by New Yorkers. On the likelihood of 
their success, Washington declared that "no person who knows the temper, genius, and 
policy of those people as well as I do, can harbor the smallest doubt."29
Washington insisted waterways improvements would inspire in Virginians the 
necessary “commercial spirit” to compete with other states. Through the waterways 
would flow tremendous wealth, which would find its way to all parts of the state. 
Washington acknowledged Virginians’ knee-jerk fear of the consequences of commerce,
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so graphically demonstrated in London by the lavish lifestyle of the factory owner and the 
oppression of the factory worker. Nevertheless, he argued, failure to engage in commerce 
would "submit to the evils arising therefrom, without receiving its benefits." If other 
states controlled the flow of goods, Virginians would face the temptation of readily 
available luxuries, but without the industry and frugality fostered by domestic trade to 
temper their proclivities. Washington conceded that, if all states refrained completely 
from trade, and every man was either a fanner or craftsman, Virginia could do well. But 
that possibility was fantastic; trade and the commercial spirit were here to stay. Virginia’s 
only hope for avoiding the social debilitations of commerce was to embrace the 
commercial spirit wholeheartedly. "Such stimulus should be employed as will force this 
spirit, by showing to our countrymen the superior advantages we possess beyond others, 
and the importance of being upon a footing with our neighbors," preferably by creating 
an effective domestic trade network.30
Realizing that an argument for river improvements based only on commercial 
theories would not be entirely persuasive, Washington introduced several pragmatic 
political considerations. In directing the "stimulus" toward the western waters, 
Washington was not entirely abandoning the conventional trans-Atlantic definition of 
"commerce." Trans-continental trade would be a means to expand trans-Atlantic 
commerce, as well as an end in itself. Washington anticipated, for example, entering "the 
fur and peltry trade" of the Great Lakes area to Europe, for once the British withdrew 
from the northern forts, he expected the region to grow more rapidly than anyone could 
possibly imagine.31 With the state in a post-war depression, predictions of prosperity fell
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on willing ears in the General Assembly. A port such as Alexandria, for instance, which
had lost foreign trade as a result of independence, could see recouping its losses by
broadening its commercial focus to include the West.32
Washington also warned that the Spanish and British were up to no good in the
West, making overtures of trade and alliances to the settlers. With westerners, in
Washington's opinion, on a pivot where "the touch of a feather" would turn them against
the Confederation, Washington called for a program
"to apply the cement of interest to bind all parts of the Union together by 
indissoluble bonds, especially that part of it, which lies immediately west of us, 
with the middle States."33
Virginians must not repeat the error of the Spanish who turned away American trade on
the Mississippi River.34 Westerners would leap at the opportunity to conduct trade
through the Confederation, provided Virginia acted wisely toward them. Given an
opportunity to profit from trade, western settlers also would manifest all the positive
features of commerce, including hard work, frugality, and a sense of civic responsibility.
Having demonstrated to his satisfaction the value of connecting the eastern and
western waters, Washington made his pitch to Governor Harrison: the state should
commission surveyors to map the Potomac and James rivers from the tidewater to their
respective sources, making note of navigation, the expense of removing obstructions, and
the nearest and best portages to rivers which flow to the Ohio. Of course, if a majority of
legislators concluded that the project was of vital importance to the state, the
improvements could begin without waiting for the results of the survey.35 Wanting state
funds, Washington proposed incorporation of a private company for each river, financed
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by shareholding "adventurers" who would recoup their investment through tolls. 
Washington could not help but believe these companies would be profitable and that 
investors would flock to such a sure thing. He observed the Potomac River company 
would command the flow of trade from Fort Pitt to Alexandria, redirecting it from the 
present overland terminus, Philadelphia.
Washington expected that Pennsylvania might try to prevent diversion of the 
present trade route, but only at great risk to the state’s unity. Virginia’s improvements 
would be a boon to western Pennsylvania settlers, decreasing the cost and accelerating the 
transport of their goods, which would pass through Alexandria instead of Philadelphia. 
Washington believed that the settlers might even secede if the Pennsylvania government 
attempted to deprive them of the advantage. The commercial impulse of Pennsylvania’s 
western settlers would override the economic interests of its largest city.
A major objection to the proposal that many would find compelling, Washington 
conceded, was the unprecedented level of state government participation required. 
Naysayers would claim "that we are in fact doing for others, what they ought to do for 
themselves."36 Washington recognized the extent of state participation he proposed 
contravened Virginia’s tradition of decentralized, locally based government, but he also 
knew from personal experience the record of failure of counties and public trustees at 
raising funds and commanding sufficient labor to complete projects. He had personally 
subscribed £500 (Virginia currency) to John Ballendine's abortive effort to clear the 
Potomac in the 1770s, but the outbreak of the Revolution posed too great a distraction for 
many who might otherwise have supported Ballendine's venture.37 Washington's
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investment was lost. In November 1784, he expressed his frustration to Madison: "[FJt 
should seem to me, that if the public cannot take it [Potomac navigation] up with 
sufficient funds, and without those delays which might be involved by a limping conduct 
it had better be placed in the hands of a corporate company."38 In his letter to Harrison, 
Washington added another incentive —  profit, should the General Assembly permit 
incorporation of privately managed joint-stock companies.
With this proposal, Washington tapped into the mercantilist spirit reemerging 
among his fellow Virginians. The Revolution had been, in part, a rejection of the British 
mercantile system, which the colonists had learned from the Country opposition was 
corrupt, arbitrary and contrary to their own interests. Once independent, the Virginia 
government became squeamish about intruding into the operation of the economy.
During the Revolutionary War, for example, the General Assembly rejected petitions 
soliciting state investment in private linen and woolen and iron factories, despite the 
strategic importance of those products.39 In place of mercantilism, Americans intended to 
develop an economy that employed commerce to cultivate republican virtue.40
However, after the war, the state government faced a host of problems that forced 
a reevaluation of its anti-mercantilist posture. Virginians remained heavily indebted to 
British trading houses, which also continued to dominate Virginia's tobacco market, 
threatening to reduce the state to the economic peonage it suffered before independence. 
Moreover, the American states faced an economic depression after the war that demanded 
a response from the Virginia government beyond asserting faith in the virtue of the 
citizenry. In formulating a plan of action, Virginians who had declared political
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independence from Britain could not as easily "dissolve the accumulated habits and 
patterns of one hundred fifty years."41 Virginia’s leaders became more willing to steer a 
course between the heavy-handed government control associated with mercantilism and a 
complete separation of the public and private spheres.42 Washington effectively played 
on this impulse in advocating that joint-stock companies for river improvement be given 
monopolies over the collection of tolls on the rivers.
James Madison was another who by 1784 concluded the state had to act 
aggressively with regard to the West. In March 1784 Madison was apprehensive when 
approached by Jefferson to support the extension of the Potomac to the Ohio River. 
Madison doubted the state could support the project because the "commercial genius" of 
Virginia was "too much in its infancy," and he questioned whether Virginia could rival 
Pennsylvania for the commerce of the region.43 Yet a few months later Madison had 
become Washington’s champion in the General Assembly and an ardent advocate of such 
improvements. He strenuously refuted arguments that western development, facilitated 
by improved river transportation, would occur at the expense of the eastern half of the 
state. In a letter dated August 20 to Jefferson, Madison rejected eastern fears of 
depopulation and deflated land values because their argument did not take into account 
the economic growth that would follow geographic expansion. The march of commercial 
agriculture into the West, he declared, would result in a reciprocal population explosion 
in the East.44 Surely these were not the observations of a man who still thought of his 
fellow Virginians as deficient in the commercial impulses necessary to propel robust
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economic growth.
The evolution in Madison’s understanding of the intersection of commerce and 
internal improvements culminated in his drafting a legislative resolution, as Washington 
had recommended, for a "survey of the rivers James and Potomac to their several 
sources...and how far and for what distance the land carriage may be reduced to, between 
the said rivers and the western waters."45 Madison further reflected Washington’s 
thinking by reporting the general suspicion that the Spanish were sponsoring Indian 
attacks along the Ohio River. Surveys of the Potomac and James would provide vital 
information for the state’s defense against Spain and yield intelligence on Indian activity 
as well.46 The General Assembly approved the resolution.
The next order of business for the legislature was to create the specific 
mechanisms for improving river transportation. In the case of the Potomac, the 
cooperation of Maryland was essential since in 1776 the Virginia General Assembly had 
carelessly recognized that state’s jurisdiction over the Potomac, reserving for itself only 
the right to free navigation.47 Virginians along the Potomac certainly wanted cooperation 
on the venture, as did western Marylanders who had grown politically powerful in the 
twelve years subsequent to the last project. Both groups saw a water route to the 
tidewater port of George Town as a counter to the monopoly Baltimore merchants held 
over the land route.48
A petition from Maryland and Virginia citizens requested the Virginia General 
Assembly to create a company for clearing the Potomac. The petition, like the earlier 
letter from Washington, noted "one material advantage to be derived to the two
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states...will consist in the progress and facility it will afford towards a commercial 
intercourse with the western country." The petitioners warned that any initiative taken 
without being coordinated with Maryland would result in different laws "and [be] 
productive of much delay."49 At Washington’s urging, the two states sent representatives 
to a conference in Annapolis in December 1784 to iron out the differences in the 
legislation of the two states for improving the Potomac. Horatio Gates, Thomas 
Blackbume and Washington himself were to represent Virginia. Blackbume did not 
attend, but ten individuals represented Maryland at the meeting, over which Washington 
presided. The conferees affirmed the importance of establishing a company for 
improving the river and called upon each state to subscribe shares as a testament of its 
confidence in the project. Such commitment would encourage private investment in the 
venture, and serve as "substantial proof to our brethren of the Western Territory, o f our 
disposition to connect ourselves with them by the strongest bonds of friendship and 
mutual interest."50 However, friendship and mutual interest were not the only impulses at 
work within Virginia.
The legislative representatives of the northern, central and southern sections of the 
state aggressively pursued their respective commercial interests. Lacking a central port, 
Virginia possessed several competing market centers along the fall line. Georgetown and 
Alexandria served the Potomac Valley and northern Virginia; Richmond and Petersburg 
controlled the trade of the central part of the state; and Norfolk, the largest port, and 
Portsmouth provided markets for southwestern Virginia and the northern parts of North 
Carolina.51 The representatives presumed any improvement to waterways in other sections
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occurred at the expense their own entrepots. Washington was acutely sensitive to these 
sectional jealousies, recommending in his letter to Harrison that the General Assembly 
create companies for both the Potomac and James Rivers.52
While negotiations with Maryland over the Potomac River proceeded, James 
Madison, Wilson Cary Nicholas, and Benjamin Harrison, among others, began to draft 
similar legislation for the James. On January 5, 1785 the General Assembly passed laws 
creating the Potowmack Company and the James River Company. The laws were like no 
previous river improvement legislation. The General Assembly exercised its authority to 
create for the first time joint stock companies for the purpose of expanding and 
maintaining river clearance, putting responsibility for the rivers into the hands of 
investors across the state, and in the case of the Potowmack Company, across two states. 
The companies maintained complete control over the parts of the rivers they improved. 
They were free from any fiscal control the counties might exert, for the laws exempted all 
land and property owned by the companies from taxes.53 Even physically, the law 
removed the rivers from the jurisdiction o f the counties, declaring the improved parts of 
the rivers to be "a public highway, free for the transportation of all goods, commodities, 
or produce whatsoever, on payment of the tolls imposed by this act...."54
Both laws open with statements about the reasons for incorporation: the 
Potowmack Company to extend the navigation of the river "from the tidewater to the 
highest place practicable on the North branch," and the James River Company to clear the 
James "from the tidewater to the highest parts practicable on the main branch."55 When 
clearing the river proved more difficult than anticipated, the James River Company
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exploited this vague language to resist making improvements west of the piedmont or 
east into the tidewater.
The Potowmack Company could solicit subscriptions for a maximum of 500 
shares, valued at $444 4/9 each, with a total potential capitalization of $222,222 2/9. 
Since clearing the James was not anticipated to be as difficult as the Potomac, the James 
River Company was authorized to seek a total of $100,000, divided into 500 shares of 
$200 each.56 The charters empowered the shareholders of each company to elect a 
president and four directors, who had complete authority to carry on the company’s 
business, including hiring staff and workers, and contracting with individuals to cut 
canals, erect locks or perform any other works the presidents and directors saw fit.57 The 
managers could also request further investments by the shareholders if the initial 
capitalization proved inadequate. If shareholders failed to keep their financial 
commitments, the managers could seize the shares and resell them.58
Of course, what compelled potential investors to overlook the risks associated 
with the venture was the promise of healthy returns from the tolls the companies were 
empowered to collect. Both laws provided a table setting the exact rates.59 The 
Potowmack Company was authorized to collect tolls at the mouth of the South Branch of 
the Potomac, at Payne’s Falls, and at the Great Falls. The James River Company could 
collect a toll at whatever spot it deemed most convenient between Westham and the 
tidewater.60
The companies were not able to start immediately extorting tolls from passers-by 
on the rivers. The laws tied the collection of tolls to the extent which the companies
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improved the rivers. In order to collect the full amount, the Potowmack Company had to 
improve the river to the mouth of the South Branch, where a road was to be built to the 
Cheat River. If the company cleared only as far as Fort Cumberland, it could collect two- 
thirds o f the designated tolls. If within three years the company failed to clear the river 
between the Great Falls and Fort Cumberland, it could not collect tolls on that part of the 
river. If it failed to provide navigation from the tidewater to the Great Falls within ten 
years, the company would lose its charter.61 The James River Company had to fulfill its 
statutory obligations within ten years as well. If the company managed to open 
navigation from Westham through the falls to the tidewater, even if it had not yet cleared 
the river above Lynch’s Ferry, the law permitted it to collect tolls until the ten-year 
deadline.62
Considering the cautious language regarding the extent of required improvements 
and the geographic targets in the timetables for collecting tolls, the General Assembly 
clearly did not expect the companies to realize the grand designs Washington laid out in 
his letter to Harrison. The charters did not require the companies to provide access to the 
Ohio River, but only to pierce the barrier of the Blue Ridge (even that goal would be 
disputed). While an unbroken route from the upper piedmont to the tidewater would 
certainly produce dramatic effects in Virginia, it was far short of tapping into the wealth 
of "the extensive country back of us" to which Washington referred. The companies were 
founded upon a more limited vision which they sought to further narrow as construction 
proved harder than anticipated and maintenance so expensive as to cut into potential
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profits.
Following Washington’s prescription, the General Assembly directly subsidized 
these projects by committing the state to buy fifty shares of the Potowmack Company and 
one hundred of the James River Company.63 Interestingly, there is no evidence of 
opposition to this exercise of power, indicating the state’s actions were not construed as 
particularly illicit. Perhaps that is because in creating new mechanisms for river 
improvement, Virginia’s leaders relied on old models with which they had become 
familiar as subjects of the British Empire. Not that they did not approach with suspicion 
joint stock companies, and government investment in them. After all, the Country 
Opposition in England had deplored the arrangement as a corrupting connection between 
the English government and the new economic order. For the American colonists this 
commentary was particularly relevant for the bribes distributed by the companies 
expedited the tariffs that maintained artificially high prices for the goods the colonists 
imported and low prices for the produce they exported.64
Virginians took the joint stock company, the tool of British mercantilism, and 
domesticated it. The river improvement companies were not chartered solely to benefit a 
privileged group of shareholders. Instead, the companies ensured sufficient resources 
would be marshaled for projects of broad public benefit. Of course, shareholders 
expected a return on their investments. But the profitability of the Potowmack Company 
and the James River Company was not dependent on the restriction and control of 
commerce, but rather on its expansion. The greater the traffic on the rivers, the more 
money the companies would generate in tolls. By improving navigation the companies
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would remove impediments to trade, rather than impose them, and by doing so, give more 
Virginians access to the wealth available to those participating in trans-Atlantic 
commerce.65
Virginia’s leaders also adopted to their own ends the British model for 
distributing political authority with which they had become familiar as British subjects. 
Before the constitutional crisis of the 1760s and 1770s, the British Empire had operated 
o n a d e  facto principle of federalism, with the colonial governments handling domestic 
affairs and London attending to continental and external matters.66 Similarly, in Virginia 
in the 1780s the county courts held virtually all responsibility for local matters, while 
Richmond assumed control of regional projects with a statewide impact, such as the river 
improvements. Virginians had extensive experience with two different spheres of 
authority operating within the same government, and, when confronted with the realities 
of independence and the need for internal improvements, fell back on the system with 
which they had the experience. Inasmuch as the river improvements would benefit a 
region and not a particular county, they fell under the purview of the state government.
Recognizing the advantages the James River and Potowmack companies extended 
to northern and central Virginia, representatives for the southern part of the state were 
determined that it would not be denied the benefits of improved waterways. The General 
Assembly received numerous petitions for improving the Appomattox. No less a figure 
than Patrick Henry was a forceful advocate for improvements in the region. In 1783 he 
introduced the first legislation calling for a Dismal Swamp canal, and also presented bills
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for improving the Dan River and the Virginia branches of the Roanoke.67 Regional 
allegiances in the 1780s seem to supersede ideological convictions.
Supporters and opponents of the federal Constitution and a strong national 
government both endorsed state participation in the improvement of their locale’s 
waterways. Washington, an ardent Federalist, and Patrick Henry, the prototypical Anti- 
federalist, were the driving forces behind the internal improvement projects that 
benefitted their respective regions. This consensus suggests the state government, acting 
as the central authority, was not threatening to individuals of Henry’s ideological 
temperament -- even when it exercised power in a manner they would have strenuously 
opposed if assigned to the federal government.
In the southeastern comer of Virginia the huge wetlands and forest area known as 
the Dismal Swamp was capable of evoking powerful, though radically different, 
sentiments. Colonel William Byrd II had characterized the air as "noisome exhalations" 
and the swamp itself as a "vast body of dirt and nastiness." George Washington, on the 
other hand, called the swamp a "glorious paradise." Of course, Washington's point-of- 
view was heavily influenced by his heavy investment in the swamp.68 A trip to the area in 
May 1763 convinced Washington to join with five associates to form the Dismal Swamp 
Company to drain the swamp for better access to the lumber that grew there plentifully. 
The company, with Washington as manager, acquired 40,000 acres. He visited the 
swamp at least six other times in the 1760s in this capacity.69
As the Dismal Swamp Company and other property owners began to exploit the
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resources of the region bordering North Carolina, they found Norfolk to be far less 
accessible than its proximity would suggest, a frustrating discovery because they could 
not have asked for a better port than Norfolk. By the time of the Revolution it was 
Virginia’s most important port, serving as the headquarters for the most successful 
Scottish tobacco firms. The Inspector General of Royal Customs estimated that nineteen- 
twentieths of all durable goods imported in the James River Valley were landed at 
Norfolk.70 But the swamp proved a considerable obstacle for both its own inhabitants 
and northeastern North Carolina farmers, who since early in the eighteenth century had 
considered Norfolk their principal port. Only two roads connected the swamp and North 
Carolina to Norfolk. The roads began in Edenton, North Carolina, skirted either side of 
the swamp, and ended near Norfolk at Great Bridge.71
With the burning of Norfolk during the Revolution in the first week of 1776, all 
shipping in the Elizabeth River was trapped, graphically demonstrating the need for an 
alternative water route to Norfolk. A "back door" to the port would increase access and 
render Norfolk less vulnerable to hostile navies.72 Within a few years of the fire, the port 
of Norfolk had been rebuilt, but in that time Richmond had also improved its port 
facilities and with its proximity to the growing piedmont region was emerging as a potent 
threat to Norfolk’s commercial prominence. The effort to improve transportation through 
the swamp took on new importance, both to expand the North Carolina economy and 
secure Norfolk’s commercial status.73
Efforts to realize Patrick Henry's dream of a canal through the Dismal Swamp 
raised internal improvement to a new level. The purpose was not merely to facilitate
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navigation on an already-existing river, but to surpass nature through the construction of 
an artificial waterway. Virginians had little experience with canals, especially those 
requiring locks to pass through several elevations. To undertake such a project in an area 
as poorly understood geographically and generally forbidding as the Great Dismal Swamp 
suggests the confidence (or hubris) with which Virginia legislators of the 1780s 
approached the question of internal improvements.
Initial legislation, passed at the October 1783 session of the General Assembly, 
provided for construction of a canal east of the swamp, from the western branch of the 
Elizabeth River to the North River. The law appointed trustees authorized to contract for 
construction of the canal and to claim by eminent domain land needed for the canal. The 
trustees also possessed the authority to charge a toll, but with a limit clearly intended to 
discourage profiteering — annual revenues from the tolls could not exceed ten percent of 
the total annual expenditure on the canal. The law also prohibited construction of any 
other canal or aqueduct in Norfolk and Princess Anne counties.74
The project, however, was shelved in January 1786, after commissioners 
appointed by the General Assembly to survey a second canal recommended a new, more 
easterly route. The commissioners reported the canal should be dug from the Elizabeth 
River south to "Drummond's Pond" in the middle of the swamp. The canal would emerge 
on the other side of the pond and head southeast to the Pasquotank River in North 
Carolina. The commissioners' conclusions not only redirected the course of the canal; 
they reoriented the financing and management of the project to reflect the innovations 
incorporated into the previous river improvement company legislation. The report
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expresses confidence that the canal would be built with funds raised from private 
subscriptions, so long as the investors are authorized to collect tolls "on terms as nearly 
circumstances will permit to those prescribed by the laws of this State for opening and 
expanding the James and Potomac Rivers."75
As with the Potomac River, the plans to build a Dismal Canal depended upon the 
assent of another state, in this case. North Carolina. Despite the survey commissioner’s 
assertion that the canal "would promote an intercourse...equally advantageous to the 
people of each state," the approval of the North Carolina government could not be taken 
for granted.76 North Carolinians had been suspicious of Virginians’ motives in the region 
since at least the formation of the Dismal Swamp Land Company. In 1763, Samuel 
Johnston of North Carolina reported to Thomas Barker that Virginians were under the 
impression the swamp could be drained at little expense, rendering the land very valuable. 
Johnston recommended North Carolinians acquire as much swamp land as possible, in 
order to keep Washington and his partners from exclusively exploiting the swamp. North 
Carolinians should buy up the land, Johnston advised, "so as to render it of little value to 
them unless they took us in as part of the company: if they did not, we should reap the 
benefit of their labour."77 When the canal itself was under consideration, Washington 
reported to Jefferson that North Carolinians were "luke warm" to the idea, because it 
would direct North Carolina goods to Virginia for marketing at the expense of Carolina 
coastal towns.78
These suspicions were formally put to rest by a compact signed by representatives 
of both states. The terms suggest the extent to which representatives suspected each other
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of seeking an economic advantage for their state. The agreement identified major 
waterways to which both states would have free and unrestricted use. Virginia agreed to 
open the Elizabeth River, Hampton Roads, the Chesapeake Bay and that part of the 
Roanoke River in the state, while North Carolina committed to free passage on its portion 
of the Roanoke, Meherrin, Nottoway, Chowan and Pasquotank rivers, as well as 
Albemarle Bay. The compact also prohibited either state from levying duties on goods 
transported through the anticipated canal. In addition, the inspection stations of both 
states would be available, for the cost of labor only, to shippers from either state. This 
last provision was intended to prohibit either state from imposing unofficial duties in the 
form of high inspection fees on shippers whose goods might be damaged in transit (a 
frequent occurrence) and in need of reinspection.79
Having hammered out a modus vivendi with North Carolina, the Virginia General 
Assembly passed legislation creating the Dismal Swamp Canal Company that closely 
resembled the previous river company statutes. Interestingly, all three laws use the term 
"canal," whether to refer to improvement of a river or construction of an artificial 
waterway. In blurring the distinction between an altered natural river and an entirely 
artificial canal, Virginians manifested a will to take control of their physical environment, 
to point the "finger of heaven" in the direction they, mortal men, thought best.
The law incorporating the Dismal Swamp Canal Company permitted a 
capitalization of 320 shares at $250 each, for a total of $80,000. As with the James River 
and Potomac companies, a president and board of directors bore the authority to make all 
management decisions and enter contracts for construction and labor. They also had the
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right to seek land condemnation through a method originally defined in the Potowmack 
Company statute, the valuation to be established by a local jury convened for that 
purpose.
Shareholders accepted responsibility for all future expenses authorized by the 
board of directors, but, like shareholders of the river companies, stood to reap any profits 
from the tolls. The Dismal Swamp Canal Company differed from the James River and 
Potomac companies in that it was authorized to collect tolls for the use of causeways 
running alongside the canal. Anticipating that water level in the artificial canal might be 
a problem, the law allowed property owners adjacent to the canal to dig "cross ditches" to 
facilitate the drainage of swamp water into the canal, so long as the company built 
adequate bridges over the ditches for the causeway.
In return for the right to collect tolls, the law required the managers of the 
company to construct a canal accommodating boats drawing three feet of water year 
round, from Deep Creek of the Elizabeth River to the highest practical point of navigation 
on the Pasquotank River. The canal itself had to be thirty-two feet wide and eight feet 
deep below ground level. Where locks were necessary, the law required them to be 
ninety feet long, thirty-two feet wide, and capable of handling craft drawing four feet of 
water. The law also set a twenty-foot width for the causeway along the canal. The 
company had one year to begin the work, and ten years to finish, or forfeit its charter and 
along with it the right to charge tolls.80
The laws creating the James River, Potomac, and Dismal Swamp Canal
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companies provide clear starting points for reviewing the post-Revolutionary efforts to 
improve or create the waterways with which they were associated. The story of the 
improvement of the Appomattox River does not offer as clear a beginning since 
subsequent legislation considerably revised the initial statute which provided for clearing 
the Appomattox River. But as with the other improvement initiatives, regional interests 
played a major role. Representatives from Petersburg sought to secure for their port the 
hinterlands of the Roanoke River system — the Appomattox could provide the access 
they required.81
The 1787 legislation providing for the clearance of the Appomattox River bore 
greater resemblance to pre-Revolutionary initiatives than to the laws creating the James 
River, Potowmack and Dismal Swamp Canal companies, particularly by not establishing 
a joint-stock company. Instead, the law appointed trustees to solicit subscriptions, not 
sell shares, for the cost of clearing the river from Bannister’s Mill above Petersburg to a 
point as far upriver as was practical.82 The trustees were permitted to levy tolls not to 
exceed those of the Potowmack Company. Rather than setting depth standards, the 1787 
law required that the river be cleared "to have sufficient depth and width of water to 
navigate boats, batteaux, or canoes, capable of carrying six hogsheads of tobacco."83 In 
addition, while not permitting the sale of shares, the law directed the trustees to distribute 
any profits from the tolls to subscribers in proportion to their contribution. The law also 
did not provide for state investment in the project.84
Incorporation came with a 1788 law which included the original obligation of the 
trustees to improve navigation above the fall line and added the requirement that the new
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company provide a channel for ocean-going vessels from the mouth of the Appomattox 
on the James to Petersburg. The 1788 law capitalized the Appomattox Company at 
£10,000, distributed in two hundred shares at fifty pounds each. The law provided that 
the company was to construct a channel navigable by ships with a draft of twelve feet; in 
return the company was permitted to charge tolls on all ships over five feet in draft. The 
company had two years to begin the project and seven years to complete it, or lose its 
charter.85
The incorporation of the Appomattox Company completed the quartet of 
improvement companies created in the 1780s. As a group they represented an effort on 
the part of the state government to put a great expanse of the state in the hands of private 
entrepreneurs (in two cases with the state itself participating as an investor) to foster 
Virginia's commercial, social and political development. As might be expected, the 
transition to this new exercise of state authority was neither seamless nor unanimous.
Not every citizen was equally comfortable with such an expansion of state authority or 
with increased emphasis on commercial development.
During the same period the General Assembly was creating the waterways 
improvement companies to facilitate the flow of produce and goods, it also endeavored to 
strengthen the state’s trading posture by concentrating shipping at a few ports. As a 
colony, Virginia had been entirely dependent on Great Britain for manufactured goods 
and for marketing its agricultural products. After the Revolution, citizens of the State of 
Virginia sought to end their economic subservience to Great Britain by developing their
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own ports and shipping so as to conduct an independent commerce.86 However, the 
controversy surrounding the passage of the Port Bill in 1784 demonstrated that the 
General Assembly could extend its authority on behalf of commerce beyond the comfort 
level o f Virginians.87 The first port bill, passed during the May 1784 session, attempted 
to concentrate trade in order to promote competition among merchants. James Madison, 
a major sponsor of the bill, pointed out that goods were more expensive in Virginia than 
in states where trade was drawn to central markets. The abundance of buyers in 
Philadelphia created a competitive atmosphere that drove tobacco prices in that city 
fifteen to twenty percent higher than in Virginia. Larger ports also attracted European 
ships that currently bypassed Virginia, resulting in decreased demand and lower prices for 
Virginia tobacco. The new law limited foreign ships to the ports of Norfolk and 
Portsmouth; Bermuda Hundred, downriver from Richmond; Tappahannock on the 
Rappahannock River; Yorktown on the York; and Alexandria on the Potomac.88
Supporters also forwarded the paradoxical argument that the Port Bill would 
increase profits by reducing the planters’ access to merchants. Virginia’s tidewater rivers 
allowed British factors direct contact with individual planters, to whom they extended 
generous credit. Once tied to a particular factor by a large debt, planters were at his 
mercy, unable to solicit the best prices for their crops. By making dealings with less 
convenient factors, planters would be forced to come to the port, where numerous 
merchants would compete for their business. Madison also pointed out that the port bill 
would promote more sensible trading by discouraging the extension of "diffusive” credit. 
Factors forced to buy manufactured goods from centralized wholesalers would be unable
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to amass a large cumulative credit with numerous merchants and would be unable in turn 
to offer generous credit to planters.89 Freedom from debt dependence coupled with a 
more competitive marketplace would allow Virginians to reap greater rewards for the 
same level of effort.
Citizens who suffered material consequences from the proposed port restrictions
were not enamored with this attempt by the General Assembly to supervise the state’s
economy. Petitions from residents of Fredericksburg and Prince William County noted
that the loss of the benefits of navigation would result in the arbitrary devaluation of their
property. They also asserted that in assuming the authority to assign trade monopolies,
the General Assembly violated one of its own founding principles:
Your petitioners conceive that the security and happiness of a Republic 
consists in its wealth and power being divided as well among the several 
districts and towns as among the individuals.90
In the minds of the petitioners, the assembly infringed upon their freedom to 
exercise every individual and local advantage at their disposal. Residents of Orange and 
Albemarle counties also noted that regions without designated ports would suffer 
diminished property values.91 Lancaster and Northumberland residents were not so 
concerned with pronouncements on the exercise of central authority as with its 
application. They maintained that the designation of Tappahannock was inconvenient 
and requested the establishment of a new town on a branch of the Rappahannock River 
known as the Corotoman River. Similarly, residents of Petersburg petitioned for a more 
accessible port than Bermuda Hundred, and if that was not feasible, they urged repeal of 
the entire act.92 The General Assembly succumbed to the many requests and designated
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additional ports, utterly thwarting the original intent of the legislation.93
George Mason acknowledged the practical arguments against the bill, but
emphasized the broader threat it posed to Virginia’s society. By promoting the creation of
large commercial centers, Mason feared the port bill would accelerate social changes that
would culminate in the thirst for luxury that had sapped Britain’s moral reserves:
If virtue is the vital principle of a republic, and it cannot long exist, 
without frugality, probity and strictness of morals, will the manners of 
populous commercial cities be favorable to the principles of our free 
government? Or will not the vice, the depravity of morals, the luxury, 
venality, and corruption, which invariably prevail in great commercial 
cities, be utterly subversive of them?94
Mason refused to accept Madison’s novel assertions that such commercial development
would ensure, not undermine, Virginia’s agrarian republic.
Other Virginians also remained unconvinced. They saw the river improvement
projects as part of a trend: their society was changing, and not for the better. By elevating
material expectations for all, the commercial spirit that underlay the drive for
improvements had a leveling effect that made traditional Virginians all the more nervous.
A"female correspondent" in Richmond reported that the city had become overridden with
bachelors because "luxury" was so pervasive "that superfluities are turned into
necessaries and wedlock, in short, is perverted from all its good purposes, to a mere
scheme of splendor and parade." The writer asserted ambitious suitors preferred
bachelorhood to an unprofitable match because "it is thought ungenteel not to be able to
make a wife appear in public with some kind of taste and pomp."95 The writer of
“Strictures on a Young Lady’s Dress” recalled that dress had once been one of the most
palpable distinctions of rank. Now "the servant...rivals her mistress in every species of
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whim and extravagance" with the result that "All sorts of people are consequently 
confounded or melted down into one glaring mass of absurdity or superfluity." The 
writer demanded that economic opportunity not be allowed to disrupt society and advised 
parents to "proportion...the dress of your daughters to their situations in life."96
In just a few years the General Assembly had enacted legislation which 
anticipated far reaching effects on Virginia’s economy and society, and these policies 
were effected through a change in the role of the state government. The laws created four 
companies that today we would call "public utilities," privately owned and managed 
corporations to which the government grants a monopoly but also regulates their rate 
structures. Not only did the state government take upon itself the authority to designate 
such entities, but favored them with state financial support. By turning to the state 
government to play an active role in the development of the state and its economy, 
Virginia’s leaders clearly relied upon lessons learned from the British Empire.
In the case of Virginia, however, this radical expansion in the role of state 
government to encompass the improvement of inland waterways was not intended to 
ensure the import of raw materials and the export of manufactured goods. As 
Washington so eloquently revealed in his famous letter to Governor Harrison, a policy of 
internal improvements was intended to secure Virginia’s agricultural base by expanding 
its farming population to the full extent of its borders. Improvement advocates 
recognized and accepted that a consequence of this new policy would be the extension of 
commerce throughout Virginia, an outcome that struck the more traditionally oriented as 
paradoxical at best, and a menace to Virginia society at worst. In response, proponents
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emphasized the many happy results of improved waterways, including greater wealth, 
access to a greater variety of consumer products, and enhanced defense.
But before these benefits could be enjoyed, the companies had to accomplish what 
their directors had represented to the investors as possible — construction of their 
respective waterways. That goal proved a far more difficult challenge than the 
companies' directors initially allowed themselves to imagine.
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TT IS A WORK SO BIG, THAT THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES 
CANNOT TAKE IT AT A VIEW.
-Virginia Journal and 
Alexandria Advertiser 
November 25, 1784
As George Washington considered the prospects of the Potowmack Company, his 
enthusiasm overcame the bitterness he bore from previous experiences with river 
improvements. Madison observed to Jefferson in October 1785 that Washington "grows 
more and more sanguine as he examines further into the practicability of opening [the 
Potomac’s] navigation."1 Washington, however, soon found the problems that had 
hindered earlier projects were visited on the new companies. Securing capital, organizing 
labor and completing construction, all in time to comply with the schedules laid out in 
their charters, proved to be more daunting than river improvement advocates anticipated.
But throughout the period of construction, the almost manic optimism of the 
sponsors served to distract the public from the very formidable impediments facing the 
projects. An advertisement announcing the first subscription of stock for the Potowmack 
Company extolled "the great advantages that must inevitably flow to our country from the 
success of the scheme, joined to the private emoluments that are likely to accrue to the 
adventurers." The Virginia Journal and Alexandria Advertiser, in which the 
announcement appeared, pronounced as "too obvious to mention...[t]he commerce and 
riches that must of necessity pour down upon us." Echoing Washington, the newspaper
91
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account stressed the Potomac project was "a work of more political than commercial 
consequence as it will be one of the grandest chains for preserving the federal Union." 
Commercial links forged entirely within the nation would not be at risk from volatile 
European political developments. The newspaper concluded with the wildly impractical 
claim that the Potomac River would be cleared as far as Fort Cumberland in three years.2
The companies’actual experience quickly shattered the illusion that they could 
meet such optimistic deadlines. By December 1785, the Potowmack Company directors 
had petitioned the General Assembly to reduce the required depths for the lock canals, 
thereby diminishing the amount of construction the improvement would require. The 
directors claimed the canal and locks at the Great Falls and Little Falls needed to be only 
two feet deep, rather than four as the law creating the company mandated. They argued 
the flow of the river into the narrow canals would naturally raise the level of water, so 
that the canal channels need not be cut so deep.3 The General Assembly concurred and 
passed a law reflecting the directors’ wishes.4
At the same time, the directors of the James River Company requested the depth 
of their canals be limited to the depth of the river in the dry season, a rather disingenuous 
request considering the river was all but unnavigable at that time of year. Even more 
significantly, the directors sought clarification of the extent to which they had to provide 
improved navigation to the West. These queries provide the first evidence of a strategy 
the James River Company employed over the course of its corporate existence: limit the 
scope of improvements at either end of the river, where such work was most difficult, 
keep expenses down, and increase the company's profitability. It was a strategy that
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surrendered the public benefit to the interests of private shareholders. Nevertheless, the 
General Assembly responded to the petition by passing legislation which declared Crow’s 
Ferry on the mouth of Looney’s Creek (the present site of Buchanan) the highest point to 
be made navigable, rather than a point farther west. The law also ordered the company to 
"proportion the depth of the canal to that of the water in the river in dry seasons."5 This 
act considerably reduced the construction demands to be placed on the James River 
Company.
The company still had its problems, however, particularly at the falls in and above 
Richmond. The falls began in the center of town and extended west about 5.3 miles. 
From the tidewater, shifting sandbars prevented navigation farther west than Warwick,
4.3 miles above the town.6 The directors soon recognized the difficulties posed by the 
dimensions set for a canal around the falls in the enabling legislation. Rather than erect 
locks, the directors petitioned the General Assembly to bring the canal into town by way 
of a basin. A system of locks, the directors argued, would be prohibitively expensive, 
particularly given the financial limits imposed by the subscription. The Committee of 
Propositions and Grievances, perhaps recognizing the shifting nature of the river bed 
rendered the wisdom of a passage without locks dubious, rejected the petition.7
The improvement companies also moved quickly to ensure that their monopolies 
on river tolls would not be threatened by their own inability to complete the projects on 
time. The Potowmack Company petitioned in November 1786 to extend its deadline for 
clearing the navigation from the Great Falls to Fort Cumberland to November 17, 1790. 
The directors argued they had fulfilled the purpose of the deadline to avoid delays in
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executing the work and had "prosecuted the same at great expense with unremitted 
assiduity, with such prospect of success [ that the directors] hope and expect to complete 
the whole navigation within the ten years allowed." Despite the best of intentions, 
however, the directors noted bad weather in 1785 had caused flooding on the upper part 
of the river and impeded work; rains during the summer of 1786 had made work 
impossible then as well. The General Assembly granted their request.8
The extension to 1790 proved insufficient and the directors again petitioned for 
more time. While claiming that most of the work above the Great Falls would be 
completed in the next year and that boats of ten tons had reached the Great Falls from as 
far away as the Shenandoah and Seneca rivers, the directors did not expect to complete 
the navigation above the Shenandoah in time. Again, heavy rains in 1787, 1788, and 
1790 were branded the culprits. The General Assembly granted another three-year 
extension, and then in 1793 yet another extension to 1795, to complete the navigation 
between the Great Falls and the head of navigation.9
The James River Company also had ongoing problems with meeting deadlines. In 
1793, the company reported it had begun the work with "promptitude and spirit" and had 
overcome "unforeseen and numberless difficulties" to extend navigation far enough that 
within a year they expected to approach the tidewater, at which point lock construction 
could commence. The petitioners also respectfully noted that laborers could only be 
employed in the summer and then only during its driest periods. Despite the directors’ 
professed resolve, they stated a need for eight more years to clear the two hundred miles 
of river from the upper lock to the highest point of navigation. The General Assembly
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granted a six-year extension.10
Residents were also well aware of the limitations of the companies and the 
improvements they endeavored. A petition from Fauquier County in northern Virginia 
requested the number of roads leading from the mountain passes to "the trading towns" be 
reduced, and the remaining roads widened and kept in good repair. By "trading towns" 
the petitioners presumably were referring to such fall line market centers as Alexandria. 
Indeed, throughout the 1780s the General Assembly directed as much of its attention to 
improving Virginia’s network of roads as it did its river system.11 Imitating the corporate 
model developed to improve the rivers, in 1795 the General Assembly chartered the first 
private turnpike company, responsible for the Fairfax and Loudoun Road to run from 
Alexandria to the Little River. Although this particular company ultimately failed, it 
marked the beginning o f an explosion in the incorporation of turnpike companies in 
Virginia and throughout the United States.12
In 1792 the General Assembly revised the charter of the Appomattox Company, 
which to that year had made no headway at all. The charter designated new trustees and 
clarified their authority to collect tolls once the river was made navigable in every season 
for boats with a draft o f nine feet. Although the company’s main responsibility continued 
to be tidewater access, extending navigation from Broadway to the Pocahuntas Bridge, 
interest continued for clearing the river above the tidewater, as the Potowmack and James 
River Companies were undertaking.13 A 1795 petition from citizens of Prince Edward 
County declared the Appomattox Company inadequate and proposed a plan similar to 
those adopted for the James and Potomac rivers for the Appomattox above the
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tidewater.14 Latrobe’s account of his trip down the Appomattox in the Summer of 1796 
corroborates the petitioners’ characterization of the river as possessing frequent 
obstructions to navigation. The General Assembly responded favorably to the petitioners’ 
request and in 1796 relieved the company of responsibility for upriver navigation by 
chartering the Upper Appomattox Company to collect tolls and extend the river’s 
navigation as far as Farmville.15
Of the four projects, the Dismal Swamp Canal's charter contained the most clear 
cut requirements. From the onset, the length, depth and width of the waterway was 
clearly stipulated in the establishing statute, and the directors knew the precise route to be 
dug. Nonetheless, the company faced the same problems the river companies confronted 
— cost overruns and overly optimistic timetables that failed to accommodate for 
unexpected problems. Though the Virginia General Assembly had chartered the canal 
company in 1787, the North Carolina legislature did not pass enabling legislation until 
November 1790. The Virginia Assembly responded by passing another bill to make the 
laws of both states identical. The new law provided for opening an additional 
subscription book in Williamsburg and repealed the provisions pertaining to the 
regulation of commerce, inasmuch as the federal Constitution had subsequently assigned 
that power to the national government. The company at last was fully organized in
1792 i6
Despite the state government’s mandate, those who used the waterways in more 
traditional ways resisted the companies’ efforts to alter the nature of the rivers. The
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disputes pitted specific local and individual uses of the river against the commercial 
opportunities offered by integration into a broader trade network. As the companies 
began their clearance projects, they immediately found themselves at odds with local mill 
owners whose livelihoods depended on their river obstructions.17 By affording easier 
access to market centers, river clearance promised to encourage more farmers to grow 
more produce. While some millers might enjoy increased business, all would have to 
undertake expensive and difficult passageways around their dams. A group of 1787 
petitions from the Appomattox River region reveals how these contradictory uses of the 
river gave rise to heated local disputes.
Petitioners from Amelia County who supported clearance asserted the exertions of 
"publick spirited men" to clear rivers in other parts of the state not only contributed to the 
public good, but increased property values along the rivers. Improved navigation, they 
claimed, would make the Appomattox River "much more advantageous, at a comparative 
small expense of labour and money," and referred to opponents as "the interested 
opposition of a few individuals," namely, "the owners of mills and their friends."18
The use of the term "interest" is significant, as it was meant to contrast the "public 
spirited” intentions of those seeking to clear the river. In contemporary usage, the word 
"interest" was defined as the “immediate augmentation of property and wealth."19 The 
petitioners sought to characterize the mill owners as concerned only for their own profit, 
and having little regard for the well-being of their neighbors. Labeling opponents as 
"interested" and insensitive to the needs of citizens must have been potent rhetoric. It 
was employed again and again in disputes over waterways improvement projects. A
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Powhattan County petition pointed to the county’s exhausted soil, the heavy tax burden of
the county residents, and "the general impoverishment of the country, [which] all
combine to show the necessity of improving our advantages, particular[ly] our inland
navigation."20 Despite the vital importance of river clearance, the petitioners asserted
contrary priorities had so far prevailed: "...a fine navigable river is totally shut up for the
emolument of a few individuals whilst the good of a great part of this commonwealth is
sacrificed." While not using the word "interest," the meaning is clear.
This same petition stated milldams were "in defiance of nature...."21 But what was
the most "natural" use of the river? Petitioners from Amelia, Powhattan, Chesterfield and
Dinwiddie counties who opposed the destruction of milldams recommended being
content with the river "where God and nature left it." While they would have welcomed
improved navigation, they claimed the river would defy all efforts to be tamed:
But sirs! To say nothing of the innumerable shoals and rapids which are 
common to this river, and which cannot be removed but at an immense 
expense, we must observe, that the Appomattox, from its want of width, 
and having its adjoining hills mostly cut down, has for several years 
generally experienced either floods or ebbs, injurious to every thing like 
useful navigation.
Since clearance would be prohibitively expensive to complete and would provide only 
limited navigation, the petitioners requested milldam owners not be deprived of their 
property and its use, as already guaranteed by the local county courts.22
Improvement projects were also perceived as a threat to fishing. In 1789, 
petitioners from Henrico County protested the surveying o f the falls of the James River as 
invading their natural rights and privileges to fish. The James River Company is not 
referred to by name in the petition, which instead accused unnamed "speculators" of
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planning to "ransack earth, air, and water for private emolument," thereby removing the 
advantages to fishing rocks and falls acting as natural fish traps. Clearly, the term 
"speculators" was used pejoratively, with the intention being to portray the James River 
Company as an "interest" willing to sacrifice those who depended on the river for food, 
just to realize a profit. As an alternative to the feared misuse of a communal resource, the 
petitioners recommended a more traditional solution. They requested the General 
Assembly declare the falls and everything in it common land, placing it beyond the 
ownership of any single individual or company.23
Land condemnation was another company practice which engendered local ire. 
The four companies were all authorized to bring "ad quo damnum" proceedings against 
individuals unwilling to sell their land. Under this procedure the county appointed a jury 
to review the land and assign it a value, upon the payment of which the company could 
assume ownership. In 1812, the Dismal Canal Company was unable to come to terms 
with the owners o f land required to cut a feeder canal from Drummond Pond. In July, 
two justices of the Norfolk County Court confirmed the company’s need to take a three- 
hundred-foot-wide stretch from the pond to the canal and empowered Carter B. 
Poindexter, the deputy sheriff, to empanel a jury of eighteen disinterested citizens to meet 
on the fourth of August and appraise the land. The jurors valued the one hundred twenty- 
four and a half acre tract of swamp at just one cent per acre, and directed the sum to be 
divided among all the property owners.24
The mere possibility of an ad quo damnum procedure was enough to bring some 
owners to the bargaining table. Colonel John Harris stressed to the James River
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Company directors that the tract of land he was willing to sell was valuable both in terms 
of what it cost him and the potential appreciation he would be losing. Harris suggests in 
the correspondence that he offered the land at very favorable terms, knowing that the 
company could take much more if it wanted to and at a price a jury would set very low. 
He was more than willing to part with his land "to prevent a great injury which I think 
might be done me, if you were to make your survey so wide as the law empowers you to 
do."25
Property owners could also use the ad quo damnum proceeding against the 
companies. James Henderson of the Dismal Land Company informed the Dismal Swamp 
Canal Company that it had yet to pay for timber cut from Dismal Land Company 
property. Henderson noted the Dismal Swamp Canal Company could only take timber by 
agreement or by an ad quo damnum proceeding. Lacking either, Henderson warned that 
the Dismal Canal Company directors were personally liable for the ten-dollar-per-acre 
value of the timber. In this correspondence, Henderson seemed so confident of the value 
of the timber that he threatened the Dismal Canal Company with an ad quo damnum 
proceeding, anticipating the jury would assign a value close to the ten dollars per acre he 
mentioned.26
Securing sufficient labor was one of the most persistent problems facing the four 
companies. Each relied on different combinations of free white and black slave labor. 
Although the records indicate a clear preference on the part of the companies for white 
labor, the supply of slaves available "for hire" was more reliable, and their use became 
more prevalent. In 1785 the Potowmack Company decided to hire one hundred free
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laborers. With the company’s incorporation coming on the heels of independence, 
Washington and the company directors did not consider the use of indentured servants, or 
worse, slave labor, to be in harmony with the principles of the new Republic. But the 
reputed dangers associated with river clearance discouraged free laborers. Solicitations 
for labor went all but unanswered. Washington recommended hiring unemployed miners, 
for they had experience blasting rock, a necessary skill for completing the lower locks at 
the Great Falls. The miners demanded high wages and payment by the day, instead of by 
each foot of progress. When their pay was not timely, they threatened the project 
superintendent with physical harm. The miners’association with the company was short­
lived.27
Unable to secure free white labor, the Potowmack Company endeavored to rely on 
Irish indentured servants. But the servants found the work harder than they expected and 
seized on the remoteness o f the work sites to escape. Local papers from 1786 and 1787 
are peppered with advertisements offering rewards for the return of runaway Irish 
servants.28 Indentured servants posed other problems as well. They had to be housed 
during the winter months when work stopped, and some servants brought families, for 
whom the company was also responsible.29
The James River Company also explored labor options other than hiring slaves.
In the first years following incorporation, the company endeavored to use criminal labor.
In 1787 the State Council directed twenty felons to "do labor as common laborers on the 
canal to be cut by the James River Company...." One of the criminals, John Fowler, had 
been assigned five years of manual labor as a condition for parole. Two others, John
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Preston and Joseph Minor, had three years of work to complete.30 Escape was a chronic 
problem. One criminal, Edward Watkins, fled the work site, only to be captured, jailed, 
and re-assigned to the company. By April 1789, only two parolees still worked for the 
company. The Potowmack Company, despite its own labor problems, politely declined 
the state’s offer of convict labor.31
Both companies resigned themselves to the need for slave labor. However, slaves 
were expensive, and the companies could not afford to tie up their operating capital in 
ownership. In addition, while work on river improvements was seasonal, slaves owned 
by the companies would have to be fed and cared for year-round. From the onset the 
Potowmack and James River companies preferred to “hire,” or lease, slaves rather than 
buy them outright. Hired slaves had the added advantage of posing a smaller risk of 
escape than white indentured or convict laborers who could travel unnoticed. If a hired 
slave did escape, the lost time was deducted from the owner's fee, diminishing the 
companies' risk even further.32
By November 1786 the Potowmack Company was soliciting the hire of one 
hundred slaves for twenty pounds each, Virginia currency, per year. As an enticement, 
the company also offered to pay their levies, clothe them and furnish them with rations: 
"one pound of salt pork, one pound and a quarter of salt beef, or one pound and a half of 
fresh beef or mutton and a sufficiency of bread each day." There would even be a 
"reasonable quantity o f spirits when necessary." Owners had to present the slaves well 
clothed, or the company would clothe them and deduct the expense from the hiring fee.33
The records of the James River Company indicate that it hired individuals to
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recruit slave labor. The account book for the years 1785 to 1789 records "ferriage fees" 
for men to go into the countryside for several days at a time in search of owners willing to 
hire their slaves to the company.34 For some of its hired slaves, the company did not have 
to look beyond its own employees. The account book indicates white employees of the 
company, and even an employee’s wife, leased out their slaves. One employee hired out 
nine.33 The willingness of individuals intimately familiar with river clearance to entrust 
the company with their valuable "property" suggests the conditions were not as bad as 
the general public presumed. Those cases where the same slaves were hired out for 
several years also can be taken as evidence of tolerable working conditions.36
The number of slaves the James River Company hired demonstrates the extent to 
which it had resigned itself to this form of labor. In 1785, the company hired only 
seventeen slaves. By 1786, the number had jumped to seventy-nine, and, by 1787, to one 
hundred twenty-nine. By 1789, the number had levelled off at eighty-two.37 But hired 
slaves were not without problems. The persistent perception of hazardous working 
conditions, whether justified or not, continued to hamper efforts to secure a sufficient 
number. Throughout the 1790s the Potowmack Company petitioned the General 
Assembly for permission to hire slaves from owners in Maryland, a practice prohibited by 
a law intended to maintain the value of Virginia slaves. A petition in 1792 asserted "the 
labor of the Potowmack Company is best performed by negro slaves," and that in the 
course of its work the company found it expedient to move workers from the Maryland 
side of the Potomac to Virginia.38 Expedience soon turned to desperation. In a 1796 
petition, the Potowmack Company warned the Great Falls project was at risk because of
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the prohibition against the importation of slaves from other states. The petition pointed 
out that work at the Little Falls took place primarily on the Maryland side and, when that 
work was completed, the company would be forced to discharge the hired slaves rather 
than employ them at the Great Falls in Virginia. The General Assembly granted the 
company permission to employ Maryland slaves in Virginia for one year.39
The sudden appearance of a large number of black slaves on the river raised fears 
among whites living in proximity to the improvements, particularly upriver where slaves 
were less numerous than in tidewater. Recognizing the value of good community 
relations, the directors of the Potowmack Company ordered the project superintendent to 
"pay particular attention to the conduct of the black people on the works and prevent as 
far as possible any disturbance taking place between them and the people in the 
neighborhood and see that there be no obstruction to a proper execution of civil law 
among [the slaves]."40
Larger numbers of black slaves also increased the chance of disturbances between 
them and the free white laborers, who were an unruly lot in their own right. An engineer 
for the Potowmack Company wrote the governor in 1796 to report the "low character" of 
the laborers and the many brawls they incited. He described the laborers as a "variety of 
characters...who of course are not o f the best description." Fights had become so frequent 
that the engineer requested an appointment as magistrate "not only to check, but to secure 
offenders of the public peace."41
More slaves also meant more runaways. In order to improve identification, and 
discourage escape, the Potowmack Company shaved the heads and eyebrows of its
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slaves.42 The James River Company account book contains numerous references to 
individuals paid to track down runaways.43
The Dismal Swamp Canal Company encountered a lean labor market as well and 
experienced difficulty persuading owners to hire out their slaves to work in the swamp. 
The company had to offer extremely attractive terms, promising what were the highest 
monthly wages of all the companies for hired slaves.44 The need for labor may also 
explain why Richard Blow’s company correspondence suggests a very permissive attitude 
toward the slave labor. Blow, president of the company, noted in one letter that a hired 
slave, Jim Pennock, had not been at the canal since Christmas, one month earlier. Having 
heard that Pennock is "lurking about Norfolk," Blow recommended a constable be 
enlisted to bring him back.45 That the company did not respond immediately to Pennock’s 
disappearance, and that Blow only sought his return without mention of punishment, 
suggests such desertions were easily excused. No doubt the company had little choice, 
for if it returned the slave to his owner, the company would forsake precious labor.
The behavior of hired slaves suggests they recognized the leverage they could 
exert against the company. The slaves did not appear for work on time and exploited 
every opportunity to avoid the canal. Blow complained that the slaves directed to deliver 
letters to him in Norfolk would not do so immediately, instead lingering in the city. It 
would seem the slaves used the correspondence as a de facto letter of transit, affording 
them considerable liberty. The longer they held the letter intended for Blow, the longer 
they could legitimately remain in town. Blow instructed that the slaves be ordered to 
deliver his letters as soon as they got into town.46 Liquor seemed to be one of the only
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inducements the Dismal Swamp Canal Company had at its disposal to keep the slaves 
obedient. Blow reported he had sent liquor for the purpose of giving the workers a 
"dram" in the morning. However, as an incentive for the workers to behave well, Blow 
directed they be allowed a "gill" (one-quarter pint) a day in the winter. Those who did not 
work would be "debarred of their allowance."47
The Upper Appomattox Company differed from the other three companies in that 
its directors initially resolved to buy slaves rather than hire them. The company’s ledger 
for 1796-1820 indicates no more than four slaves were hired in any year, a total of thirty- 
two over the twenty-five years covered by the ledger.48 Not only did the Upper 
Appomattox Company hire few slaves, but a few of these it bought outright. Company 
records indicate that it hired from Robert Atkinson "Hampton," a blacksmith, for the 
years 1797, 1798 and 1799. In November o f 1799, the company bought Hampton. 
Apparently the Company concluded Hampton’s skills were indispensible — buying him 
was cheaper than hiring him over the next several years. Nor did the company depend on 
white labor. From 1796 to 1820 the company employed a total o f fifty-five white men 
with another three listed as "sundries" and two recorded as "cash," suggesting they were 
part-time or short-term laborers whom the company recorded cumulatively. It never 
employed more than seven in any given year and after 1808 no more than two.49
Slaves owned by the Upper Appomattox Company clearly provided the backbone 
of its labor force.50 A petition in 1800 from the company requesting increased state 
support noted most of the clearing was done by "[f]orty young negro men who have been 
purchased by the company" and who represented "a large proportion of the company's
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stock [capital]."51 In 1809, one source lists twenty-nine slaves owned by the company, 
while another suggests a total of thirty-four. The difference may represent mortalities.52 
Considering the liabilities of ownership and the flexibility afforded by hiring, the question 
remains: Why did the company elect to buy slaves rather than hire slaves owned by 
others?
Perhaps the directors perceived slaves as an appreciable asset that doubled as 
labor. If so, slaves proved to be at best a spotty investment. In the period recorded in the 
ledger, the company sold ten slaves, although three were not recorded with an acquisition 
price. Of the seven that can be traced, three sold at the price for which they were bought, 
and one sold at a £ 13 profit. However, one slave was sold at a £20 loss, and another at a 
£30 loss; the last slave was sold at a whopping £60 loss.53 A far more profitable venture 
for the company was to hire out its own slaves. In 1816 the company reported that it 
leased twenty of its slaves around Petersburg, and expected to raise fSOO.54 In either case, 
selling or hiring out slaves, the company deprived itself of the slaves that did virtually all 
of the work. Not only were slaves a poor investment, but one which the company could 
not afford to liquidate.
The four companies also faced the prospect of undertaking their improvements 
with far less capital than they anticipated. Individuals proved more willing to subscribe 
for shares than make subscription payments. Initially investors claimed all of the James 
River Company's shares by the time the subscription books were closed, and the 
Potowmack Company sold four hundred three of five hundred shares.55 Once beyond this
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auspicious beginning, the companies had to plead incessantly with their investors for 
payment because the enacting legislation neglected to give them much authority to coerce 
subscribers. The company directors were permitted to sell at auction shares for which 
subscribers failed to pay, but the auction just resulted in another subscriber in whom the 
companies could place no greater faith.
The Potowmack Company published advertisements reporting work had begun, 
that it was hiring laborers on a daily basis, and that the costs were yet to be covered by the 
income from shares. It warned if payments were not soon made the delinquent shares 
would be sold at auction and, if the shares did not sell at full value, the original 
subscribers would be sued for the balance, as the enacting legislation permitted.56 The 
James River Company published similar threats. Its directors were forced to "earnestly 
intreat the members who have not paid up their respective proportions of the several 
requisitions to make immediate payments, as the credit and interest of the company 
suffers [sic] very materially by their delinquency."57
Some subscribers were probably not paying simply because they had no 
compelling reason to do so. On the contrary, sharp speculators recognized that under the 
subscription system they would be rewarded for holding back payment. Should the 
company prove profitable, investors could pay their subscriptions and reap the benefits of 
appreciated share values and dividend distributions. But should the company’s future 
look bleak, subscribers could default, forcing the sale of their shares at auction. If the 
auctioned shares did not sell for full value, the original subscriber was only responsible 
for the difference, minimizing the loss.58
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Speculators seeking to manipulate the subscriptions were not the only ones who 
failed to pay for subscribed shares. Individuals truly optimistic about the prospects of the 
companies also had trouble paying for their shares. In their zeal, they tended to subscribe 
beyond their means, undermining the companies’ability to complete the improvements 
upon which these same investors desperately depended. Many investors were so 
confident of the potential of the Potowmack Company, they also bought land adjoining 
the river in anticipation of its accelerated settlement and increased value. But once their 
resources were tied up in real estate, these investors were unable to meet their 
subscription pledges.
An extreme case of over-extension is the Revolutionary War hero Henry "Light 
Horse Harry" Lee. Recognizing the potential held by Potomac River frontage, Lee 
bought five hundred acres at Great Falls. He planned to offer storage facilities and 
eventually turn the area into a milling and manufacturing center. In 1790 Lee secured 
incorporation of a town from the General Assembly, naming it Matildaville after his wife. 
Lee divided the town into lots for houses —  now all he had to do was wait for the river 
traffic.
Not only was the volume of traffic far less than Lee expected, but the Potowmack 
Company was hostile to his scheme. The company feared town development at Great 
Falls would threaten the nearby canal works. It also wanted a portion of Matildaville for 
a corporate headquarters.59 The Company exercised its ad quo damnum authority and 
condemned the land. Lee now had land that, because of the condemnation proceeding, he 
could not sell, which meant he could not raise the cash he needed to pay for his
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subscription. While negotiating a price for the land, the company added insult to injury 
and sued Lee for defaulting on his subscription.
This last development was the result of a change the Potowmack Company and 
James River Company secured in their charters, giving them authority to sue directly for 
payment of subscriptions. The inability of the companies to find buyers when shares 
reverted necessitated the change. In 1787, when the Potowmack Company attempted to 
auction fifty-four delinquent shares, not one bidder had appeared. Although the General 
Assembly responded with permission to sue the original purchasers, the companies 
gained little advantage because their poor financial status precluded their tying up 
precious resources in legal fees. Defaults on Potowmack Company shares continued for 
several more years.60 Neither civic responsibility nor the legal system could coerce the 
payment of stock subscriptions.
Finally, in 1795 after years of wrangling, a jury ordered Lee to pay the amount he 
owed on his shares, less the value of the land. That Lee was still in debt after deducting 
the value of the land demonstrates the extent to which he had overextended himself in 
Potowmack Company shares.61
The State of Virginia, too, had not been punctual with its subscription payments. 
William Hartshome and Robert Pollard, the respective treasurers o f the Potowmack and 
James River companies, persistently (but politely) requested that the state meet its 
obligations. Inasmuch as the state was not insulated from the general lack of money in 
the economy, Governor Beverly Randolph announced in his annual message to the House 
of Delegates in 1789 that the Commonwealth was unable to pay for its subscriptions.
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Later, the state was forced to borrow or sell part of its tobacco holdings to subsidize its 
subscription payments.62
Despite the state’s spotty record as a subscriber, it was nonetheless an investor 
with potentially bottomless pockets. The companies treated the state as a generous patron 
always prepared to deliver them from financial peril. In 1790 the directors of the James 
River Company petitioned the General Assembly to buy another one hundred shares. The 
directors reported they were "greatly embarrassed to find the original stock subscribed so 
nearly exhausted that it was insufficient for carrying on the work another year.” The 
General Assembly authorized two hundred more shares and agreed to buy one hundred of 
them.63 In 1795 the General Assembly authorized the state treasurer to advance thirty 
dollars on each share the state owned, to be repaid from tolls, as long as half of the money 
was spent clearing the river from the Blue Ridge to Crow's Ferry. This proviso suggests a 
knowledge on the part of the General Assembly of the company’s foot-dragging on its 
commitment to undertake the difficult and expensive route to its western terminus.64 By 
1797 the General Assembly authorized the company to borrow money privately.65 
Similarly, in 1795 the General Assembly authorized the state to buy twenty more shares 
of the Potowmack Company.66
In 1801 the state bought another twenty-five shares of the Upper Appomattox 
Company. The amount still was not sufficient, and the state in 1807 loaned the company 
funds to cover one-quarter of its expenses on a bond to be repaid by November 1809. 
When 1809 rolled around, the company secured permission to issue another bond to repay 
the first.67 In 1813, when the second bond came due, the company's directors observed in
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a petition that they could not repay the bond "without great sacrifice as well in the price 
of property [i.e., slaves] as in being compelled to dispose of lands, that ought to be held 
for the public convenience." They also asserted that if the state granted them an 
indulgence, so would their private creditors, "until it will be in the power of the company 
to discharge their debts without any very important inconveniences." The General 
Assembly granted a five-year extension.68 Finally, in 1819, the state bought $15,000 in 
new stock and granted another three-year extension on the loan, which the company never 
was able to repay.69 In 1816, the General Assembly in addition granted the company 
permission to run the first of four lotteries.70
Other citizens complained the price of shares was too high. In 1785 citizens of 
Botetourt County in western Virginia on the upper James River argued the price of James 
River Company shares put them out of the reach of western citizens who had the greatest 
interest in the river’s improvement. The petitioners claimed the high price "tend[s] too 
much to a monopoly" of wealthy eastern speculators concerned more with profits than 
navigation. The petitioners recommended a hybrid arrangement, combining the sale of 
shares with traditional subscriptions in a community project that held no presumption of a 
return on investment. The petitioners requested permission to subscribe in the traditional 
manner, contributing according to their means, and to have their funds applied locally to 
clear the river from Lynch’s ferry (later Lynchburg) to the mouth of the Cowpasture 
River. These special subscribers would be also be considered "fractional" trustees in 
proportion to the share of the capital their contribution represented. The General 
Assembly never acted on this petition.71
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The legislature ignored another Botetourt petition four years later requesting 
permission for county residents to apply the price o f their James River Company shares to 
delinquent taxes. The petition called for the "public to become subscribers of thirty other 
shares in the James River Company, to be paid out o f the taxes due [to the state] from the 
said county, prior to the first day of January, 1788."72 The petitioners sought to turn their 
tax liability into a James River Company asset. Again, they were not successful. The 
citizens of Botetourt County changed their strategy in 1790. Rather than offering cash 
payments, they tendered their labor on clearance projects as payment for back taxes, with 
the added proviso that they would be reimbursed from the first tolls collected on the 
river.73 The General Assembly was not amenable to that proposal either.
The currency shortage bedeviled all of Virginia’s citizens. The river companies 
offered a solution by providing an alternative means of exchange. Because of their 
extensive participation in the local economies through the hire and acquisition of slaves, 
the requisition of supplies, the payment of salaries, and the collection of tolls, the 
companies maintained accounts with a variety of individuals and concerns. The array of 
account items was extensive. The James River Company account book included the 
following categories: white men’s wages; negro hire; petty charges; steel; iron; 
gunpowder; coal; pork; salt; wheat; molasses; fish; com; meat; oats; fodder; lands 
purchased along the canal; timber; tanning; house rent; and tools.74 Holders of James 
River Company accounts could settle debts among themselves by exchanging credits 
recorded in the company ledger, obviating the need to lay out hard currency. The 
companies thus provided an important banking function by serving as a clearinghouse for
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local debt.75
Hiring out slaves to a river company, for example, was not only lucrative but gave 
the owner access to the company’s account network. Richard E. Meade hired out his 
slave to the Upper Appomattox Company in 1803 for £40. But instead of paying Meade, 
the Company recorded a £40 credit in the account of Joseph Eggleston, to whom Meade 
apparently owed money. Thus, two debts, Meade's hiring fee and his debt to Eggleston, 
were satisfied with no exchange of currency.76 The James River Company acted 
similarly, recording payments to its workers, but crediting the money elsewhere. Local 
merchants received the paper wages of workers who owed them for goods. The 
company, diverted a portion of Chisolm Austin's pay to James Harris, from whom Austin 
had bought a pair of shoes.77 Merchants such as "Venables & Womack" made good use 
of the toll account they maintained with the Upper Appomattox Company. Rather than 
issuing cash for each boat to pass down the river, the merchants deposited a sum in the 
toll account, which the Company periodically debited when it received a reckoning of 
merchants' tolls.78
The Upper Appomattox Company Ledger Book reveals considerable 
sophistication in some individuals' management of their accounts. Take, for example, the 
case of Robert Atkinson, whose name appears from 1797 to 1811. After selling land to 
the Upper Appomattox Company, Atkinson did not demand the sales price of £1 18_6_8 
in full. Instead he subscribed to two shares in the company for a total of £60, made two 
withdrawals of £24 and £7_16_0, and left the rest on account. Atkinson subsequently 
was credited £41_8_0 for carting barrels and £15 for selling to the company timber, fire
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wood, and his Sycamore Island. At one point he transferred some of his credit to a Daniel 
Teasdale for an undisclosed reason. Atkinson never completely emptied his account, 
preferring instead to withdraw cash on a regular basis, treating his credits with the 
company as a kind of savings account. By maintaining so sizable an account for fifteen 
years, Atkinson also demonstrated considerable faith in the company’s solvency.79
As the companies pressed on with their clearance projects the constant shortage of
funds and labor was not the only impediment to progress. The weather was little help.
Work was accomplished whenever the elements permitted, the typical work season
running from summer to autumn, after the spring floods and before cold weather returned.
During the winter, ice demolished much of what had been constructed the previous
season, and what the winter ice did not destroy, the ice flows of the spring thaw
threatened. If any improvements survived the ice, the thaw also brought sudden floods,
known as freshets, that acted as water-bulldozers, knocking down everything in their
path. Consider the destructive potential of an uncontrolled James River after a heavy
rain in the eighteenth century:
On Friday night the James River began to rise, and by Saturday morning 
exhibited a high freshet. Vast quantities of drift wood, and grain of all 
sorts, poured down the falls. [T]he part of Mayo’s bridge which lays 
between the toll house and Manchester gave way — about six pens of the 
wooden work floated down the stream, the cases of six piers were tom off, 
and the piers fell down. Mr. Trent’s dam on the other side of the river is 
swept away and a great many mill dams in the upper country carried off.
The injury above must be immense.80
Structures to improve navigation were not only at the mercy of the river, as they 
also fell prey to the limited technical expertise of those building them. Dams and locks
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endeavored to tame the river, but their technology was complex and Americans had little 
experience with it. John Ballendine relied on knowledge he acquired in England in his 
attempt to clear the Potomac before the Revolution.81 He advocated an extensive system 
of seventeen locks to reach the headwaters of the river. Four of the locks were to be 
installed at Little Falls, eight at Great Falls, one at Seneca Falls, two at Shenandoah Falls, 
one at House Falls, and finally one where the Antietam River met the Potomac.
Ballendine also planned a level canal three miles long from the tidewater to the 
locks at Little Falls and a one and one half mile "cut" or channel from the river to the lock 
at Seneca Falls, with shorter cuts to the other locks. The remainder of the river was to be 
cleared of obstructions and tow paths were to be installed.82 The outbreak of the 
Revolution just as the work was to begin prevented Ballendine from marshaling the 
substantial resources necessary to give substance to his vision.
The Potowmack Company directors, no doubt aware of Ballendine’s failure, 
initially proposed improving the river without locks, even though locks were required in 
their charter. Washington’s opposition to dams and locks demonstrated intimate 
familiarity with the threat posed by the elements: "canals and locks, besides the natural 
decay of them, are exposed to much injury from ice, drift-wood, and even the common 
freshes; in a word [dams] are never safe where there are such...violent torrents, as the 
rivers in this country are subjected to." Washington proposed to avoid the necessity of 
locks by building "inclined planes," or gradual slopes, over which boats could be pulled 
by lines and winches.83 These inclined planes would have the advantage of being 
completely underwater, rendering them less susceptible to the elements.
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Washington’s reluctance to use locks was clearly influenced by Thomas Johnson, 
first state governor of Maryland and a prominent Potomac improvement advocate. In 
1770 Johnson advised Washington against the use of locks because of their vulnerability. 
He recommended channeling the river through sluices made of logs bolted together and 
filled in with stones that were plentiful along the river bank. Sluices were short retaining 
walls built on both banks at an angle facing downstream, hence their other names, "v- 
dams" and "wing dams." A gap just wide enough for boats was left between the two 
walls. By forcing the river through this narrow channel, the water level could be raised 
by one or two feet. Sluices took the river on its own terms, urging the water flow to a 
level compatible with navigation. Johnson expected that the sluices would be underwater 
in the winter and would be less likely to sustain damage from ice or driftwood. Should 
the sluices be damaged they were easily rebuilt. At falls and rapids, Johnson advised 
blasting a passage.84
The plan upon which the Potowmack Company directors settled was a 
compromise between Ballendine’s system of numerous locks, and Johnson’s proposal for 
a lock-free navigation. Nearly all of the company’s capital was committed to providing a 
passage around Little Falls, five miles above Georgetown, and the Great Falls, seven 
miles farther downriver. The Little Falls presented a descent of thirty-seven feet, which 
was to be overcome by a two-mile canal, containing four locks. The Great Falls, with a 
seventy-six foot descent over 1,250 yards, would require five locks, the channel for the 
last two blasted out of solid rock. House Falls required a fifty-yard canal, and the 
company would also create passages through the Shenandoah and Seneca Falls. A final
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one-mile canal would be cut above Harper’s Ferry.85
The Potowmack Company made steady, if not dramatic, progress in the first years 
of the project. A newspaper reported in 1789 that a boat bringing two hundred sixty-two 
barrels of flour from Shephard’s Town easily passed the Shenandoah and Seneca Falls. 
Another story asserted the company had established navigation "at present upwards of 
one hundred fifty miles above tidewater." Both reports congratulated the company on its 
work and noted a savings in carriage costs of between five and ten shillings per barrel.86
These reports were far more sanguine than the actual improvements warranted. 
Much work remained to be done, particularly at the Little and Great Falls. The company 
had yet to undertake improvements to the Little Falls, and although the directors 
optimistically characterized the Great Falls as "nearly completed," construction of the 
locks —  the biggest part of the project — had yet to commence. The Seneca Falls were 
cleared to the extent that obstacles to navigation had been removed and the descent had 
been graduated, but a channel was not yet completed. The falls at the Shenandoah fork 
were only partially cleared.87
By 1793, the Potowmack Company reported progress above the Great Falls, 
noting that work had begun on the canal and locks at the Little Falls. On that basis, the 
company requested that the state pay the balance of the most recent installment of its 
subscription.88 A few months later the company’s directors reported that they had nearly 
completed the project, but that difficulties associated with raising unpaid subscriptions 
frustrated their efforts. They requested an extension of their deadline to January 1, 1795. 
The General Assembly granted the request.89
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By 1795, the Potowmack Company claimed to offer navigation to flatboats as far 
as thirty miles above Fort Cumberland and sixty miles up the Shenandoah River.90 
However, the locks at the Great Falls were still not finished, forcing the company to offer, 
at cost, overland conveyance around the falls and to provide boats downriver for the final 
trip to tidewater.91 An advertisement for the sale of shares in 1795 stated the company 
collected tolls at the Great Falls and that "the capital employed in this fund will be as safe 
and profitable as any in our country." But the next year Thomas Mason complained to 
the governor that the company’s directors, most of whom lived in Alexandria, were 
interested only in clearing navigation to that town, and, once they achieved that objective, 
could not be trusted to fulfill their statutory responsibilities.92
Unknown to the directors at the time, 1802 would be the highpoint for the 
company. The directors were delighted to report the locks at the Great Falls had been 
completed in February. But the weather continued to hamper the company’s efforts. 
Spring rains had been so meager that the river level was uncharacteristically low. 
Although the company had expected to reap considerable toll revenues with the opening 
of the Great Falls, less than $4,000 had been collected. And, unfortunately, the dividend 
of $5.55 per share that the company proudly paid was the only dividend the Potowmack 
Company ever distributed.93
At the same meeting, the directors admitted they could never connect the Potomac 
River with the Ohio Valley and should instead focus on improving more heavily settled 
areas along the Potomac and its tributaries. Because of limited precipitation in the area, 
they also decided to discourage water-using industry in the Potomac Valley although it
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would have generated supplemental income for the company.94 At the meeting the 
shareholders approved suspending further dividends to extend the clearing and maintain 
previous improvements.95 This action demonstrated both the shareholders’ commitment 
to their communities and a sound business strategy emphasizing short-run investment to 
ensure future profits. The profits, however, never materialized, and the Potowmack 
Company limped along.
An 1804 newspaper article promoting the company's improvements asserted 
millers in the Alleghenies could ship flour two hundred miles to tidewater less 
expensively than fifty miles overland, the only impediment being the design of the boats. 
The article observed that, if boats could be built to navigate in fourteen inches o f water, 
they would be able to ply the river ten months out o f the year without incident.96 This 
reference suggests that the two hundred mile navigation was only possible under ideal 
conditions attributable more to nature than to the efforts of the company. A petition from 
the Potowmack Company the next year conceded that assessment. During the spring run­
off boats carrying not less than fifty or sixty barrels of flour could navigate the river at its 
lowest stages, passing through the Shenandoah, Seneca, Great and Little falls, a distance 
of about one hundred twenty miles and a descent of two hundred twenty-five feet.97
To residents of the area, the Potowmack Company was failing to achieve even its 
more limited objectives. An 1810 petition from residents on the Shenandoah River 
complained that the company, which had already been given an extension of nine years, 
had not cleared navigation from the mouth of the Shenandoah River to Smith’s Creek on 
the North Fork or from the mouth to Port Republic on the South Fork. The petitioners
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requested that no further extension be granted the company because the 1811 deadline 
"will have the salutary effect to evince to the Potowmack Company the necessity to 
consult our interest and not their own convenience to execute and finish the improvement 
and opening of the [Shenandoah] river."98
The Potowmack Company’s response to this pressure was to divest itself of 
responsibility for clearing the Shenandoah River. In 1813 the company's directors 
informed the legislature they had reached an agreement with the residents of Augusta, 
Rockingham and Shenandoah counties for the creation of a new company to clear the 
Shenandoah. The Potowmack Company relinquished the right to clear the river and 
petitioned for a new company that would reimburse the Potowmack Company for the 
improvements already completed. The annual reimbursement would never exceed annual 
toll revenues. Should the new company net be formed within six months, the right to 
improve the Shenandoah would revert to the Potowmack Company, which would be 
granted a five year extension to complete the work. The General Assembly assented to 
the arrangement.99
The James River presented fewer obstacles to navigation than the Potomac.
While the Potowmack Company had to overcome numerous falls, the James River 
Company had only the falls at Richmond to conquer. Clearance was primarily a matter of 
removing obstructions and building sluices. The account book of the James River 
Company indicates clearance projects were in full operation by January 1786. The 
company was buying supplies and tools, providing a residence for the manager, and
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securing labor.100 In 1791, citizens as far west as Amherst County, at the base of the Blue 
Ridge Mountains, were reporting the river navigable in that part o f the state even during 
the driest parts o f the year.101
By 1794 the company had completed a canal around Richmond that could be 
navigated by boats carrying ten to twelve hogsheads of tobacco. Navigation was 
temporarily possible from Rockett’s Landing in the lower part of Richmond to 
Lynchburg.102 This canal soon filled with silt, necessitating a new approach. Excavation 
began on the Great Basin soon after. In 1800, the company let water into the basin, 
marking the completion of its largest construction effort — a canal around the falls, 
though not around the entire city and into the tidewater.103
The canal around the falls was actually two canals. The upper canal, about two 
hundred yards long, used three locks to lower boats thirty-four feet and then returned 
them to the river, where they could travel for three miles. The lower canal, about three 
and one-half miles long, carried boats to the Great Basin, without the use of locks.ltM 
Benjamin Latrobe did not think much of the works when he viewed them in 1796. He 
considered the most impressive aspect of the canal to be the lower portion, most of which 
had been blown out of solid granite. Other than that, Latrobe characterized the canal as 
"neither judiciously, nor ornamentally managed, and there are several most gross blunders 
in its execution." In particular, he disparaged the locks which he noted were made of 
granite block laid together without concrete. Water leakage was substantial which greatly 
lengthened the time required to fill the locks. "The loss of water is no consideration," 
reported Latrobe, "but that of time is considerably inconvenient."105
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It is important to emphasize the distinction between the company’s 
accomplishments in bypassing the falls and its providing navigation through to the 
tidewater. With the completion of the canal and the Great Basin, the James River 
Company had created a w aterway around the falls that ended in the western part of the 
city. Another canal would be required to connect the Great Basin to the river at Rockett’s 
landing, where the city’s warehouses were located and where ocean-going vessels were 
laded. Twenty years after Latrobe’s comments, the General Assembly chartered the 
Richmond Dock Company to effect the tidewater connection.
1794 also marks the first year in which the James River Company collected tolls, 
having demonstrated to the General Assembly that it had progressed sufficiently with its 
improvements. At this point only half tolls were permitted; full tolls would not be 
allowed until 1806. The Company paid its first dividend in 1801.106 Unlike the 
Potowmack Company, the James River Company would continue to pay dividends for 
twenty years.
In an 1801 report to the Virginia Senate, James River Company President William 
Foushee asserted that the company had largely complied with its charter, having 
completed the construction of virtually all locks and dams, leaving only the final clearing 
of the river bed in places. He noted the near completion of the navigation to Crow s 
Ferry, which he stressed was the highest point the company’s charter required it to clear. 
But later in the report he admitted the clearance from Goolsby’s Falls up to Lynchburg, 
and from thence to Crow’s Ferry would require several more seasons. To temper this bad 
news, Foushee pointed out that the company had also cleared navigation on several
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tributaries not required by the charter. He described the navigation of two hundred miles 
of the James River, and its cleared branches, as "stretching out their arms to some 
distance, thereby greatly enhancing the value of lands throughout a large extent, as well as 
some remuneration to the individuals who have advanced and hazarded their money on an 
arduous experiment, for the public good."107
In a similar report that year to Governor James Monroe, Foushee observed that 
"there remains comparatively speaking, but little to be done for the completion o f such an 
extensive navigation, and that the dams, locks, lower sluice canal, and basin were 
finished.” He noted in particular the work between Lynchburg and Crow's Ferry, about 
two hundred twenty miles from the tidewater, and boasted that flour was routinely 
brought down the river from the fork at Jackson’s River, forty miles farther upriver. 
Foushee thus credited the Company with two hundred sixty miles of navigation, though 
the falls at Richmond were not cleared, work also remained to be completed on the 
middle of the river, and the last forty miles were mostly conjecture.
Despite his rosy assessment, Foushee could not avoid conceding much work 
remained for the Company. He was quick to point out any further improvements were 
entirely dependent on the weather, and that '"tis impossible to work advantageously 
unless the water is low, and that generally can be calculated on for but a short period each 
summer." Foushee neglected to reveal the Company had no intention to undertake any 
clearing below Richmond to afford a true connection to the tidewater.108 In 1802 Foushee 
reported continued progress on the river bed, rendering tolerable navigation from Crow's 
Ferry to the Basin. He again made no mention of the tidewater.109
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The resistance of the James River Company to providing tidewater access evoked 
an angry response in the Richmond Enquirer. A letter to the General Assembly pointed 
out the company’s charter included opening the river from Westham "to the tidewater" 
[original italics].110 Instead of complying with the intent of the charter, asserted the letter, 
the company had creatively interpreted it. The eastern end o f  the company’s canal basin 
was indeed beyond the falls, so the company had, technically, reached the tidewater. 
However, it had failed to provide a communication into the tidewater. Instead, all the 
produce brought into the canal had to be conveyed in drays to the docks at Rocketts. 
Should tidewater access be completed and scows used for conveyance, the letter 
calculated the price for transporting one hundred hogsheads to Rocketts would decline 
from over forty-one dollars to seven, resulting in a considerable increase in profits for the 
farmers using the James River.
The letter noted two objections to the connection, no doubt raised by the 
company. First, that the tidewater connection would impose an additional expense on the 
company, reducing its dividends. The letter tossed aside this argument, pointing to the 
company’s considerable profits, and observing that, at worst, the costs of the connection 
would reduce dividends for just a short time. A second objection was that a connection 
would diminish the business of warehouses along the basin, and lower the value of 
adjacent property, the owners of which anticipated an appreciation when new warehouses 
would be built. Shifting from drays to scows would not reduce the need for the current 
warehouses, the letter continued, and new ones were unlikely to be built anyway. The 
remaining land was not suitable for new warehouses, or much else, because it was subject
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to flooding by freshets, the swells from which could be as high as twenty feet.111
Asserting the James River Company had resolved not to complete a connection to 
the tidewater, an 1804 petition from Powhattan County complained the company 
sacrificed the need of the community in favor of the interests of individual shareholders 
and the inhabitants of the city of Richmond. The petitioners claimed the company sought 
to relieve itself of an expensive project and at the same time providing Richmond, where 
the navigation currently ended, with a competitive advantage over other ports. As a 
result, citizens of the region were forced to pay trans-shipment fees from the end of the 
river to the sea-going docks on the other side of the city. This expense was particularly 
great for heavy items such as coal.112
In 1805 the company responded to these criticisms. A tidewater connection 
would require the construction of locks, which the company argued would be so 
expensive that such work would not only divert resources from removing obstructions 
from the bed of the river, but would absorb profits which would have been distributed as 
dividends. Such an expenditure, the company argued, would be to no end, for tobacco at 
Rockets warehouse sold for the same price as at Shockoe slip. Furthermore, though 
expensive locks would indeed permit river batteaux to pass into the tidewater, the passage 
would be to no end as merchants would resist relying upon such small boats when much 
larger boats in the same area were available and which offered greater security against 
produce damage from capsizing. The company concluded that forcing it to connect the 
James River with the tidewater would be "impolitic and unreasonable," for such 
construction would pose a cost beyond any possible benefit and would preclude state
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investment in other more useful improvements.113
If the James River Company was not going to provide tidewater access, residents 
were determined to seek another solution. An 1805 petition from the inhabitants of the 
town of Manchester and Chesterfield County agreed that a set of locks through the city of 
Richmond would be impractically expensive. As an alternative they proposed a canal on 
the south side of the river through Manchester and into the tidewater. This canal, the 
petition claimed, could be dug at far less expense and would have the immediate effect of 
renewing Manchester’s commerce, which had declined in recent years. The petition 
requested the incorporation of a new company, the Manchester Canal Company, on terms 
similar to that of the James River Company. The petition also recommended that the 
James River Company invest in the new venture, thereby suggesting to legislators that the 
existing company had no genuine intention of securing tidewater access.114 Another 
petition of that year made the same arguments and went on to commit the new company 
to "assisting" the James River Company in improving upper navigation once it had 
completed the canal.115
In the face of mounting public pressure, the company could no longer brush aside 
its responsibility to provide tidewater access. In July 1810 it announced the signing of a 
contract with Ariel Cooley of Springfield, Massachusetts, to build a canal from the basin 
to the river. Cooley’s exploits demonstrate the limitations of the expertise available in 
this period for river improvement. Cooley was an hydraulic engineer of some 
prominence, having designed and overseen construction of the Fairmont Water Works in 
Philadelphia, a river dam on the Schuykill River, and a canal with locks in Hadley,
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Massachusetts. His S50,000 contract called for thirteen locks, including the primary 
water-lock. He received a $10,000 advance for the project, which he was to complete by 
May 1812.116
Apparently, Cooley thought he had devised a plan to complete the preliminary 
excavation more quickly and cheaply than the Company’s directors imagined. Cooley cut 
a ditch along the center-line of the route for the canal, and opened a sluice from the Great 
Basin. Cooley expected the action of the water cascading down to the river to gouge out 
a canal bed. In twenty-four hours, however, the water had scoured an unusable channel 
and filled the James River with clay and stone that had to be removed.
Cooley overcame this initial disaster and completed the canal and locks, which 
were opened for the first time on October 17, 1811. A boat Cooley built to carry five 
hundred barrels of flour was the first to attempt the passage. The ascent and descent each 
took under an hour. Regarding the construction of the locks, a newspaper reported:
"Time, we imagine, must test their execution."117 They did not pass the test. The wooden 
locks soon began to rot and required constant upkeep, and the canal continued to dump 
silt into the river, creating a navigation hazard. Only a few boats passed through the canal 
before the project was abandoned, ending the James River Company’s efforts to comply 
with its charter and reach the tidewater.118
Throughout the period, the James River Company stressed its successes at 
clearing navigation on the western reaches of the river. But this, too, was a cause for 
contention. In an 1804 report the James River Company noted between the years 1796 
and 1800 it had directed its resources to clearing the river from Crow’s Ferry to
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Lynchburg, and the next four years below Lynchburg. The company pointed out it had 
provided navigation on certain branches of the James River, including the Willis River up 
to Caira, the Rivanna as far as Milton, and the North River to Lexington. The company 
acknowledged it had not provided navigation at the two foot depth its charter required, 
but asserted the batteaux that plied the James and its branches required only one foot or 
less.119
The General Assembly did not seem enthused with the company’s progress. In 
January 1805 it considered legislation prohibiting the James River Company, as of 
January 1, 1807, from collecting tolls for parts of the river it had not rendered navigable. 
The law also directed the appointment of commissioners to identify just what parts of the 
river had been cleared and whether the company was in compliance with its charter.120 
The James River Company directors responded to the law by admitting non-compliance 
with the letter of the law, but asserted the company was very close, reiterating progress on 
the river up to Crow’s Ferry, below Lynchburg, and on several of the river’s tributaries. 
While the directors acknowledged the river had not maintained the required depth during 
the drought of 1803, they offered testimony that the shallowest sluices had a depth of nine 
or ten inches. The company’s directors also sought to defuse the criticism they were more 
concerned with profits than their commitments by noting it was average citizens who 
received dividend payments. The directors asserted "[o]ne half of all sums received by 
the company and disposed of in dividends, go to the public, and to those to whom they 
have made the donation spoken of."121
The company’s statement also provides a hint as to who prompted the legislation.
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The company’s directors alluded to complaints by residents of Lynchburg that the 
company had failed in its commitments. The directors pointed out they had given the 
Lynchburg residents considerable latitude as to how the improvements in their area 
should be accomplished, and by whom. Only late in 1804 did the company’s directors 
find out the Lynchburg residents had declined this offer, leaving the company no time to 
plan its own clearance efforts.122
Once the commissioners completed their survey, the James River Company 
contacted them in an effort to put the best possible "spin" on the report. Knowing the 
commissioners would be critical of the company’s work, Foushee and Edward Carrington 
requested the report include several matters to ensure a "full statement." Despite an 
extremely dry year, the directors asserted, a boat drawing the depth required by the charter 
passed from Crow’s Ferry to Richmond. Only once in the mountains did low water 
require some of the travelers to step out of the boat to lighten it, though all the goods 
remained in place. In fact Foushee and Carrington argued that from Lynchburg to 
Richmond the river had been so improved that boats much larger than the charter required 
were carrying heavy loads to the state capital.
Foushee and Carrington also tried to justify those instances when the test boat 
struck rocks that the commissioners felt should have been removed. The occasional 
obstruction, argued the directors, was more the result of crooked sluices and the dams and 
wing-walls that provided an abundance of water, than it was from low water. These 
improvements, the directors asserted, could even pose a threat in themselves when barely 
submerged under rising water. They failed to mention the crooked sluices were ones
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they built or why improvements were not substantial enough to serve in high water as
well as low. The correspondence ended with a request that the commissioners convey to
the General Assembly "all the information on this important subject."123
The commissioners were also presented with a deal by agents for the company,
who claimed to do so
in order to avoid a painful and unnecessary contest on the fact of their 
having complied or not complied with the terms of their charter in relation 
to the navigation of James River, and in order to promote the interest of 
the commonwealth and of the public who may have occasion to use the 
river.
The James River Company would agree to focus their efforts on whatever parts of the 
river deemed not navigable by the commissioners, in return for the repeal of the 1805 law 
limiting the areas where the company could collect tolls. The commissioners and the 
General Assembly did not nibble.124
The Upper Appomattox Company boasted a much better record of constructing 
well-designed and durable improvements. It relied on sluices with sixteen foot openings 
to produce sufficient water flow throughout the river. On rapids as many as six pairs of 
sluices were built, although the company generally considered a single long sluice with 
stone walls to be more cost effective.125 In order to bypass the river's falls — which in the 
case of the Appomattox were really a stretch of rapids — the Company constructed a five 
and one-half mile canal and aqueduct beginning in Dinwiddie County, with a basin in 
Petersburg serving as the terminus. By 1801 the company had completed about two miles 
of the canal and continued to extend the canal throughout the next decade. 126
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The canal ultimately contained four locks, each made of stone. This form of 
construction was more expensive than wood, but far more durable. The locks were 
thirteen feet wide and two hundred fifty feet long and lowered boats a total of thirty-nine 
feet. The lock gates, which were v-shaped to accommodate the pointed hulls of the 
batteaux, were sixty-four feet long and ten feet wide — more than large enough to 
accommodate the largest river craft.127 The company also built a stone aqueduct to permit 
the canal to pass over Indian Town Creek. By 1810 the Upper Appomattox Company 
boasted one hundred miles of improved navigation.128
Digging on the Dismal Swamp Canal began in 1793. Relying upon an incomplete 
survey, two teams of workers began on either end of the canal route, expecting to meet 
somewhere in the middle. By 1796 the Due de La Rochefoucauld reported that five miles 
of the anticipated sixteen-mile canal had been dug, but no levels had been taken, and the 
number of locks that might be necessary was still unknown.129 By February 1799,
Thomas Newton, the company's president, reported a cut running the entire length of the 
canal would be completed by Christmas, affording a passage to "show the utility of the 
work and convince those who have considered it impossible." The cut would be only half 
the width the company's charter required. In 1801 Newton was still anticipating 
completion and offered the familiar excuse of higher costs and lack of money. He was 
happy to note that "[b]oats like those used in the James River Canal" — no doubt 
batteaux —  plied the canal waters on either end o f the planned route. Only the middle of 
the canal remained to be cut, and he expected that task to take one summer.130
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The first report of a completed lock on the canal appeared in November 1801.
The lock had been constructed at the south end of the route, opening a link to the 
Pasquotank River. The lock admitted boats similar to those on the James, five feet wide 
and drawing two feet of water. The report also noted the erection of a smaller temporary 
lock some distance north of the Great Lock which raised the water height where the 
ground descended, leveling that stretch of the canal. But at the end o f 1802, Newton 
reported little additional progress because of the rainy summer.131
By 1804 the regret of the company’s directors for failing to finish the canal had 
escalated to "mortification." One and a half miles remained to be cut to accommodate 
boats large enough to carry twenty hogsheads of tobacco. The directors reported the 
construction of a lock on the north end of the canal that raised the water level enough to 
allow passage of small "shingle flats," used to carry juniper shingles from the swamp.
The flats were thirty to forty feet long, four to six feet wide and drew eighteen to twenty- 
five inches of water. The directors anticipated erection of three more locks to ensure full 
utilization, but meanwhile temporary locks permitted navigation on long stretches of the 
canal. The one and a half miles remaining would soon be open with one-half the required 
width to permit limited traffic. The canal would then be expanded to full width.132
In a report to the Governor in the same year, President Newton admitted the canal 
did not maintain sufficient depth, necessitating construction of a feeder canal from Lake 
Drummond, about three miles west of the canal’s mid-point. He projected the feeder 
canal could be finished in a season, at which time the company would achieve its goal of
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affording access to navigation for those living near the southern waterways of the 
Roanoke, Meherrin, Nottoway and Blackwater rivers. "Produce that is now almost 
useless to the inhabitants in those places," Newton observed, "would yield them 
considerable profit if they had water carriage to market."133
In 1805, the company’s directors reported connecting the waters of the Elizabeth 
and Pasquotank Rivers. Four miles of the canal had not yet been cut to its required depth 
and width, and locks remained to be finished at either end, but shingle flats could 
navigate the entire length. In addition, the report boasted the road constructed along the 
canal’s west bank would greatly shorten travel overland between Norfolk and North 
Carolina.134
Two years later Blow reported to Congress that of the permanent locks on the 
river, only two, measuring seventy-five feet long, nine feet wide and six feet deep sills, 
were made of wood. Additional locks in the middle of the canal and at either end were 
needed. Over the next five years, the company completed eight new locks, and the feeder 
canal to Lake Drummond.135 On May 12, 1812, the governor of Virginia, James Barbour, 
presided over a ceremony commemorating the official completion of the Dismal Swamp 
Canal, "amidst the shouts and applause of the spectators."136
Nature may have provided the James River, but the James River Company’s 
expertise enhanced it to better convey the region’s traffic. In 1803, almost 17,000 
hogsheads of tobacco were annually coming down the river along with 170,000 bushels 
of wheat, 58,000 barrels of flour, and 34,000 bushels of com. In addition, two thousand
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coal boats navigated the river.137
Just as important as the traffic down the river was what was going up it. The 
increasing volume of trade meant greater access to finished goods for the farming 
population of the interior. In the 1780s Virginians like Jefferson had warned of the moral 
debilitation similar finished goods and articles threatened. By the first decade of the 
nineteenth century, such items were so available to so many, the danger they represented 
was no longer so apparent. As had already happened in Europe, the Virginia public’s 
attitude toward luxury reflected their growing familiarity with the conveniences offered 
by the commercial expansion —  an expansion that the four improvement companies in 
Virginia accelerated. "Luxury," which had been disdained as dangerous, was undergoing 
reevaluation in the Old Dominion.138
River improvement advocates had initially sold their plans by tying the material 
impulses associated with trade to the disciplined, frugal behavior deemed necessary for a 
republican citizenry. But as trade increased, and luxuries became more available, the 
capacity to acquire became the measure of success rather than any demonstration of 
republican virtue. A toast offered to the Richmond Volunteer Companies during the 1809 
Fourth of July celebrations boasted that the "industry and ingenuity" of Virginians 
procured them "every comfort and many luxuries of life."139
The meaning of "luxury" had undergone a metamorphosis. It no longer meant the 
acquisition of purely frivolous items, but could refer to owning items of comfort and 
convenience. A series of articles in the Richmond Enquirer pondering the term identified 
four very different definitions. Luxury could refer to the pleasures associated with
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intellectual refinement, or with sympathetic affections such as love and friendship. Those 
items that provided health or comfort, as suggested in the Fourth of July toast, could also 
be construed as luxuries. Only the fourth definition, articles of sensual pleasure, 
"fabricated, not for the purpose of comfort, utility and convenience, but for the 
gratification of pride, vanity and ostentation," carried a negative connotation.140 By 
identifying multiple meanings of luxury, and asserting that only one was harmful, the 
author transmitted the message that luxury was not, by definition, socially poisonous. To 
the contrary, anyone associated with the positive aspects of luxury was clearly healthy, 
wealthy, and wise.
Now that the term "luxury" was no longer pejorative, Virginians had fewer 
inhibitions about participating in commercial activity along the improved waterways.
The improvements not only enhanced commerce and access to luxuries, they also 
dramatically changed the landscape and undermined the traditional relationships among 
those who lived near the rivers or made their livings from them. Luxury came with a 
price — new and unexpected social, economic, and political conflicts.
Whether the improvement companies or the local users were accused of 
interestedness, in either case the strategy relied on the traditional presumption that interest 
was antithetical to public benefit.141 Washington’s innovation was to reject this 
dichotomy. In his letter to Harrison, Washington explained that private interest, 
manifested in the shareholders of joint-stock companies, would best serve the public’s 
needs by successfully completing river clearance — something the counties had been 
unable to do. The unresolved question was, would private interest remain benign so long
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as it was effectively coupled to public benefit?
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CHAPTER IV
"PUBLIC EXPENSE WHEN UNCONNECTED WITH PUBLIC ADVANTAGE 
VIOLATES THE MOST VALUABLE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICANISM..."
-Legislative Petition 
from the residents of the 
Town of Milton, 1800.
As the companies proceeded in their work, the improved navigation permitted 
commercial networks to grow rapidly and settlement to accelerate, just as expected. But 
Virginians found themselves caught between the forward-looking initiatives and the 
traditional agrarian society they sought to secure. “Urban" development along the rivers 
gave rise to a new class of town dwellers who sought a public prominence befitting their 
affluence. The presence of individuals whose lives were not tied directly to land 
ownership created tensions in counties which had recently been utterly rural. In addition, 
towns, both new and old, challenged one another over which would most fully exploit the 
new economic opportunities carried on the rivers.
Perhaps least expected was that the primary agents o f the commercial expansion 
were black boatmen whose expertise in navigating batteaux on the river made them 
indispensable. Whites who lived along the river found the constant presence of highly 
independent, highly mobile, and highly muscular blacks quite unsettling. They blamed 
the black boatmen for every misdeed on and along the river, particularly theft. Slave 
owners assumed the boatmen aided and abetted runaway slaves. As important as the 
black boatmen were to the flow of river traffic, white Virginians nonetheless perceived
148
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
149
them as a menace to society.
Manufacturing had also been widely acknowledged as a threat to undermine 
Virginia’s agrarian society, so much so that internal improvement advocates in the 1780s 
in part justified the clearance projects as a way to promote commerce yet thwart the 
impulse for manufacturing such commerce might inspire. Nevertheless, Virginians 
readily adapted to the downturn in international trade from the Embargo of 1807 and later 
the War of 1812 by looking to integrate domestic manufacture into the state’s economic 
base. Rather than a threat, manufacturing came to be perceived as complementing 
agrarian society. Domestic manufacture would permit a well-rounded trade network to 
exist entirely within the state -- Virginia’s planters and farmers would no longer suffer the 
vicissitudes of foreign conflicts.
Having embraced domestic manufacture as a liberating force, Virginians cast a 
jaundiced eye on foreign commerce, which perpetuated their participation in international 
trade and was the cause of their current woes. The international trade network promoted 
dependence on foreign finished goods and reinforced the subordinate economic status of 
Virginia to the European nations. So important became internal trade as a response to 
foreign commerce that the General Assembly expanded the state's role in improvements, 
creating in 1816 the Board of Public Works and the Internal Improvement Fund.
River improvement had a dramatic effect on settlement patterns in Virginia. In 
the early 1780s, Johann Schoepf observed Virginia's lack of towns in comparison to the 
northern states. Schoepf, however, found very appealing Virginia's decentralized
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settlement and, in quoting Justus Moser, echoed a classic agrarian theme: “About his 
house he has his lands and woods, carries on his tillage as it pleases him and in time of 
need has always something at hand to tide him over." But the Virginia that Schoepf 
considered so attractive was found less frequently along its navigable rivers. Towns were 
popping up both spontaneously and by the design of land owners hoping to increase the 
value of their land.1
The Richmond Enquirer in 1804 carried a series of articles entitled "Progress of 
Improvement" seeking to convince its readers this “urban” development and commercial 
expansion, while discomfiting, was nonetheless necessary to perpetuate Virginia’s brand 
of agrarian republicanism. According to the articles, settlers initially spread out as far as 
the navigation of tidewater rivers permitted, so they might have enough land to farm and 
a means to carry produce to market. Farmers were soon followed by merchants and 
mechanics, carried to "clustered habitations" by "the spreading sails of indefatigable 
commerce."2
These small settlements then acted as "commercial colonies," providing the nuclei 
for flourishing towns. But as settlers were attracted to the region, they had to find for 
themselves new arable land to till, forcing them to move farther up the rivers. "It is in 
this manner that agriculture, as it ascends the confines of the navigable rivers, occasions 
the selection of new places of deposit, and the establishment of new towns; and it is for 
this reason, that in every civilized country so many towns may be traced on the map of its 
navigable rivers." In other words, the best sign of a healthy agrarian economy was the 
appearance of many new towns.
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As settlers continued to seek land, they eventually moved beyond the fall line, 
traveling as far as canoe and boat could take them. According to the author of the 
articles, settlements both at the highest point of navigation and at the fall line grew 
considerably because they were the departure points for river transportation. Batteaux at 
the head of navigation travel downriver to the fall line town which "becomes the 
emporium of all the exports of the upper districts of the country, and, of course, of all the 
valuable imports which it receives from distant markets." Between the upriver and 
tidewater termini many small towns would spring up along the river to carry on trade. In 
conclusion the author observed, "Where can we meet with a more satisfactory illustration 
of these abstract theorems, than in the history of our own state?"3
"Abstract theorems" connecting river navigation to town development were even 
more concretely illustrated in advertisements promoting the sale of town lots. The 
advertisement for Columbia, a town laid out at the junction of the James and Rivanna 
rivers, boasted good boat navigation was possible upwards of two hundred miles on the 
James River into the counties of Botetourt and Rockbridge, "thereby opening an easy 
communication with the western country." Richmond was only fifty miles away and, the 
advertisement claimed, could be reached by larger batteaux capable of delivering goods 
directly to ocean going ships. The advertisement hastened to note the canal around the 
falls to Richmond would be finished in just three years, and in another three years a 
communication would be opened directly to the tidewater. It also strongly suggested that 
those who bought lots in Columbia were getting in on the ground floor of a town that 
would be booming in just a few years.4
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A petition from the residents of Loudoun County requesting establishment o f a 
town at the Great Falls of the Potomac also employed the logic of the "Progress of 
Improvement" articles. The petitioners asserted the need for a new place of deposit for 
the larger number of boats coming down the river which had to wait for passage through 
the locks at Great Falls. The petition also requested inspection stations for produce, 
particularly hemp and tobacco.5 Similarly, a petition from residents of Powhatan County 
observed that as a result of the improvements to the James River, "most of the produce of 
the upper country has been and will continue to be carried to market through this channel" 
and that towns will arise to provide storage during the passage down the river. Naturally, 
the land for which the petitioners requested town establishment was a very eligible spot 
and particularly deserving of the General Assembly’s sponsorship.6
The increased pace of town development might have been a natural and 
predictable result of agricultural expansion, commercial growth, and improved river 
navigation, but it did not occur without turmoil. The rush to settle promising points of 
deposit on the rivers generated sometimes vicious regional rivalries. The residents of 
Amherst County petitioned the General Assembly in 1791 for establishment of a town 
directly across the river from Lynchburg, which was already rapidly emerging as the head 
of navigation "emporium” of which the "Progress of Improvement" articles spoke. Why 
the need for another town? After all, Lynchburg was a town on the rise. The settlement 
received a tobacco inspection in 1785; the first tavern, which also contained a store, was 
established in 1788. The first stand-alone store opened in 1790. By 1801, one thousand 
individuals signed a petition seeking another inspection, and in 1806 there were five other
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inspections. By 1816, Lynchburg boasted a population of 1,765 whites, 256 freemen and 
1,066 slaves.7
The petitioners acknowledged the rise and growth of Lynchburg in Campbell 
County, but asserted they were "inconvenienced" by having to cross the river with their 
produce to reach the town’s market. Stressing that they were from the rich and fertile 
counties north of the river, the petitioners requested permission to administer their own 
inspections which would more conveniently serve Amherst, Rockbridge and Augusta 
counties. The petition neglected to state the obvious reason for a new town —  stopping 
the stream of commerce in Amherst County rather than letting it pass across the river to 
Lynchburg.8
A similar conflict arose over the establishment of a new town across from Milton 
on the Rivanna River. The petitioners for a new town readily conceded the inspections of 
flour and tobacco at Milton had served as a convenient point of deposit for produce 
coming down the river. But they complained Milton's services were not quite convenient 
enough because the town lay on the wrong side of the river — more than half of the 
produce arrived on the river bank opposite Milton. According to the petition, the river’s 
banks were rugged and steep, its bed very rocky, and the stream subject to sudden swells. 
Crossing the river was undertaken at the peril of the goods and those trying to transport 
them. As a solution, the petitioners recommended the establishment of a new town on 
their side of the river, with inspections for flour and tobacco. The petitioners were quick 
to stress that their plan would not be realized at the expense of Milton’s economic 
development. Because of the overall growth, they observed, the new town would not
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reduce Milton’s market. There was enough for everyone.9
The citizens of Milton disagreed strenuously, building an argument around the
rhetoric of interestedness. A counter-petition refuted the suggestion that most of the
produce came from north of the river, estimating fully two-thirds came from the area to
the south of Milton, and crossed the river "with great convenience and small expense to
the proprietors of tobacco." Instead, they argued the expenses to the state associated with
a new inspection would exceed the advantages because only a small part of the
community could benefit, while rendering the majority "materially impaired" by the
competition. The Milton petitioners concluded the advocates for a new town had put
their own zeal for profit above their civic responsibility:
Public expense when unconnected with public advantage violates the most 
valuable principles of republicanism and is calculated to defeat those rules 
of economy which has heretofore been the peculiar [i.e., unique] boast of 
your honorable House.10
As far as the Milton residents were concerned, a new town was only not only an
imprudent waste of money; it was unpatriotic.
One of the most conspicuous consequences of waterways improvement was the
growth in the number of highly independent groups of freemen and slaves -- boatmen
who operated the batteaux that plied the rivers. Their skill at navigating the craft through
rapids, shallows, and narrow sluice gates, made possible the vision of a commercial
republic which had inspired the improvements in the first place. One historian, noting the
importance of the rivers to improving the connections between the eastern and western
parts of the nation, credits the boatmen with contributing mightily to the development of
an American nationality.1’ For white Virginians, particularly those along the river, this
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contribution did not come without a price.
An anecdote in a 1790 petition from residents of Powhattan, Goochland and 
Cumberland Counties graphically illustrates the tension between black boatmen and 
whites along the shore. We are presented with the scene of a growing mob of whites 
walking along the river, restricted to its bank, hoping to gather enough individuals to 
challenge a group of blacks they suspect of theft, who are literally and legally just beyond 
their reach, floating down the river, eventually out o f the jurisdiction of the county 
sheriff.
The white petitioners were highly appreciative of the benefits afforded by the 
improvements to the James River, but they observed the boats that traveled upon it were 
operated by individuals characterized as "without property and as we have experienced 
without principle." The petition noted that a boat discovered along the shore with stolen 
stock or property could not be detained if the particular offender could not be specifically 
identified. And when the offender was known, none dared approach to point him out, as 
several boats together contained a large and intimidating number of boatmen. AH that 
could be done was to follow the boats "until a sufficient number of neighbors can be 
collected to carry the offenders before some magistrate...," presumedly when the boatmen 
came ashore.
The petitioners feared continued violations unless the General Assembly adopted 
a speedier means for bringing the transgressors to justice. As a solution, the petition 
recommended registering all boats in use on the James River above the falls, and 
requiring the owners to deposit a security for the behavior of the master and crew. All
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boats would be numbered and marked in large characters on the side. The petitioners 
believed that if the owners could be easily and speedily held financially accountable for 
damages by their crews, "more caution would be used in hiring the crew of these boats 
and better discipline would be kept up by the masters of them.”12
Despite the fears, the volume of traffic on the James River grew, and the batteaux 
and their boatmen became an evermore dramatic presence on the rivers. In 1819, the 
Richmond Enquirer reported a survey of the river estimating the number of boats that 
operated between Lynchburg and Richmond to be around five hundred. If each boat bore 
the typical compliment of three, approximately 1,500 boatmen were constantly traveling 
the three hundred miles between the two cities. One individual recalled the river being 
crowded with boats, "and its shores alive with sable boatmen —  Such groups! Such 
attitudes! Such costume! Such character! They would have been worthy subjects for the 
crayon of a Darley or Gavami!"13
Night "was the glorious time," according to a contemporary writer using the 
pseudonym Porte Crayon. The batteaux often traveled in groups of three, and at dusk a 
fleet of fifteen or twenty would at times come ashore together. They would eat well, 
helping themselves to whatever produce, molasses, coffee, sugar or salt was part of the 
cargo. Theft was narrowly defined as taking from another slave, which permitted as an 
ethical option “taking [the master’s] meat out of one tub, and putting it in another.” After 
dinner, the whiskey jug would be passed, and banjoes and fiddles would be played while 
all sang.14 Such recollections glamorize the boatmen as heroic figures. They were mythic 
in their physical strength, renowned for their skills and enjoyed a lifestyle everyone —
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black and white —  envied.
After the Civil War, the black boatmen were romanticized in antebellum river
folklore.15 In 1884, Dr. George W. Bagby in a chapter of his memoirs entitled "Canal
Reminiscences" recalled:
Those were the "good old days" of batteaux — picturesque craft that 
charmed my young eyes more than all the gondolas of Venice would do 
now. True, they consumed a week in getting from Lynchburg to 
Richmond, and ten days in returning against the stream, but what of that?
Time was abundant in those days. It was made for slaves, and we had the 
slaves...I want the beat back again, aye! And the brave, lighthearted slave 
to boot.16
One can practically see the moonlight and smell the magnolias.
Bagby claimed that "if ever a man gloried in his calling, the negro boat-man was 
that man."17 The work was hard, and sometimes very dangerous; however, the lack of 
white oversight afforded black boatmen unrivaled freedom. But the same (stereotypical) 
group of happy-go-lucky, banjo-playing boatmen of whom Bagby spoke, were in the eyes 
of many whites who lived along the river, a band of fifty or so physically powerful, 
unscrupulous blacks who lacked sufficient supervision. Not only were the boatmen of 
necessity highly mobile but the state itself had afforded them a degree of autonomy. The 
charters of the improvement companies had designated their waterways "public 
highways" and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of counties. While the intention was to 
ensure no counties attempted to set up their own tolls or tariffs, or impose arbitrary 
standards on the companies, the designation also restricted the authority of county sheriffs 
to arrest and remove anyone from the river. Added to the boatmen’s intimidating 
presence and their practice of traveling in groups, this immunity meant boatmen had little
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reason to fear anyone while on the river.
Rather, the boatmen elicited considerable consternation, and at times outright fear, 
from the whites who lived along the river. A contemporary observation painted a far less 
pretty picture of the boatmen than did the fonder reminiscences. While Bagby and 
Crayon dismissed the penchant of the boatmen for petty theft as harmless and even 
endearing for those who shared in their ill-gotten bounty, General John Hartwell Cocke 
described the boatmen as "slaves of the worst character" whose owners were willing to be 
rid of them by hiring them out to shippers. Cocke claimed that "no man’s stock of cattle, 
sheep or hogs are safe in a pasture bordering on the river," casting the boatmen in a far 
harsher light than Porte Crayon, who suggested they pilfered only what they needed to fill 
their bellies. Cocke went on to report the primary business of the many groceries being 
licensed along the river was trafficking goods stolen by the boatmen. He wanted all 
groceries banned and the boats prohibited from touching shore except in bad weather and 
then only at public landings.18
The leadership of the Potowmack Company was similarly displeased with the 
reputation of the boatmen. A 1793 petition from the Potowmack Company complained 
the boatmen on the newly navigable parts of the river "are ignorant and careless to an 
extreme." They took little care of their cargo, which often arrived damaged, and often 
attempted to overcharge the recipient of the goods. The company was very concerned 
that potential customers were discouraged from using the Potomac River and 
recommended licensing the boatmen, as was in the practice in Pennsylvania on the 
Delaware River.19
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White Virginians also frequently associated the waterways and the boatmen with 
attempts to escape slavery. Newspapers of the day are filled with advertisements 
referring to the boatmen or the rivers as a means of escape for runaway slaves. But to 
speak of boatmen running away is not entirely accurate, for, even in flight, many stayed 
on the river. The boatmen recognized their skills were much in demand, and they did not 
seem to have any problems finding desperate boat owners who, needing a crew, did not 
ask too many questions. Other runaway advertisements mentioned the fact that the slave 
in question had formerly been a boatmen and would no doubt attempt to hire himself out
— boat owners were specifically cautioned against harboring such runaways.20
The river also provided runaways of all sorts with considerable mobility. One 
advertisement suggested an escaped slave might be in Powhatan or Cumberland counties, 
in Lynchburg, in Richmond, or he might be at the coal pits where he worked for many 
years, and would no doubt be harbored. The slave owner had narrowed the search to the 
entire expanse of the river made navigable by the James River Company.21 The owner of 
another runaway, known to have "a considerable acquaintance with boatmen that run the 
James," suspected the slave was associated with the two crimes slaveowners most feared -
- arson and theft. The owner suspected the slave’s escape had something to do with a fire 
that drew the owner from his house, leaving it prey for robbers. The advertisement 
suggests that boatmen would be sensitive to the runaway’s plight and abet his escape.
The slaveowner had no trouble believing boatmen were of such low repute they would 
provide assistance to so wayward a slave.22
One particularly informative advertisement noted the escape of a slave hired out
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to the armory on the canal basin in Richmond. Here she labored outside the direct 
purview of her owner and in the company of numerous other slaves hired out to work in 
the Armory. Apparently believing her obligations to her master superseded any marital 
bonds, the slaveowner asserted she had been "inveigled off' by her husband who was a 
boatmen for the coal pits in Westham on the James River. As runaways, the couple could 
rely on two support networks of which they were a part, his stemming from the coal pits 
and hers from the armory. In either case, the James River created the means to maintain 
their marriage, and as the advertisement suggests, other kinship and friendship ties. It 
reported she might be in Chesterfield or Powhattan counties where she had many 
relatives, or at a plantation in Henrico where she and her husband were known.23
Water travel might have been quicker than other modes of transportation, but it 
was by no means fast, particularly when going upstream. It took about ten days to 
proceed upriver from Richmond to Lynchburg. It would seem that someone on 
horseback would have ample time to catch up with a batteau poling upriver. But 
runaways did not have to stay on the river — they were not escaping into hostile territory. 
One historian has asserted the Africanization of the piedmont during the third quarter of 
the Eighteenth century.24 After the Revolution, more slaves lived in the piedmont than 
the tidewater, and the overall density of black population was high in both regions. In 
1782, one-third of the counties between the fall line and Blue Ridge, compared to forty- 
seven percent in the tidewater, contained more blacks than whites, and the heaviest 
concentrations o f black population followed the courses of the James, Potomac and 
Appomattox rivers.25
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The manner of slaveholding in the piedmont also created inviting prospects for 
prospective runaways. By the mid-eighteenth century, tidewater planters need not buy 
more slaves because the slaves they had inherited were reproducing at a rate more than 
supplying their labor needs. And those the masters did not need, they sold or transferred 
westward to plantations they established in the piedmont. These new plantations tended 
to be of middling size (eleven to thirty slaves), and became so numerous that by 1780 the 
concentration of such plantations differed little from the tidewater. By the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, the slave populations in both the tidewater and piedmont were 
concentrated in plantations sizable enough to grant slaves a fair degree of autonomy from 
whites, and sufficient opportunity to build kinship ties and friendships that afforded 
community solidarity to the slaves of the “Africanized” piedmont.26
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the piedmont was heavily populated by 
slaves who had been fully acculturated to life in Virginia and could take advantage of 
numerous opportunities to circulate without supervision. In the aftermath of the 
American Revolution, slaveholders in Virginia temporarily liberalized manumission laws, 
creating the impression that freedom was in reach. The slave trade had been restricted, 
and many masters felt an obligation to keep slave families together when they were sold. 
Whites also often ignored the requirement of written passes for slaves to travel alone, 
were lax in supervising slave gatherings, and overlooked prohibitions against engaging in 
commerce with slaves; masters would permit slaves to hire themselves out.
This more permissive servitude afforded a slave named Gabriel the means to 
improve himself, but demanded he accept a system that would never fully appreciate his
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talents. After the Revolution, there might have been a new birth of freedom, but there 
was also a great expansion, and entrenchment, of slavery. Gabriel faced a contradiction: 
he was permitted to cultivate his talents, but he would never achieve the social status he 
felt he deserved.27 Gabriel’s solution to the contradiction he faced was not to run away, 
or bum down a bam, or steal, but to rebel.
Gabriel was a skilled carpenter and blacksmith; what is more, he knew how to 
read and write. These abilities placed him in a growing class of slave-tradesmen who 
were literate, skilled, and mobile, and worked in a commercial environment that rewarded 
ability. They were also sophisticated enough to recognize the deck was stacked against 
black slaves, and that most whites around him were unaware they were dealing with 
slaves capable of resistance to the system that put them in bondage.28
In the language of criminology, Gabriel had motive and opportunity. Gabriel 
might have been a rural slave, but the agriculture of the James River region’s depended 
on a variety of crops which forced planters to rely on more skilled, less well supervised, 
and more privileged slave labor. Gabriel, for example, was able to visit Richmond every 
Sunday. Moreover, it was the custom among slaves in the area to gather in Richmond 
every Saturday night. Gabriel, his brother Solomon and Jupiter, the core of the 
conspiracy, all knew Richmond well and masterfully set up a network of recruiters to 
inform sympathetic slaves of their plan. Naturally, boatmen were key to the coordination 
of the rebellion, providing transportation and acting as recruiters in their own right. After 
the rebellion, a boatman named “Stepney,” was arrested for recruiting in Cartersville, 
Cumberland County, but it was discovered his influence stretched along the James River
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from Powhattan County to Buckingham County.29 Additional organizers worked among 
the slaves at the canal project at the Falls of the James River, and the coal pits above 
Westham.30 The James River was the conspiracy’s artery. Without the waters o f the 
James, the rebellion could not have been planned. Ironically, water — rain water -- would 
be the rebellion’s undoing.
Gabriel had selected the night of Saturday, August 30, for the rebellion. By noon 
of that day heavy rains had begun to fall. The storms swelled streams and washed out 
roads and bridges. A few slaves who were able to rendevous at Gabriel’s plantation were 
told to come back the next evening, but no one showed up the next night. The rebellion 
which had taken months to plan had dissolved in a matter of hours. Along with the rain, 
betrayal dampened whatever enthusiasm might have remained. On the day of the 
rebellion, at least three slaves informed their masters, who contacted Governor James 
Monroe. Monroe dispatched two cavalry troops to sweep the area. In a few days, twenty 
slaves had been arrested and ten had been executed.
Considering the importance of the river to the rebellion, it was only fitting that 
Gabriel had sought escape by boat. Having eluded capture for over two weeks, Gabriel 
jumped on board a boat at Ward’s Reach, four miles below Richmond. The captain of the 
craft, Richardson Taylor, was an anti-slavery Methodist who asked no questions when 
Gabriel claimed to be a freeman named David. On September 28 in Norfolk, the boat 
was boarded and inspected without incident, but Isham, a slave, brought the officials back 
believing he had identified the fugitive slave for whom a handsome reward was offered. 
Gabriel was removed in chains.31
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Gabriel remained silent throughout his trial, and went to the gallows without
publicly stating his motives. But a few years later, another slave offered the following
testimony during his conspiracy trial:
I have nothing more to offer than what General Washington would have 
had to offer, had he been taken by the British and put to trial by them. I 
have adventured my life in endeavouring to obtain the liberty of my 
countrymen, and am a willing sacrifice in their cause; and I beg, as a 
favour, that I may be immediately led to execution. I know that you have 
pre-determined to shed my blood, why then all this mockery of a trial?32
The slave’s comparison of himself to Washington and his reference to fellow
blacks as “countrymen” are most compelling evidence that well-informed slaves, like
Gabriel, were immersed in the political thinking of the Revolution. The use of the word
“adventured” deserves particular focus. As previously noted, the contemporary definition
of the term “adventurer” was closer to the modem “entrepreneur.” While it is disputable
whether Virginia’s white founding fathers were more influenced by classical references or
by contemporary liberalism, Gabriel would seem to possess a thoroughly forward-
looking political perspective. Gabriel had struck against the old order which denied him
the freedoms championed by the American Revolution. He sought a new order, one in
which he would be measured by his earning potential, and not the color of his skin. He
was quoted as saying that after taking Richmond (and presumedly killing as many whites
as he could) he “would dine and drink with the merchants of the city,” who were to be
exempt from the wrath of his compatriots.33 The merchants and Gabriel had something
else in common — they both sought material gain, and both depended on the river for the
success of their enterprises.34
Whites found Gabriel’s Rebellion particularly jarring because the conspirators
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were slaves who had distinguished themselves by their skills and intelligence, and had 
most benefitted from their owners’ tolerance. Rather than accepting their relatively 
comfortable situation, or even opting to run away, these slaves organized a rebellion.55 
Post-revolutionary idealism had led to a relaxation of slavery in Virginia, but because of 
Gabriel’s activities and those of other independent-minded slaves, the General Assembly 
returned to the colonial brand of slavery in order to better discipline slaves. Gabriel’s 
efforts had the opposite intended effect; rather than securing justice for slaves, he 
delivered them into a more restrictive servitude.36
In 1802, Governor Monroe established the Public Guard of Richmond, a night­
time police force authorized to protect public buildings and militia arsenals. It also was 
available to enforce the new law forbidding slave assemblies at night. In addition, 
justices of the peace were empowered to break up evening meetings at houses of worship 
and "inflict corporal punishment on the offenders."37
Boatmen, some of the most skilled and autonomous slaves who participated in the 
conspiracy, received special attention from the General Assembly. No black or mulatto, 
including freemen, was permitted to obtain a pilot’s license. In 1808, Potowmack 
Company officials expressed concern for the large quantities of flour and other articles 
brought down the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers "which are exposed to injury from the 
inattention of boatmen and want of protection from the weather." The company's 
directors sought a legislative act by the General Assembly "authorizing the Potowmack 
Company to make by-laws for the safe conveyance of produce and other articles in boats 
and generally for regulating the boating business in the Potowmack and Shenandoah
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Rivers and the branches thereof." The Committee on Propositions and Grievances 
concluded the petition sought too much authority for the company over a public highway 
and rejected it.38
Possibly owing to the larger volume of traffic on the James, and that its waters 
had nurtured Gabriel’s Rebellion, the General Assembly took more aggressive action 
toward the boatmen on that river. In 1810 it passed an act that addressed the most 
pressing concerns of both those who lived on the river and those who depended on it for 
the transport of produce and goods. No free negro or mulatto was permitted to carry a 
gun or rifle on a boat, and any white who seized the gun was permitted to keep it. Any 
boatman who was found away from his boat on the banks of the James River or its 
branches, during the trip or during loading, could legally be taken by any citizen to the 
local magistrate, who was authorized to dispense a punishment of no more than twenty 
lashes. A payment of two dollars "for the use of the poor" could secure a release, not to 
mention deliverance from the lash.
The owner of any slave caught stealing lumber, produce, livestock or any other 
goods upon the slave’s conviction had to repay the owner the value of the stolen item.
The slave received twenty lashes for the first offense and forty for the second. The third 
offense also earned forty lashes, but the slave's owner had to pay triple damages.
However, in a provision intended to discourage accusations against boatmen for the 
purpose of making a profit on the damages, if the testimony of the property owner were 
required to secure a conviction, the compensation paid went to the poor of the locality.
The statute also endeavored to reduce the perceived thievery of boatmen,
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particularly on the busy docks of Richmond. Manifests were required of all boats 
heading upriver, which the "inspector of boats" stationed at the upper locks of the canal 
reviewed to ascertain whether all goods on the boat were listed. The inspector had the 
authority to seize unlisted items and advertise them in the local papers for the rightful 
owner to reclaim. Free blacks had to have "some respectable white person" vouch for 
any personal property or goods they transported.39
By the first decade of the nineteenth century, Virginia had achieved an economic 
success that was due in no small part to the development of an infrastructure of improved 
waterways. United States Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin considered the 
improvements of waterways in Virginia to have had so dramatic and positive an impact 
that they warranted replication by other states. They were, most notably in New York. 
Gallatin’s 1808 Report on Roads and Canals offered a survey of the internal 
improvement projects in the United States that might warrant the sponsorship of the 
federal government. The report was an effort to rise above inter-state rivalries and 
develop a coherent plan for a national infrastructure and market system.40
Virginia's improvement projects appeared prominently in Gallatin's report. Of the 
four major canals he recommended be cut across capes and necks in order to enhance the 
coastwise traffic, only the Dismal Swamp Canal had actually been begun.41 Gallatin also 
envisioned several trans-Appalachian river networks, which, complemented by 
strategically placed canal systems, would be capable of reaching the Ohio River from the 
east. One network was the Monongahela and the Potomac; another, the Kanawha and the
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
168
James.42 Regarding the Potomac, Gallatin noted the river required a series of canals and 
locks and reported with a sense of awe that the lower locks o f the Great Falls works were 
excavated out of solid rock. Gallatin argued that if the Potomac, one of the fastest 
moving rivers on the Atlantic coast, could be subdued, so could any other river. The 
James River received special attention from Gallatin not only for the extent of the 
improvements to navigation, but because it was the only system that afforded tidewater 
access to significant deposits of coal.43
Gallatin laid out a plan for the development of an infrastructure that could 
accommodate an entirely self-sufficient American economy, an objective to which the 
improvements in Virginia seemed very much to lead. But economic independence would 
require the development of domestic manufactures to replace the products currently 
imported. Despite the Virginians’ commitment to expanded commerce and an acceptance 
of the "luxury" it brought, at the turn of the nineteenth century most remained dubious of 
permitting English-type factories into their agrarian republic.
With the improved navigation of the waterways and the sudden expansion in the 
number of towns in the state came a growing awareness among Virginians that they had 
to rethink their state’s commercial posture, and, most significantly, reconsider the state's 
manufacturing potential.44 A series of articles on the "Progress of Improvement" in the 
Richmond Enquirer in 1804 spoke of a "new era" unfolding in agricultural Virginia. As a 
country becomes more settled, the article's author postulated, foreign commerce becomes 
less advantageous. Agricultural surpluses result in price decreases while the prices of 
foreign finished goods increase due to heightened demand. In an effort to maximize
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profits, domestic fanners naturally begin to allocate resources to domestic manufacture. 
Towns begin to appear, not to facilitate international trade, but as factory centers. 
Domestic manufacturing becomes "the nucleus of a diversified population and increasing 
wealth," the series concluded.45
In 1815, a report of the House of Delegate’s Committee on Roads and Internal 
Navigation went so far as to conclude the establishment of new towns had become so 
integral to Virginia’s development that "whatever contributes to increase the population 
and wealth of the towns, must contribute to the growth and improvement of the 
country."46 Along with merchants, mechanics and artisans were the most prominent 
residents of these towns. In fact, many legislative petitions had come to use the presence 
of mechanics and artisans to justify their request for town establishment. A petition for 
the establishment of a town in Albemarle County in 1804 reported considerable 
improvements to the settlement, resulting in a great population expansion, "consisting 
chiefly of mechanics and manufacturers, the surest presage to the prosperity of an inland 
town."47
A powerful new incentive for expanded domestic manufacture came in December 
1807 with President Thomas Jefferson’s embargo.48 In response, manufacturing societies 
sprang up in cities across Virginia. The newly formed Richmond Friends of 
Manufacturing Association asked, "Are we capable of being entirely independent, or are 
we not?" If the nation chose not to, the association warned in a published address, the 
flag would be insulted, entangling foreign alliances might become necessary, and foreign 
trading partners would exert monopolistic control over shipping. Considering the
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international situation, the address set out plainly that "agriculture...can no longer supply 
all our wants —  we must of necessity become manufacturers."49
The nation should look to its own internal resources "with which the bounty of 
Heaven has so abundantly blessed us," the Richmond Friends of Manufacturing pointed 
out. Virginia possessed vast natural resources and fine sites for manufacturing, not to 
mention a mechanical genius on the part of the inhabitants that was beyond doubt. The 
only problem Virginia faced in cultivating domestic manufacture was securing sufficient 
labor. But the address claimed that manufacturing’s need for an overflowing population 
was a myth the British and French propagated for fear o f competition. Many industries 
had developed labor-saving devices, it was observed, which Virginians could utilize to 
compensate for a smaller population than that of European manufacturing nations. Since 
foreign commerce would be eliminated, there would be, the address assumed, a reduced 
need in Virginia for the crops formerly sent abroad, creating a surplus of farming labor at 
home that could be redirected to manufacturing.
Having rejected the arguments against manufacturing, the Richmond Friends’ 
contended all that remained was to summon the necessary will to achieve complete 
economic independence. The question was, could Virginians muster the civic virtue that 
had made victory in the Revolution possible and apply it to securing manufacturing 
independence? The address played on the sense of inferiority of the post-Revolutionary 
generation: "If we possess the patriotic self-denial, the constancy, the enterprise and 
perseverance, of which our fathers in 1776 gave us so illustrious an example, then indeed 
we shall be independent."50
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The Petersburg Manufacturing Society, also in a published address at the time of
the Embargo, stressed the opportunity presented to Virginians by their state’s improved
navigation, which provided the kind of unifying interest of which Washington had spoken
in 1785. The Petersburg society declared:
Let us then throw ourselves on our vast interior resources in this great 
western hemisphere, develop our energies and avail ourselves the proper 
use of them. Domestic manufacture and internal trade will yield benefits 
that will more than supply the wants of foreign commerce. Internal trade, 
by combining and identifying our interests will produce the most happy 
results: it will make secure and call into action, an insecure and dead 
capital; it will give the means of employment and gain to all men, 
especially the needy; it will insure the enjoyment and cultivation of our 
peaceful habits and disposition; it will promote the harmony o f social life 
and improve our morals by the exclusion of foreign fashions, vices and 
luxuries; it will revive our republican manners, simplicity and frugality...51
The address of the Surry Manufacturing Society lacked the lofty rhetoric of its
Richmond and Petersburg counterparts, but demonstrated its members were prepared to
accept the implications of domestic manufacture. The members of the society had for the
most part clad themselves in homespun, with the intention of doing so entirely in the near
future. A committee of the society was also investigating machinery with the intention of
buying whatever was necessary to permit them to make their own clothes.52 In an address
to the General Assembly, Governor John Tyler also spoke of temporary inconvenience for
long-term economic security. "Can we not be content to wear a coat of our own
manufacturing," he asked, "though not so finely and handsomely wrought? or must it be
touched with the finger of a foreign artist to make it pass current among the Beau
Monde?" He encouraged Virginians to focus their efforts on projects that advanced
domestic production and consumption so that the state’s wealth would increase and "our
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citizens be diverted from seeking their fortunes on a tempestuous sea."53
If the embargo had been strong incentive for the development of local 
manufacturing capacity, the War of 1812 created a sense of absolute urgency. Thomas 
Jefferson, who had spoken so unequivocally against domestic manufacture in his Notes 
on the State o f Virginia, had been wrestling with the role of manufacture in Virginia since 
his imposition of the Embargo on the country. In 1809 he suggested that domestic 
manufacture was acceptable to the extent it processed domestically available raw 
materials: "I do not think it fair in the ship-owners to say we ought not to make our own 
axes, nails, etc., here, that they may have the benefit of carrying the iron to Europe, and 
bringing back the axes, nails, etc."54
The war forced Jefferson to reconsider his position further. In response to a letter 
asking him to explain his remark in Notes that "the work shops of Europe are the most 
proper to furnish the supplies of manufactures to the United States," Jefferson observed 
the world had become far different from what he had expected. "We have experienced 
what we did not then believe, that there did exist both profligacy and power enough to 
exclude the United States from the field of intercourse with other nations." Jefferson 
could come to only one conclusion, "that to be independent for the comforts of life we 
must fabricate them ourselves." He went on to assert, "he therefore, who is against 
domestic manufactures, must be for reducing us to a dependence upon foreign nations —
I am not one of these." Jefferson, who had built his vision of Virginia upon the citizen 
farmer, initially had modified his philosophy to provide a role for commerce and 
merchants. Now he believed that "we must...place the manufacturer by the side of the
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agriculturalist."55
In endorsing domestic manufacture Isaac Briggs, a noted engineer of the day, went 
so far as to characterize it as a moralizing influence, using language similar to that of 
Jefferson and Madison when they described the positive effects of commerce on 
backcountry farmers. He observed that child labor may be abused in European factories, 
but he was confident that "a course of the purest moral, and religious instruction may, 
with great facility, be connected with these establishments." In addition, the factories 
would render productive those who had been contributing nothing to society: "A great 
portion of the lame, poor, and (otherwise) idle persons are employed in our manufactories 
-- [i]dleness, crimes poor-rates, and taxes diminish."56
With the notion of domestic manufacture no longer antithetical to the country’s 
interests, foreign commerce became the threat to the American, and Virginian, way of 
life. Writers distinguished between foreign commerce, which increased dependence on 
imported goods, and domestic trade, which promoted internal trade and self-sufficiency. 
Starting in the 1780s, Virginia newspapers began to explore the virtues of domestic 
production and to disparage the foreign trade it would obviate. One article distinguished 
foreign commerce as "the avenue of foreign vices." Another criticized planters for 
abetting foreign trade by presuming goods could be bought abroad cheaper than they 
could be made domestically. Although not going so far as to advocate the development 
of domestic manufacture, the article’s author pointed out that sufficient numbers of 
artisans could be attracted from Europe by higher wages, lower taxes, bountiful food 
supplies, and the right to vote — of all of which denied them in Europe. And considering
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that domestic production would "save the foreign taxes, freights, luxuries, and insurance,
surely artisans might live better here, and supply us cheaper."57
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the diplomatic crises with Great Britain and
France drove home the importance of developing internal commerce. Trade restrictions
and the loss of foreign markets forced commercial interests to look westward rather than
across the Atlantic. Indeed, traffic on Virginia’s principal rivers rose almost in direct
proportion to the drop in external shipping. Richmond and Lynchburg in particular
experienced dramatic growth during the first decade of the nineteenth century.58 After a
temporary boom in 1810, Virginia suffered four years of restriction, depression and war.59
With the economic disruptions of the War of 1812 still fresh in the minds of Americans.
Hezekiah Niles, editor of Niles Weekly Register, asserted: "[International] Commerce
produces nothing...whereas agricultures and manufactures contribute so much to the
wants, the conveniences, the luxuries or the wealth of a country."60
Internal improvement advocates such as Niles were stunned when President
Madison, whom they considered one of their own, obstructed federal participation in the
plan by vetoing the Bonus Bill in 1817. Madison’s veto message provided a strict
constructionist explanation for his action:
The legislative powers, vested in congress, are specified and enumerated 
in the 8th section of the first article of the constitution; and it does not 
appear that the power, proposed to be exercised by the bill, is among the 
enumerated powers; or that it falls, by any just interpretation, within the 
power to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution those 
or other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United 
States.61
The message went on to explain that the commerce clause does not include the power to
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construct roads and canals. Furthermore, if the power to construct roads and canals is
absent, even the assent of those states directly affected cannot confer the power.
Henry Clay took the President to task over the veto. In remarks before the House
of Representatives (and prominently reprinted in Niles’ magazine) Clay observed that
Madison’s esteemed predecessor, Thomas Jefferson, recognized the power of the federal
government to enter into compacts with states for the construction of roads and canals,
and willingly signed the bill creating the Cumberland Road. Clay also noted Madison
expressed no qualms regarding the establishment of the Second Bank of the United
States, despite there being no reference to creating a national bank in the Constitution. “If
ever there were a stretch of the implied powers conveyed by the constitution,” asserted
Clay, “it has been thought that the grant of the charter o f the national bank was one.”62
Clay found particularly frustrating Madison’s veto of a bill which Madison had
called for just months earlier in his annual message to Congress:
I particularly invite again the attention of congress to the expediency of 
exercising their existing powers, and where necessary, of resorting to the 
prescribed mode of enlarging them, in order to effectuate a comprehensive 
system of roads and canals, such as will have the effect of drawing more 
closely together every part of our country, by promoting intercourse and 
improvements, and by increasing the share of every part in the common 
stock of national prosperity.
Clay agreed with Madison that Congress could use its existing powers to create a system
of roads and canals, but took exception to Madison’s suggestion that a constitutional
amendment might be required. Neither in the message to Congress nor in the veto
message did Madison offer a single example of the type of “defect” that would necessitate
a constitutional amendment, because, according to Clay, there was none.63
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Clay’s characterization of Madison’s opinion was not entirely accurate. In both 
the message to Congress and the veto message, Madison made quite clear his position 
that the federal government’s participation in the construction of roads and canals 
required a constitutional amendment. In the message to Congress, Madison reflected on 
the difference of opinion as to the right of Congress to establish internal improvements. 
After due deliberation, Madison reported “a settled conviction in my mind that congress 
do [sic] not possess the right.”64
Madison certainly had support in Virginia for his position. Thomas Ritchie in the 
Richmond Enquirer said of the veto: “Never has the constitutional veto been more 
properly exercised. Never had the friends of State rights more reason to rejoice. Never 
have we witnessed more sincere congratulations from their lips.” Ritchie described the 
rejected legislation as a “splendid bill,” the attraction of which made it all the more 
dangerous. “But had that bill been passed into a law,” asked Ritchie, “where would the 
proud waves of federal usurpation have been stayed?”65 The majority of the Virginia 
delegation in the House of Representatives seems to have agreed with Ritchie. Fourteen 
out of twenty (with 3 absent) voted against the Bonus Bill.66
There were also less high-minded reasons for Virginia’s congressmen to vote 
against the bill and for Madison to veto it. Virginians like Ritchie had ardently supported 
enhancing Virginia’s economic competitiveness through internal improvements. He did 
not want to see the federal government underwriting internal improvement projects in 
other states that would draw the flow of trade from Virginia. Ritchie and Madison may 
have harbored constitutional concerns regarding the Bonus Bill, but they also knew of
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New York’s plans for the Erie Canal and feared that Virginia would not be able to 
compete for federal patronage with that project.67 In 1811, the Richmond Enquirer 
reported that DeWitt Clinton and Gouvemeur Morris were in Washington to petition 
Congress for assistance in their plan for a canal between the Great Lakes and the Hudson 
River. “Will these gentlemen be so good,” asked the report, “to lay their fingers upon 
that clause of the constitution which authorizes the U.S. to meddle with canals?”68 
Historian Robert Wiebe calls this state-oriented impulse “expansive provincialism:” each 
state capital endeavored to coordinate local development proposals so that “they did not 
smash one another in wild ambition.”69 In order to provide the largest possible economic 
base, and thereby reduce intrastate rivalries, each state sought to siphon business from 
“foreign” states; any initiative that held the potential to expand the economic base of 
another state — such as the Bonus Bill —  Virginians naturally would oppose.
After surveying the exploding interest in internal improvements and economic 
development after 1815, Wiebe characterizes “expansive provincialism” as a post-War of 
1812 phenomenon. In Virginia, however, the centralization of power in the state 
government and its application to improve the state’s transportation network was an idea 
dating back to Washington’s famous 1785 letter. Washington enunciated issues Wiebe 
suggests do not become prominent for another thirty years: the emerging economic 
contest with other states; the unlimited wealth to be secured from gaining access to the 
West; and the importance of submerging intrastate regional rivalries through state 
patronage of improvement projects within Virginia.
As we have seen, the rest of Virginia’s political leadership all but immediately
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adopted Washington’s model of a robust central state government aggressively pursuing 
internal improvements. Individuals from all points on the ideological spectrum 
recognized the value of the state government’s participation in development of an 
infrastructure. No representative questioned the legitimacy of the state’s actions, so long 
as his region received attention. Orrin Libby, one of the first modem historians to review 
ratification of the federal Constitution in Virginia, concluded that support for the 
Constitution was found along “the great highways of commerce” that followed the natural 
contours of the land. In other words, individuals who benefitted from the commercial 
networks, such as those in the fall line cities and the ports, tended to be Federalists. 
Conversely, Antifederalists came from remote areas.70 What Libby failed to recognize is 
that virulent Antifederalists such as Patrick Henry sought similar commercial access for 
their own regions and supported state participation in internal improvements with an 
enthusiasm equal to that of Federalists.
Jeffersonian Republicans inherited the Antifederalist mistrust of the federal 
government and opposed initiatives which expanded its authority, but they had no qualms 
when similar powers resided in the state capital.71 The existence of a strong central 
authority was not the point of dispute between Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists 
in Virginia. The location of that central authority — Richmond or Washington D.C. -- 
most certainly was. Fortifying Jeffersonian Republicans’ constructionist understanding o f 
the Constitution was their fear that any federal usurpation of power over the construction 
of roads and canals would advance some other state’s economic position. From this 
perspective Madison’s veto was neither a rejection of his earlier support for internal
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improvements nor a repudiation of government sponsorship of such projects. Instead, the 
veto reflected Madison’s long-held conviction that the Constitution invested the 
responsibility for internal improvements in the individual state governments, who could 
further their own interest by participating in activities denied the federal government. He 
would not intrude without the express permission that only a constitutional amendment 
could grant, and by doing so, refused to allow the federal government to put his own state 
at a material disadvantage.
The extent to which the attitude toward domestic manufacturing had changed in
Virginia since the 1780s is evident in an 1815 report of the Virginia House of Delegates
Committee on Roads and Internal Navigation. The report called "the duty, and the
interest of every good government to facilitate the necessary communication between its
citizens," a fact "too obvious to require much illustration. By extending commerce, these
improvements"promote the agricultural and manufactures of a nation, and thereby ...
augment its wealth and population." The importance of domestic manufacturing to
Virginia’s future was now recognized, and the relationship between its development and
internal improvements taken for granted.
The report credited the internal improvement companies with greatly contributing
to the economic revival after the Revolutionary War and commended the farsightedness
of the legislators who committed state resources to the projects. Although these
investments have not paid handsome returns,
Your committee, however, confidently believes, that there is not an 
individual with the Commonwealth alive to a sense of her true interests, 
who would have desired, for the sake of a higher profit to the treasury 
upon the stock of the public in either of those works [the James River and
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Potowmack Companies] to withdraw the funds which were required for 
their completion, and permit those noble rivers to return to a state of 
nature.
The report then described how such internal improvements benefitted all 
Virginians, not just those directly affected by them. For example, farmers far from the 
improved rivers enjoyed expanded markets and the higher prices for their produce. Those 
in the tidewater should certainly recognize the advantage of improvements to western 
waters that directed commerce toward eastern Virginia rather than Baltimore or 
Philadelphia. As it was, the report asserted, "there is scarcely a village to the West of the 
Blue Ridge, and very few above tidewater, from the Roanoke to the Potomac, which 
derive any part of their supplies of manufactured commodities, either foreign or domestic, 
from the seaports of Virginia."72
The report also referred to an "unexpected Revolution" in transportation beyond 
the Alleghenies, which turned the thoughts of westerners away "from their place of 
nativity" toward other ocean outlets. The committee could not impress enough upon the 
General Assembly the seriousness of the threat New Orleans posed -- steamboats from 
that city were already plying the waters as far north as Pittsburgh.73 A series of 
"warnings" in the Richmond Enquirer underscored the importance of the state’s continued 
commitment to internal improvements. The newspaper reprinted a number of articles 
from western papers heralding the steamboat and the opportunities for trade with New 
Orleans that it made possible.74 The editors hoped to arouse Virginians to this 
technological threat to their western trade in order to reinvigorate efforts to extend 
navigation on the state’s rivers to the West. One reprinted article, from the Cincinnati
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Gazette, went so far as to suggest resources expended on transporting goods over the 
Appalachian Mountains, or improving river navigation through highlands, would be 
better spent on the construction of steam boats to connect the western parts of the nation 
with New Orleans. Cincinnati’s potential was evident in its tremendous growth, more 
than tripling in size between 1810 and 1820, from 2,500 to 9,600. Failure to tie such a 
growing region into Virginia’s trade network would be a lost opportunity of tremendous 
proportions.75 Western farmers and manufacturers, another article asserted, would benefit 
greatly from a steamboat connection to New Orleans and direct dealings with British 
merchants. Such an arrangement would eliminate factors on the Atlantic coast who only 
served as middlemen, driving up prices and charging interest on British credit that 
westerners could access more directly through New Orleans.76 Both Virginia farmers and 
"middlemen" had cause to be nervous.
The 1815 committee report recognized the value of internal improvements in the 
more efficient administration of government. Internal improvements, the report declared, 
"expedite the communication between the seat of its government and its remotest 
extremities." In a republic, where "public virtue should be the spring of all public 
action," internal improvements were integral to "political liberty," for they "strengthen the 
cords of social union, and quicken that generous feeling of patriotism."77 Thirty years 
later, Washington’s original arguments to Governor Harrison still bore repeating.
Despite the best efforts of the companies the General Assembly had chartered, the 
committee report noted, improvements had been halting. The report commended the 
directors of the companies, who worked without compensation, as "public-spirited private
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gentlemen," but pointed out that they were not professional engineers and did not have 
the experience to guard against fraudulent individuals who claimed to be engineers. 
Because of limited resources, observed the report, no single company could afford to 
employ a reputable engineer full-time, "yet, without the previous surveys, plans and 
estimates of such an officer, no very arduous public work could be confidently begun or 
successfully executed.”7S
These observations by the committee served as a long preface to the real point of 
the report —  the General Assembly should create an internal improvement fund to 
finance future projects and create an oversight board to manage it. The recommendations 
of the committee were incorporated into the law creating the Internal Improvement Fund 
and the Board of Public Works. The passage of this legislation resulted from the 
successful collaboration of two political and regional opposites: Wilson Cary Nicholas 
and Charles Fenton Mercer. Nicholas, a Republican and staunch backer of the James 
River Company, firmly believed in the superior commercial position of Richmond; 
Mercer was a Federalist whose financial interests were tied to the fate of the Potowmack 
Company. However, they shared a strong belief in Virginia’s future lying to the west.79 
Like Patrick Henry and George Washington a generation before, their cooperation 
signaled bipartisan support in Virginia for internal improvements.
In the spring of 1815, Governor Nicholas relied upon Mercer to devise a new 
financial mechanism for subsidizing internal improvements. Relying upon Mercer made 
good sense; he had proposed in 1812 creating a fund for internal improvements, overseen 
by a board of public works. The proposal received backhanded compliments from
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delegates who complained their regions would not sufficiently benefit from the plan -- 
they would not have protested so vigorously on behalf of their regions unless they 
expected the plan to work. Notwithstanding local interests, the British blockade in 
February of 1813 ended consideration of the bill.80
Later, in the midst of a booming post-war economy, the General Assembly was 
receptive to the proposal, especially since Nicholas and Mercer included road and canal 
improvements that would benefit Norfolk, Fredericksburg, Alexandria, the Valley, and 
the Trans-Allegheny. No region could claim to be excluded. The proposal was first 
referred to the Committee on Roads and Internal Navigation, which was chaired by 
Colonel William Lewis of Campbell County (just south of Lynchburg), a supporter of the 
initiative. Mercer also sat on the committee which submitted to the General Assembly 
the aforementioned report, along with the proposed legislation. “An Act to create a Fund 
for Internal Improvements” passed on February 5, 1816.81
The act designated the stock that the state government currently held of a group 
of publicly chartered companies as the capitalization for the Internal Improvement Fund. 
The stock was valued at $1,249,211 1/9, of which $938,100 currently provided an annual 
income exceeding $98,000.82 The members of the Board of Public Works, which acted as 
the trustees of the fund, included the governor as president ex-officio, the attorney 
general, and the state treasurer. Ten elected members, who were private citizens, 
represented the four major regions of the state: three from west of the Allegheny 
Mountains; two from the area between the Alleghenies and the Blue Ridge; three from 
the Piedmont, defined as the region between the Blue Ridge and the post road along the
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fall line; and two from the tidewater.
The Board of Public Works was authorized to perform several duties that would 
facilitate the efforts of internal improvement companies. As the committee report 
recommended, the Board was empowered to appoint a principal engineer to make his 
services available to the various projects, which otherwise could not afford to secure such 
expertise. The Board could also purchase as much as two-fifths of the stock in internal 
improvement companies, but only after it was authorized to do so in each instance by the 
General Assembly. In theory, the Board would insulate from political calculus decisions 
regarding the investments of the Internal Improvement Fund, but in practice the General 
Assembly could not bring itself to relinquish all authority. The Board also could not 
purchase a company’s stock until three-fifths had been subscribed privately and one-fifth 
paid for or adequately secured.83
The three-fifths clause was intended to be both carrot and stick. It demanded local 
commitment to justify state investment, but that requirement could hamper improvement 
efforts in the poorer, less well populated sections of the state, where private investors 
might find the investment prohibitively speculative and expensive. In order to provide 
added incentive for private investment, the law offered a carrot: the Board was directed 
each year to distribute to private subscribers the first six percent of the dividends the 
Internal Improvement Fund earned on stock it held before the state realized any income 
from its holdings. As Mercer later explained, the state would consider itself “amply 
compensated” by the completion of projects that would have been impossible to begin 
without the Fund’s participation. In Mercer’s words, the state subscription would operate
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“as a modest insurance against loss to the private adventurers, who are expected to be 
attracted to all such enterprises by the hope of gain, and is thus calculated to elicit the 
subscription of individual wealth to public use.”84
To ensure the integrity of the companies in which the Internal Improvement Fund 
invested, the Board was empowered to appoint up to two-fifths of a company's board of 
directors. However, the Board of Public Works could not appoint directors to existing 
companies without the specific authorization of the General Assembly. Further, the 
Board of Public Works received the authority to secure information on internal 
improvements for its annual report. Among the types of information it could demand of 
companies was financial statements. It could also direct the principal engineer of the 
Board of Public Works to investigate private companies’ projects and verify their claims. 
By creating the Internal Improvement Fund and the Board of Public Works, the Virginia 
General Assembly had taken to a logical conclusion Washington’s recommendations a 
generation earlier. The state’s participation in private internal improvement companies 
and commercial expansion was now formalized, along with the means to ensure that the 
state's investment was wisely allocated.85
Despite all the lofty rhetoric advocating domestic manufacturing, this period of 
Virginia’s history produced no enduring monuments to economic independence in the 
form of large factories. After a phase of unbridled enthusiasm for manufacturing during 
the years of the Embargo and the War of 1812, most Virginians tended to recalibrate their 
endorsement of domestic manufacture to fit more comfortably into their understanding of 
a fundamentally agrarian society. Jefferson, for example, readily acknowledged the
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importance o f domestic manufacturing, but envisioned its organization on a small scale. 
He continued to fear the corrupting influence of manufacturing in Virginia, preferring to 
keep as decentralized as possible any means of production that may have developed. 
Virginia should exploit labor-saving machinery, he argued, but ought to locate it in a 
number of new towns and not let it become concentrated in large factories. Such 
manufacturing ought not to produce fine silken garments, but rough homespun cotton 
goods, which Virginia already turned out in a large supply. According to historian Drew 
McCoy, Jefferson "had visions of literally domesticating the industrial revolution."86
Advertisements demonstrate that the kinds of business springing up along the 
waterways conformed to this more sober expectation for domestic manufacture. The 
Upper Appomattox Company advertised "valuable seats for mills or manufactories" along 
its canal near Petersburg, where a drop in altitude of one hundred feet provided ample 
water power. The advertisement emphasized the company’s interest in attracting 
"manufactories o f cotton and wool" by which it meant those engaged in spinning yam. 
There were already a saw mill and a grist mill on the canal, but opportunity remained, the 
advertisement declared, for much of the wheat coming down the river still had to be 
transported at great expense to Richmond, Petersburg’s "only rival."87 On the James 
River, a group of individuals advertised the sale of property adjacent to the town of 
Manchester across from Richmond. The advertisement stressed that the land, being on 
the falls, offered an "excellent situation for the various kinds of mills and other works 
operated by water." The landowners also spoke of the existence of numerous ironworks, 
fueled by the seemingly inexhaustible supply of coal found along the river. These works
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did not produce steel, but pig and bar iron for export to those factories (no doubt in Great 
Britain) where they could be smelted into steel.
These two advertisements presented a vision of domestic manufacturing far more 
expansive than anything imagined in the 1780s. Still, the manufacturing they depicted 
engaged in the processing of raw materials rather than the production of finished goods. 
Virginians were as yet unwilling to undertake a system of large factories such as 
Britain’s, producing the kind of fineries Virginians coveted but also encouraging the 
social dissipation Virginians still dreaded.
The internal improvement theories of the 1780s had turned out to be as often 
wrong as they were right. By the second decade of the nineteenth century, better 
navigation had created the more extensive trade network Madison and others considered 
fundamental for instilling the values necessary for an agrarian republic. But once the 
genie of commerce was out of the bottle, nothing could contain it; Virginia changed in 
ways the General Assembly had not expected when it enacted the charters of the 
improvement companies. While still largely agrarian, the landscape had endured an 
explosion in the number of towns, and the state experienced a host of new regional 
conflicts. Perhaps most unsettling, black boatmen, accountable to virtually no one, 
became simultaneously a necessary but forbidding presence on the rivers. Attitudes of 
supporters toward the improvement companies also changed. Virginians who had pinned 
their futures on the rivers became deeply resentful when the companies failed to maintain 
the waterways as promised. The years following the War of 1812 became a period of 
such intensive scrutiny that only one of the original four companies survived.
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CHAPTER V
"AN ODIOUS MONOPOLY"
-Legislative Petition 
from the residents of 
Chesterfield County 
commenting on the James 
River Company, 1816
Throughout the second decade of the nineteenth century, Virginians continued to 
enunciate the goals for waterways improvement first voiced by Washington. Governor 
Wilson Cary Nicholas in his 1815 address to the General Assembly considered the 
economic and political effects of internal improvements as "too obvious to escape 
notice." Such improvements, he asserted, acted as a bond for the Union and could not be 
rivaled as a source of wealth and prosperity. The first president o f the Board of Public 
Works, James Preston, stated in the agency’s inaugural annual report that "to open the 
navigation o f those rivers which penetrate deep into the interior of the country; to unite, 
by commercial and political ties, the widely extended territory of the Commonwealth, are 
in the estimation of the Board, objects of the first magnitude in the scale of importance, 
contemplated by the General Assembly."1 And the Marshall Commission report of 1812 
demonstrated that the expectation of Madison and Jefferson for internal improvements 
and commerce to spread republican virtue persisted into the nineteenth century: 
"Agriculture would mingle more than heretofore with grazing; and industry [translate: 
hard work] would flourish when the reward of industry would be attainable."2
Despite the lofty rhetoric, the companies proved far less capable of addressing the
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mundane responsibilities associated with clearing waterways and fulfilling their corporate 
charters. The Potowmack Company did a creditable job of providing navigation around 
the falls, as required by its charter, but its sorry financial affairs utterly disappointed 
shareholders who enjoyed only a single stock dividend. The James River Company 
produced frequent and ample stock dividends, but had to answer widespread public 
criticism for failing to maintain the river and for resisting completing the navigation of 
the river to the extent required by its charter. Those Virginians who still embraced 
Washington’s vision, and those who simply looked forward to an easier way to transport 
goods, found themselves increasingly at odds with the companies. The entrepreneurial 
impulse that improvement advocates hoped would cultivate civic virtue, moved the James 
River Company’s directors instead to place greater emphasis on the well-being of the 
company's shareholders than on clearance of the river. The company's arrogance led in 
time to a state takeover.
The Upper Appomattox and the Dismal Swamp Canal Companies were less 
susceptible than the James River Company to criticism for failing to improve navigation, 
for two reasons. First, both companies were chartered with far more limited missions.
The Upper Appomattox Company was not expected to reach the Blue Ridge, and the 
Dismal Swamp Canal Company had the charge of cutting a single canal less than 30 
miles in length. Secondly, both these companies were more successful in completing 
their assigned tasks. The Upper Appomattox Company made the investment in durable 
stone improvements and the Dismal Swamp Canal Company actually brought about an 
improvement beyond what its charter required, increasing the dimensions of the canal.
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However, the Dismal Swamp Canal Company was the only one of the four companies to 
survive beyond the 1820s as originally chartered. As the joint-stock companies failed to 
fulfill the expectations laid out in their charters, the General Assembly adapted its internal 
improvement policy to provide an even more profound role for the state government than 
that exercised by the Board of Public Works.
The Board of Public Works was clearly dissatisfied with the management of the 
Potowmack Company. The company had proven unable to provide the agency with 
timely reports o f its progress and its fiscal status. In 1818 the directors of the Board of 
Public Works recorded the Potowmack Company had failed to submit a report, 
charitably allowing that the omission had "probably arisen from accidental causes." In 
reality the Potowmack Company was all but an empty shell, having no remaining 
resources and unable to maintain responsibility for the navigation on the Potomac, much 
less consider plans for a connection with the Ohio River.3
The company attempted to explain its failures to the Board of Public Works. In 
1817 the company emphasized its good intentions but noted the fiscal stresses produced 
by the massive scale of the project and the nagging technical problems of river 
improvement and lock construction. Nevertheless, the company’s directors persisted in 
the delusion "that the day is not very distant" when the company would pay off all debts 
and return large dividends to investors.4 The directors of the Board of Public Works had 
no doubt that, where cleared, the Potomac River afforded significant benefits to those 
regions of the state, but the directors were not convinced the Potowmack Company was
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up to the job still before it.5 The Board of Public Works noted the company had run out 
of money and was unable to go on with the improvements. Deeming it “conducive to the 
interest of the community, and in all probability most to the ultimate advantage of the 
Potowmack Company,” the Board suggested disposing these works, for greatly less than 
they cost, to a new company duly incorporated for the purpose of improving the river."6
Why had the Potowmack Company fallen so far short of the grand and noble 
designs that inspired its charter? Twenty years earlier prospects were still glowing. In 
1795 an advertisement for the sale o f company shares bragged that tolls were being 
collected at the Great Falls and that "the capital employed in this fund will be as safe and 
profitable as any in our country."7 But not until 1802 did the directors approve the 
company's first and only dividend —  three percent on each stockholder’s capital 
investment, a total distribution of $3890.55. At the same meeting the shareholders 
approved a suspension of further dividend payments in favor of extending cleared 
navigation and maintaining previously completed improvements.8 This was a sound 
business decision, based on a strategy of emphasizing capital investment in the short run 
to secure reliable profits in the future. However, the profits never materialized, and the 
Potowmack Company continued to limp along.
On August 23, 1815, the first boat passed through the Seneca locks, the last of the 
major works required by the Potowmack Company's charter. The boat was loaded with 
almost one hundred people and passed a great number of spectators along the banks of the 
Potomac.9 The celebration was the last hurrah for the Potowmack Company, which soon 
faded out of existence. The company statistics, as reported in the Board of Public Works
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annual reports, were not nearly as gratifying as attending the first use o f the Seneca locks. 
The 1817 report noted navigation had been cleared for two hundred twenty miles on the 
Potomac itself, but that considerable work remained on tributaries such as the Monocacy, 
the Conogochague, and Patterson’s Creek. Throughout this period the Potowmack 
Company dutifully maintained navigation by clearing obstructions and replaced aging or 
damaged locks.10 Toll receipts from 1799 to 1817 amounted to $162,379.95, but total 
expenses "as nearly as can be ascertained" totaled $650,000, plus an aggregate debt over 
the period of $140,200, largely in the form of bank loans obtained when state support was 
no longer forthcoming.11
The public had also become frustrated with the Potowmack Company. From 
1813 to 1816 the residents of Jefferson and Frederick counties undertook an effort to 
secure from the General Assembly permission to dig a canal from the head of the Seneca 
Falls into Huntington Creek, or some other part of the Potomac River within the District 
of Columbia. The Frederick County petitioners asserted the poor state o f navigation on 
the Potomac River was attributable to the Potowmack Company’s "radical error" to try to 
force navigation on the river despite even a cursory view demonstrating such a project to 
be impractical and prohibitively expensive. The river, they claimed, could not be 
navigated after the month of May, and seldom longer than the beginning of that month. 
Even when the river was navigable, it could only be traveled by those who were familiar 
with its many channels. And while the petitioners proclaimed their only intention to be 
'affecting a work of such great national advantage," it could not have been lost on 
legislators that the course of the proposed new canal lay entirely within Virginia.12
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The Potowmack Company directors responded that the river had been navigated 
in every month except the preceding two dry summers by boats with cargoes averaging 
about fifty barrels of flour. The directors also complained a new canal would not only 
violate its charter rights, but would draw both water, and water-borne traffic, from the 
Potomac River. The opening to the proposed canal would be constructed, the directors 
noted, just above the Great Falls, where the Potowmack Company collected tolls, 
permitting craft to avoid payment to the company for the use of the river. The directors 
implored the General Assembly not to change the grounds on which chartered companies 
such as the Potowmack Company stood, for it would "dampen enterprise as to future 
undertakings," and thus undermine any future growth in the state.13
In this case the General Assembly sided with the Potowmack Company, but 
events would soon force the state government to explore other options. First, the national 
economy collapsed in 1819, suddenly depleting the Internal Improvement Fund on which 
the Potowmack had depended for its survival. Then in 1821 Thomas Moore, chief 
engineer of the Board of Public Works, submitted a report highly pessimistic of the 
company’s prospects. Moore concluded that a Stillwater canal could be more easily 
constructed, would be more reliable in all weather, and could be used for a far greater 
portion of the year. The final blow came from both Virginia and Maryland 
commissioners who had been appointed to ascertain whether the company was still 
worthy of their states’ patronage. The commissioners concluded the company was 
hopelessly insolvent and would never fulfill its charter. They suggested the company's 
charter be revoked and agreed with Moore's recommendation a separate canal be built.14
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
202
Another survey by Moore (who died during the project) reported to a joint 
Virginia-Maryland Committee in December 1822 that a canal thirty feet wide in the 
tidewater and twenty feet at its western terminus, with a depth of three feet, would cost 
about $500,000. Based on this report the Virginia General Assembly on February 22, 
1823, approved legislation incorporating the Chesapeake and Ohio Company and in 1824 
permitted any Potowmack Company shareholder to exchange stock and bills of credit for 
shares in the new company. The Maryland legislature, now satisfied it would not have to 
completely write off its investment in the Potowmack Company, incorporated the 
Chesapeake and Ohio Company in 1825. Lacking government support and forced to face 
the fact that they would never complete the project, the Potowmack Company 
surrendered its charter in August 1828.15
The James River Company did not adopt the apologetic demeanor of the 
Potowmack Company in responding to requests for information from the Board of Public 
Works. To the contrary, it exuded the arrogance of a highly successful company that saw 
no reason for such bothersome oversight. When the company failed to provide 
information for the first annual report in 1816, the Board of Public Works demanded 
information on the present state of improvements, existing obstructions, the total cost, 
revenues, and debts. The James River Company replied by sending data that was one 
year old. The company did the same in 1818, submitting information that should have 
been included in the 1817 report. Finally, in March 1819, the legislature enacted a statute 
requiring every company to submit an annual report on or before December 7.16 But by
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then the point was moot, for the days of the James River Company were numbered. The 
company’s hostility to providing an east-west connection was well-documented, as was its 
failure to maintain navigation on those parts of the river it claimed to have improved.
The James River Company wanted nothing to do with tidewater access. It had 
submitted to public pressure once before, resulting in the Ariel Cooley debacle. Interest 
in tidewater access increased after the War of 1812, as those with interests in Richmond 
sought to ensure their city emerged from the war as Virginia’s principal seaport.17 The 
James River Company was able to avoid responsibility for tidewater access by employing 
a strategy similar to that of the Potowmack Company in the Shenandoah Valley — get 
another company to do the work. In February 1816, the General Assembly chartered the 
Richmond Dock Company to extend navigation of the James from Rockett's Landing, 
where the city's warehouses were located, to the basin of the James River Company. The 
canal was to range from thirty-six to seventy feet in width with a minimum depth of 
seven feet at the basin. The enacting legislation noted the consent of the James River 
Company to the new company, provided boats that paid a toll to the James River 
Company would not have to pay one to the Richmond Dock Company. The law also 
clarified that the Richmond Canal Company bore full responsibility for building and 
maintaining the navigation up to the James River Company’s basin. The last clause was 
important to the James River Company because, after Cooley's efforts, it no doubt sought 
to avoid responsibility for any damages caused by the flow of water from the basin into 
the Richmond Dock Company works.18
Nor was the James River Company interested in a connection to the western
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waters, even though the Kanawha River system passed within miles of the headwaters of 
the James. The General Assembly in February 1811 appointed five commissioners to 
identify the best route for a road connecting the mouth of Dunlop’s Creek (considered the 
highest navigable point on the James River) to the Greenbrier River. From there the 
commissioners were to follow the Greenbrier to the New River and on to the great falls of 
the Kanawha.19 The commissioners met in Lexington, but inasmuch as the General 
Assembly had failed to provide for their expenses, they did nothing more than authorize 
the building of a boat and hire a crew.20
Having learned from its mistakes, the General Assembly created a new 
commission of twenty-two members, led by Chief Justice John Marshall. The new 
commission was allocated seven hundred fifty dollars to defray expenses. It convened in 
Lynchburg on September 1, 1812, and set about measuring the James River by sections 
up to Dunlop’s Creek. The commissioners then marked out what they considered the 
most direct route for a turnpike over the Alleghenies: from Dunlop’s Creek on the James 
to the most convenient navigable point on the Greenbrier River, the mouth of Howard’s 
Creek, whence they then followed the Greenbrier to the New River and on to the Great 
Kanawha and the Ohio River.21
The Commissioners concluded the turnpike was possible because it would largely 
follow the course of an already existing road. The Greenbrier would pose no problem 
because the Commissioners found it could be made as navigable as the James. Their 
estimation of the Greenbrier’s prospects would appear to have been rather optimistic, 
considering it took them ten days to cover the forty-eight miles from Howard’s Creek to
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the mouth of the Greenbrier, and then only with the assistance of extra men and the 
occasional use of horses. The commissioners explained away their difficulties by the fact 
that they had traveled the river at the driest period of the year.22 They believed the falls of 
the Greenbrier, really a set of rapids, could surely be made navigable through the use of 
sluice gates or locks. The last leg, the Kanawha, once its falls were traversed, was ample 
and smooth.23
The middle leg, the New River, was the main problem. Its rapids, known as Lick- 
Creek Falls, included a waterfall of 23 feet which forced the commissioners to portage for 
the first time during the expedition. The New River also posed a challenge far different 
from that of the Greenbrier — it had too much water. The New River possessed a fast 
current which shot water through gaps in and between its numerous rocks, making down 
river travel treacherous. The commissioners were not at all confident the New River 
could be traveled at all upriver, for the current was too rapid for rowing and the water too 
deep to pole. The commissioners proposed upriver traffic could be rendered viable by the 
use of steam boats, or by harnessing the boats to horses who would follow a towpath.
The commissioners even suggested boats could be brought upriver by pulling on chains 
attached to large rocks along the banks.24
The commissioners’ report echoed Washington’s sentiments in his letter to 
Governor Harrison almost 30 years earlier. The General Assembly faced a choice. It 
could act conservatively and extend the highest point of navigation on the James to 
Dunlop's Creek and build the turnpike road to Howard’s Creek with no further 
improvements beyond there. Such a project would certainly have a dramatic effect on the
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region. The commissioners believed that "a considerable impulse will be given to
agriculture, a valuable effect produced on the wealth and population of a considerable
tract of country."25 The counties of Bath, Botetourt, Greenbrier, Monroe, and even Giles,
according to the commissioners, would all experience an increase in agricultural
production as well as population, owing to the greater ease of transporting goods.26
Again we see the imperative of providing an economic incentive for behaving like frugal,
hard-working republican citizens.
On the other hand, the General Assembly could act boldly and undertake the
improvement of the western waters all the way to the Ohio River:
Not only will that part of our own state which lies on the Kanawha and on 
the Ohio Receive their supplies and send much of their produce to market 
through James River, but an immense tract of fertile country, a great part 
of the state of Kentucky and Ohio, will probably give their commerce the 
same direction.27
The commissioners hastened to point out such a course of action would place the route in 
competition with improvements to transportation contemplated in other states. In order to 
secure the business, the James River route would have to be the most convenient, and 
convenience would not come cheaply.28 One of the commissioners who was involved in 
improving the Rivanna River, estimated the total cost at $190,000. But other 
commissioners, though the report characterizes them as possessing "too little experience" 
to guess, placed the figure at $600,000.29
The commissioners also emphasized that the importance of these improvements 
transcended the commercial intercourse they would generate. A reliable connection 
would cement the interests of the West to the East by improving social and political
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intercourse. As had Washington, the commissioners expressed a concern that the West 
was still but tenuously tied to the East. In their report they feared if the West were not 
provided with sufficient reason to remain with the eastern states, some incident could 
easily result in West’s disaffection, much as Washington had spoken of a "touch of a 
feather":
At all times, the cultivation of these dispositions must be desirable; but in 
the vicissitude of human affairs, in the mysterious future, which...is yet 
hidden from us, events may occur to render their preservation too valuable 
to be estimated in dollars and cents.30
As far as the commissioners were concerned, if a connection to the Ohio River averted a
secession of the western states, it would clearly have paid for itself.
In making this argument, the commissioners again echoed Washington and
stressed the perils of relying solely on the Mississippi River for transportation. While
during times of peace westerners could get by with a single channel for commerce, the
commissioners warned that in time of war the Mississippi might be cut off, and the
W est’s "whole trade might be annihilated."31 The War of 1812, declared just months
earlier, lent a sense of urgency to the commissioners’ argument. They reported arms had
to be transported by wagon all the way from Richmond to the falls of the Great Kanawha,
an observation that might also be taken as an indictment of the James River Company.32
The report of the Marshall Commission inspired the imagination of the General
Assembly in much the same as had Washington's letter. After the distraction of the War
of 1812 ended, the report was reprinted and generated considerable public interest.33 It
seems to have inspired Governor Nicholas’ remark in 1815 that the benefits of internal
improvements "too obvious to escape notice." The Committee on Roads and Inland
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Navigation used the Marshall Commission’s findings to recommend the creation of the 
Board of Public Works and the Internal Improvement Fund. Just as Washington’s letter 
served as the initial impetus for chartering the waterways improvement companies, the 
Marshall Commission report was in a large part the reason for the expansion of state 
participation in internal improvements manifested by the Board of Public Works and the 
Internal Improvement Fund.
In its first annual report, the Board of Public Works recommended the State of 
Virginia communicate with the federal government and the states of Ohio, Indiana, and 
Kentucky to cooperate in uniting the Great Kanawha with the James River. It also 
contacted the James River Company in order to find out on what terms it might be willing 
to take on the extension of the river to Dunlop’s Creek. Characteristically, the James 
River Company responded, while it had accomplished much, it still had considerable 
work to do in order to fulfill the requirements of its original charter. Once again it 
recommended the formation of a new company, in which it would be willing to invest 
should sufficient tolls be provided.34 In response to these recommendations, the Board of 
Public Works directed its chief engineer, Loammi Baldwin, to survey the land from 
Crow’s Ferry on the James to the mouth of the Kanawha River to identify the best route 
for a turnpike between the two rivers.35 In directing Baldwin to bypass the New River, 
the board seems to have been influenced by the Marshall Commission, which found that 
river virtually impassable.
Baldwin conducted his survey in 1817, and his findings, which appeared in a
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report by the Committee on Roads and Internal Navigation of the House of Delegates, 
reiterated the sentiments of the Marshall Commission. Baldwin calculated improving the 
Kanawha from its mouth to its fall could cost as little as $45,OCX), but to maintain 
sufficient depth at all times of the year to accommodate steamboats as well as keeiboats, 
would cost $100,000. A turnpike from the falls to the mouth of Dunlop’s Creek would 
cost $500,000. Improving the James River from Crow’s Ferry to Dunlop’s Creek could be 
accomplished for as little as $58,000, but again, Baldwin suggested a navigation to 
accommodate steamboats would cost much more, totaling $400,000. Baldwin explained 
the figure of $58,000 was for a product "equal to the present state of the navigation of 
James River within the company’s limits." The much higher estimate for steam 
navigation ($400,000) suggests Baldwin did not think much of the James River 
Company’s efforts to date.36
Eager to act on these surveys, the Board of Public Works pursued the James River 
Company with the prospect of connecting the eastern and western waters. The company 
laid down extravagant terms for its participation, including: permission to issue an 
additional $ 1,500,000 in stock to which the Board of Public Works would subscribe two- 
fifths; receipt of dividends of six per cent during construction, and not less than ten nor 
more than fifteen per cent after completion; doubling the current tolls on the James River; 
and, no change in the company’s existing charter to make the company responsible for the 
improvements. The Board presented the proposal to the Committee on Roads and 
Internal Navigation which dutifully delivered a bill to the floor of the House of Delegates. 
On the floor, the bill faced vigorous opposition as a unilateral agreement that acceded to
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the company’s excessive demands. It was defeated. Considering the company’s aversion 
to extending its charter requirements, the demands would appear to have been 
deliberately extreme to ensure their rejection by the General Assembly.37
The General Assembly wanted an east-west connection and would not be thwarted 
by the James River Company. In February of 1819, it ordered the Board of Public Works 
to engage its engineer in identifying "the best practicable communication, for the 
purposes of trade, between the waters of the James River and those of the Great 
Kanawha."38 The new principal engineer, Thomas Moore (Loammi Baldwin had rejected 
the Board’s offer to continue) was given a more extensive charge than Baldwin. Moore 
and his assistant, Isaac Briggs, were to consider all means of transportation to connect the 
eastern and western waters, including even that part of the James under the control of the 
company.39
Moore and Briggs delivered their report to the Board of Public Works on January 
14, 1820. They offered two alternatives. The first, similar to the Marshall Commission’s 
and Baldwin’s recommendations, called for sluice navigation to Dunlop's Creek, a 
turnpike to the Kanawha Falls, and improved Kanawha River navigation to the Ohio 
River. The other more ambitious option was the same route with a Stillwater canal from 
the basin in Richmond to Dunlop's Creek. Though a Stillwater canal would cost ten times 
more than the sluice navigation — $1,927,000 as compared to $191,421 — Thomas 
Randolph, President of the Board of Public Works, asserted the more reliable 
transportation the Stillwater would provide would so stimulate economic growth that tolls 
would easily finance the project.40
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The survey also noted the strategic importance of the James River. The Erie 
Canal, then under construction in New York, would offer western access via the Great 
Lakes — but they were vulnerable to British attack if hostilities should once again erupt. 
Although the British had successfully blockaded the Chesapeake, the James River system 
could access the Dismal Swamp Canal, which emptied into Albemarle Sound. The 
survey reported the Albemarle Sound discharged into the Atlantic "through narrow and 
difficult passes, safe to our experienced seamen, but often disastrous to our enemies." 
Such a secure passage would be vital to the nation in a time of war.41 This line of 
argument implied the efforts of James River Company to avoid responsibility for 
tidewater access not only inconvenienced those who hoped to rely on the improvements 
but actually undermined the nation’s defense.
Moore’s proposal for a Stillwater canal was a bold plan to realize the east-west 
connection Virginians had dreamed about for thirty years. The proposal was particularly 
well received, for it was delivered at a time when Virginians believed that the interior 
trade was slipping quickly from their grasps. Towns and cities along the Ohio and 
Mississippi Rivers were grabbing the western trade. And what commerce did not flow 
down the Mississippi might very well be attracted to the Erie Canal. However, if Virginia 
could complete a central water line to the Ohio, its superior ports, and longer transport 
season, not to mention its proximity to Europe, might prove attractive enough to regain 
the western trade before the Erie canal became operative.42
The proposed central water line was also an unmistakable encroachment on the 
James River Company’s chartered privileges and a repudiation of the company’s efforts to
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clear the river. Board of Public Works President Randolph recognized Moore’s proposal 
would require an "equitable arrangement" with the James River Company, but he also 
asserted "the Board of Public Works have supposed it to be beyond their province to 
negotiate any terms with the James River Company." This remark could be taken as 
recognition of the Board's limited powers, or it could mean that Randolph was well aware 
the James River Company was at that moment in negotiations with the General Assembly 
over its very existence.
In 1812, the same year as the Marshall Commission expedition, the General 
Assembly appointed a set of commissioners to review the status of the James River. 
Starting from Crow’s Ferry, these commissioners loaded a boat to draw twelve inches of 
water and proceeded down the river. While giving the company credit for a significant 
number of improvements, the commissioners also observed many sluice works on the 
river, especially below the mountains, "are so crooked, meandering, and shallow, as to 
render the navigation difficult and dangerous, and not such in the unanimous opinion of 
the commissioners, as is contemplated by the charter." This finding in itself might very 
well have been enough for the General Assembly to revoke the company's charter, but the 
War of 1812 distracted the state government.43
The commissioners were not the only ones dissatisfied by the efforts of the James 
River Company. In 1816 "A Farmer" reported in the Richmond Enquirer that he decided 
to personally accompany his produce down river. When he arrived at the lock gates the 
lock keeper informed him "nothing was more common than to see boats in tolerable tides 
grounded a hundred yards or perhaps less from the toll gates." The keeper said he had
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informed the company officers of the sand bars, but they had done nothing.44
The condition of the company’s improvements in and around Richmond moved 
the inhabitants of Chesterfield County to renew their campaign for a southern bank 
canal.45 They charged the James River Company with being “an odious monopoly,” 
which a new canal would break by offering planter, farmer and merchant alike a choice of 
markets. This petition also noted the superior nature of a Stillwater canal, claiming it 
would be available at all seasons of the year, and would offer an easier and safer 
navigation. Commenting on the James River Company's efforts to pass through the city 
of Richmond, the Chesterfield petitioners reported the water level was often insufficient, 
the locks frequently out of repair, and the navigation generally hazardous. The petitioners 
concluded by appealing to the "liberal spirit for internal improvements, which has of late 
years distinguished the Virginia Legislature."46
The issue o f a Manchester canal inspired a spirited debate in the Richmond 
Enquirer. "Juriscola" turned "the finger of heaven" argument against the company, 
asserting that the residents of Chesterfield should have the same opportunity to improve 
what nature had bestowed upon them as the one given the James River Company. The 
petitioners should not be deprived of their rights to improve their geography, the author 
argued, when permission had been so willingly granted to the James River Company. 
Noting the "beneficial consequences of competition," Juriscola pointed out the James 
River Company's charter gave it the sole right to improve the river, not a monopoly over 
water transportation in the region. He conceded this interpretation would benefit those 
who held property in Manchester and who had been strong advocates of the canal, but
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countered these individuals have the same right to pursue their interests as the advocates 
with property on the north side of the river.
Juriscola labeled "blasphemy" assertions the proposed canal threatened 
Washington’s legacy of company shares to the Lexington Academy. The value of 
dividends paid out to the Academy, and to all shareholders for that matter, ought not to 
outweigh the advantages to the public o f securing all means of efficient transportation. 
While particular members of the public may have derived some benefit from the 
distribution of James River Company dividends, these profits were not evenly shared by 
all members of the Commonwealth, as would, for example, reduced taxes. Washington’s 
true legacy, Juriscola concluded, was the constitutional rights upon which the petitioners’ 
memorial for a new canal was founded.47
A response on behalf of the James River Company appeared shortly. "Virginian" 
expressed confidence the General Assembly would reject Juriscola’s arguments, which 
would "undermine the basis of free government." He called the James River Company’s 
charter a "solemn grant" to improve the river undertaken at the behest of the General 
Assembly, as opposed to the Manchester petition, which sprang from the vested interests 
of a few local residents. This petition, according to “Virginian,” called upon the General 
Assembly to violate the constitution and undermine the judiciary’s authority to decide 
upon the legitimacy of contracts. Moreover, the General Assembly as a party to the 
contract with the James River Company would be acting as a judicial body despite a clear 
conflict of interest. “Virginian” also tossed aside the notion that the James River 
Company represented a limited public benefit — did not two hundred fifty miles of
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improved navigation allowing a healthy commerce where there had been none constitute 
a considerable public advantage? And now, after the state and investors had committed 
resources totaling four times the initial estimate of the expense, the petitioners wanted to 
deprive the James River Company shareholders of the remuneration so solemnly 
promised them by the General Assembly thirty years earlier.48
Despite the best efforts of the Manchester petitioners, they were unable to 
convince legislators a new canal would not violate the James River Company’s charter. 
The General Assembly’s Committee on Roads and Internal Navigation rejected a 
Manchester canal petition brought during the 1817 session on the grounds that charges 
against the James River Company for not complying with its charter "[wjould be more 
properly made before the Judiciary than the Legislature...” A delegate from Chesterfield 
then pursued an amendment to the resolution focusing on the assertion that the James 
River Company was not acting in the interests of constituents in Chesterfield and 
surrounding counties. Although this amendment also failed, the consideration of it 
demonstrated the General Assembly’s growing dissatisfaction with the James River 
Company.49
That same year the General Assembly’s Committee on Roads and Internal 
Navigation also received testimony from individuals critical of the operation of the 
company and from company officials in response. The affidavits included in the report to 
the 1817 legislative session presented a picture of a company producing greater profits 
than any other company in Virginia, yet failing in its fundamental responsibility to 
provide navigation from the tidewater to Crow’s Ferry. The report reiterated previous
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findings that in many places along the river the company had failed to meet the objectives 
of its charter. The committee also noted the 1816 petition for the Manchester canal and 
the complaints that accompanied it.50
The affidavits attest to the general failure of the James River Company in a 
number of areas related to navigation. Caleb Stone stated he had navigated the river from 
Lynchburg to Richmond at least four times during the summer and noted several places 
where the river was only six or seven inches deep. He had resorted to doubling the 
number of hands on the boat and employing hand spikes to keep it moving. Other 
captains also reported resorting to similar measures to get their boats down river. Besides 
finding low water, Joshua Casey characterized the sluice works as generally in bad order 
and often not providing more than six or seven inches depth. He was never able to bring 
more than seven hogsheads, and usually only five, down the river in a boat.51 Others 
testified to problems associated with the canals. John Staples reported the canal was 
shallow in the summer of 1816 because of both the drought and the amount of water 
diverted from the canal by mills. Echoing the complaint of “A Farmer,” he charged that 
boats were frequently grounded near the upper locks at Westham, and the use of the canal 
was limited by the buildup of sand which could not be washed away because of the lack 
of water. Boats were reduced to carrying only five hogsheads of tobacco rather than the 
ten or twelve they were supposed to be able to carry in the dry season.S2
Thomas Ladd was particularly frustrated by the state o f the Ariel Cooley's lower 
canal. Ladd had several boats constructed for the express purpose of carrying produce 
through the lower locks to Rockets landing. The boats were about nine feet wide and
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
217
drew two feet, four inches. Because of the lack of water, he had never been able to use 
them. Other affidavits repeated the low canal level was the result of too much water 
being diverted for mill use. While the use of the canal as a source for water power 
produced revenue for the James River Company, the practice seemed at cross purposes to 
the company’s primary mission of facilitating navigation.53
William Archer, who was engaged in the transportation of coal, reported boats 
which usually carried one hundred eighty to two hundred forty bushels could only take 
sixty or seventy. Even then, navigation was difficult, requiring "skillful and experienced 
hands to manage the boats." While Archer acknowledged the lower locks were a cheaper 
method of conveying his coal to Rockets, he preferred the more reliable carting. In fact, 
he had never used the lower locks. Archer also noted the dissatisfaction of flour millers 
with the poor navigation of the river and, in particular, the canal. Rather than risk delays 
in the upper locks, and having to pay a toll for their inconvenience to boot, millers were 
stopping their boats above Westham to carry the flour to Richmond by wagon.54
Witnesses who testified on .behalf of the James River Company tried to portray the 
critical affidavits as holding unreasonable expectations for the river improvements, the 
canal, and the locks; their testimony succeeded only in confirming the company’s failures. 
Orris Paine, who was in the coal business, described one hundred fifty bushels as an 
average load, rather than upwards of two hundred forty as Archer stated. Paine, however, 
would also prefer to rely on drayage rather than hazard the lower locks which he 
conceded were often out of order due to bad work. James Tally, a company 
superintendent, complained he was unable to secure sufficient labor to properly clear the
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river beds. He eagerly reported one hundred hands had been employed in clearing the 
lower locks, but had to admit that for a month during the summer of 1816 boats could not 
pass through the canal until the armory and mill works ceased operation for the day.55
The conclusions of the committee did not bode well for the James River 
Company:
Upon deliberate consideration of the foregoing evidence, your committee 
are of opinion that the James River Company have not complied with the 
terms and conditions of their charter; but they are at the same time of 
opinion that, under the bill of rights and constitution of Virginia, the 
question cannot be conclusively settled without the intervention of a court 
and jury.
The committee decided the issue was a "controversy respecting property" because the
charter of the James River Company specifically defined the river and its canal works, as
well as any profits, to be the property o f the company, as long as they completed the
improvements specified in the charter. Therefore, any complaints regarding the
company’s compliance with its charter involved the company’s property. A court alone
could decide which improvements the company was bound to make and whether, in fact.
it had made them. The committee concluded the Virginia Constitution prevented the
legislature from intruding into this process.56
Nevertheless, the committee was not about to let the company off the hook for its
negligence and submitted the following resolution:
Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that the James River 
Company have not complied with the terms and conditions of their charter, 
and that the attorney general be directed to institute the proper proceeding 
against them, for such non-compliance, in some court authorized to take 
cognisance of the subject.57
The General Assembly approved the resolution, which was expanded by the
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Senate to enunciate its own dissatisfaction:
Whereas it is alleged that the James River Company have failed to 
perform the conditions on which they were authorized by the laws 
regulating their charter, to demand and receive tolls, and it is desirable to 
ascertain by legal proceedings, whether such allegation be true or not; 
therefore,
Resolved, that it shall be the duty of the attorney general to institute the 
proper proceedings against the said company, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the truth o f the allegation aforesaid, and to prosecute such 
proceeding to a judgment, as soon as may be; that when such judgment 
shall be rendered, the executive shall cause the record thereof to be 
certified and laid before the General Assembly, at their ensuing session; 
and that if such judgment shall be against the said company, the effect 
thereof shall be suspended until the pleasure of the Legislature thereupon 
be declared by law.
Resolved further, that it shall be the duty of the Board o f public Works to 
take such measures as may seem to them best, to cause an accurate survey 
to be made of James River and its branches, for the purpose of ascertaining 
the best means of improving the navigation thereof; and especially of 
ascertaining the practicability and expense of procuring a navigation of 
said waters, or any part of them, for vessels drawing three feet water; and 
that the said board report thereupon to the General Assembly, at their next
cesession.
The General Assembly had thrown down the gauntlet. From the moment the resolution 
passed, the James River Company would not be negotiating to enhance its financial 
status. It would be fighting for its corporate survival.
The General Assembly continued its assault on the James River Company while 
the Board of Public Works was conducting surveys to identify alternatives to it. In 
response to the resolution, on September 24, 1818, the attorney general obtained a ruling 
against the James River Company from the superior court of law for the County of 
Henrico. The court ordered the company’s officers to appear and explain why a writ 
should not be brought for suspending its tolls as well as its charter.59 The legal
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proceeding had been framed such that the burden of proof lay with the company to justify 
its continued existence rather than with the state to prove non-compliance with the 
charter.
The charges against the company asserted it had failed to make the river navigable 
in dry season by vessels drawing one foot of water; it had neglected to remove 
obstructions such as rocks and gravel, which rendered navigation difficult, if not 
dangerous; and, the company had failed to make the canal from the falls into Richmond 
capable of carrying traffic as stipulated in the charter. Numerous witnesses testified 
against the company, adding damaging evidence to what had been reported to the General 
Assembly. Rebuttal witnesses did not so much prove that the company had fulfilled its 
duties as attempt to justify and explain its failures. In particular, the company witnesses 
stressed the impossibility of providing the required river depth in the dry seasons and the 
damage to the river works caused by floods.60 To further impress upon the James River 
Company the resolve of the legislature, the General Assembly passed a resolution in 
February 1819 authorizing the lowering or suspension of the tolls on the James River 
should the legislature conclude that the navigation and works of the James River 
Company were not in the condition required by the charter.61
With the prosecution pending and the General Assembly clearly willing to press 
the issue, the James River Company negotiated a settlement with the state for the 
company to relinquish control of its charter. But o f even greater importance to the 
directors than overall control of the company was ensuring the integrity o f the 
shareholders’ investments.62 Once again, the Company was able to snatch victory from
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the jaws of defeat. Enacted on February 17, 1820, the new law. called a "compact" 
between the state and the company, stipulated the James River Company was responsible 
for all communication from the tidewater to the Ohio River, including a road from 
Dunlop’s Creek to the falls of the Kanawha. The company also had to effect such 
improvements as the General Assembly would require and under the supervision of 
individuals appointed by the General Assembly. Only after the James River Company 
completed all the projects the General Assembly assigned to it would the writ brought 
against it by the General Assembly be dismissed.63
On the other hand, the company was permitted to borrow $200,000 annually, at an 
interest rate not to exceed six percent. Before any interest was paid, the company had to 
return its shareholders an annual dividend of twelve percent until 1832, when the 
dividend would increase to fifteen percent annually. Any surplus was to be deposited in 
the Internal Improvement Fund. Should the tolls and all other income of the company 
prove insufficient to pay the dividend and the interest, the president of the Board of 
Public Works was authorized to draw whatever amount was necessary from the Internal 
Improvement Fund. Not only were the company’s shareholders guaranteed a rate of 
return, but a new source o f state funds was available to secure that guarantee.64 The 
experiment in public-private cooperation which the James River Company embodied had 
failed. The state had taken over the enterprise, but not at the expense of the shareholders.
Newspaper reports on the deal suggest an ambivalence over the fate of the James 
River Company. A legislator from Greenbrier County, Mr. Smith, praised the new law as 
proof that the interest in internal improvements had reawakened in Virginians. He
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attributed new interest to the challenges posed by other states, particularly New York. 
Smith stressed that Virginians did indeed possess the "energy and enterprise" for a 
connection of the eastern and western waters, the objects of which are "[t]he political, 
commercial and agricultural prosperity and advancement of the state." While Virginians 
had rekindled their interest in internal improvements, "these great natural advantages with 
which our country everywhere abounds, require the fostering and protecting care and 
attention of the government." Smith might have believed Virginians possessed the 
initiative to tap the state’s great natural potential, but, like Washington before him, he was 
not so sure they would be able, or willing, to make the necessary personal investment to 
do so.65 Hence, the need for the state to step in and ensure both the continued navigation 
of the James River and the integrity of the James River Company’s shares.
Despite the limited extent of the James River Company’s improvements, the high 
volume of river traffic made the deal viable. Another Richmond Enquirer article 
calculated tolls would produce sufficient revenue to distribute the twelve percent 
dividend on company shares, pay off the interest on loans permitted under the terms of 
the compact, and still realize a surplus of $12,000. The state, with its new supervisory 
authority, would be in a position to lower the tolls on the river to more accurately reflect 
the company's costs.66 However, another writer voiced concern the Board of Public 
Works’ estimates for the costs of the connections of the James River Company were 
grossly underestimated. If anything, tolls would have to increase.67 But such details were 
no longer the concern of the James River Company. Its dividends were guaranteed.
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Traffic volume was a more serious consideration for the Upper Appomattox 
Company than for the James River or Potowmack Companies. The Appomattox was 
much shorter, limiting the total agricultural area feeding into it. In addition, farmers who 
might potentially use it could be drawn away by the larger rivers, the James and Roanoke, 
which ran along either side of the Appomattox.68 Developing access to Norfolk as well as 
Petersburg was vital to the company’s survival. Not surprisingly, the company advocated 
connecting the Appomattox to the network of rivers running through southern Virginia 
and northern North Carolina. This network would then connect to Norfolk, via the 
Dismal Swamp Canal. The Board of Public Works in its second annual report announced 
it had directed its engineer to survey the route of a canal between the Roanoke and 
Appomattox Rivers. The suggestion for this canal had come from "certain inhabitants o f 
the Town of Petersburg," no doubt Upper Appomattox Company shareholders.69 And 
engineers appointed by the North Carolina legislature to review the best route for a canal 
linking the Roanoke River to the Meherrin River reported receiving much assistance from 
“a number of gentlemen of great experience, and who were the most active Directors of 
the Appomattox Company.”70
Despite all the interest in southwestern waterways, the work of the Upper 
Appomattox Company waned. The 1818 report of the Board of Public Works contained 
discouraging news for the company. Contrary to earlier, rosier surveys, the board’s 
sober-minded engineer, Loammi Baldwin, reported his own pessimistic survey of the 
roughly fifty-seven mile route proposed for the Appomattox to Roanoke canal. Not 
wanting to be the doomsayer, Baldwin refrained from completely rejecting the idea, but
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his words make quite clear what he thought: "Although the survey now brought before 
the Board exhibits many obstructions which appear to be great, it ought not to be 
considered conclusive either as to the practicability or expense of the contemplated 
canal." Considering his estimated expense for the project was two million dollars, 
Baldwin was being quite kind in his evaluation of the project.71
The same report of the Board of Public Works noted suits associated with the 
canal were cutting into resources desperately needed to improve navigation on the 
Appomattox proper, as were debts the board absorbed from the old Appomattox 
Company. The company’s managers concluded work could not proceed for a few years. 
This information was provided by an "unofficial" report of the company President, James 
Venable, which he submitted when the official report of the managers did not reach the 
board’s secretary in time.72 The company was in disarray and never did return to its 
previous vitality.
The river, however, kept rolling along, as did the boats navigating it. The 
company might not have endured, but its improvements survived to provide a public 
benefit. References dating from the 1830s indicate that as many as forty batteaux, each 
carrying five to seven tons, were regularly plying the waters of the Appomattox.73
Unlike the experiences of the river improvement companies, the efforts of the 
Dismal Swamp Canal Company largely managed to avoid public criticism. The 
company's charter clearly defined its objective —  creating a Stillwater canal from the 
Elizabeth River to the Pasquotank River —  wording that precluded the kind of disputes
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over the extent of navigation that the James River Company faced. The Dismal Canal’s 
reputation also benefitted from the services, though limited, it provided during the War of 
1812.
Governor William H. Cabell had anticipated the canal’s value in his December 
1807 address to the General Assembly, just before the declaration of the embargo. Cabell 
predicted that a connection between the Albemarle Sound and Chesapeake Bay would 
become vital should an embargo cut off trade with Britain. Even worse, "the clouds 
which we see now see collecting in our horizon, indicate the approaching storm of war," 
which Cabell predicted would seriously limit all trade. Congress also requested a report 
from the company on the status of the canal, recognizing the potential strategic value of 
an alternative route to the Atlantic.74 When the European war expanded to the American 
continent in 1812, the British did indeed blockade the Chesapeake Bay; Albemarle 
Sound, with its shallow depth and several passages to the ocean, was more difficult to 
effectively patrol. Unfortunately, the Dismal Swamp Canal at that time could only 
accommodate flat boats carrying juniper shingles out of the swamp. Nevertheless, the 
first report of the Board of Public Works asserted that the canal, "limited as it was, was of 
essential service during the late war."75
Beginning in 1814 reports appeared in the newspapers of successful trips down 
the Roanoke to Norfolk via the Dismal Canal. In June of that year, a twenty-ton ship set 
off fifty miles below the falls of the Roanoke and used the canal to reach Norfolk. 
However, the boat had to be lightened to pass a stretch of two hundred yards where the 
canal was too shallow.76 A year later, three men, setting out on the northern leg o f the
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Roanoke, known as the Staunton River, passed through the Roanoke falls, down to 
Albemarle Sound, up the Pasquotank, and through the Dismal Canal to Norfolk. While 
the type of boat is not described, their trip "excited much interest."77
A reason for the great interest in the canal was the promise it offered to free 
Norfolk from the economic doldrums in which it languished. By the middle of the 
second decade of the nineteenth century the steamboat had already begun to divert the 
coasting trade from Norfolk. And with the growth of internal commerce afforded by the 
James River Company, Richmond’s economic picture continued to brighten. In order to 
regain Norfolk’s economic prosperity, and reestablish its status as Virginia’s premier 
port, representatives from that region focused their attention on completing, and 
expanding, the Dismal Swamp Canal.78
Pressed by advocates of the canal, the General Assembly approved legislation 
directing the widening of the Dismal Swamp Canal to forty feet and its dredging to a 
depth sufficient in the dry season for boats drawing five feet. The locks on the river were 
to remain fifteen feet wide and ninety feet long. In December 1815 the Dismal Swamp 
Canal Company was authorized to raise up to $50,(XX) through one or more lotteries to 
fund the project.79 The Board of Public Works reported the company drained the canal on 
May 1, 1816, to widen the passageway. In 1817 the canal was still without water. Since 
there were about three hundred men working on the project, there was hope the canal 
would be finished by the fall of that year. It was not.80
Despite the commitment of the company and the support of the General 
Assembly, the federal government remained unconvinced of the canal's strategic
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potential. Recalling the canal's limited value during the War of 1812, Congress 
dispatched Major James Kearney to identify the best alternate interior route to connect the 
Chesapeake to the Atlantic. Kearney considered two routes. One was a canal connecting 
the eastern branch of the Elizabeth River to the North Landing River. The latter river fed 
into Currituck Sound, the northern arm of Albemarle Sound, which possessed several 
passages to the Atlantic. The other option was to employ the existing Dismal Canal 
system.81 In his 1816 report, Kearney stressed the purely strategic perspective behind his 
evaluation:
In considering the relative advantage of these routes for military and naval 
purpose...it is necessary to view them during a war with some maritime 
power, in which rapidity of movement and complete security should as 
much as possible be combined in the transportation of supplies, materials, 
and troops.82
Reporting on the efforts of the Dismal Swamp Canal Company during the summer 
of 1816 to deepen and widen the canal, Kearney noted the company had encountered 
unexpected obstacles. When construction first began the builders had assumed the 
ground over the course of the canal route was level. During the dry season, however, they 
discovered that, although deep water remained at the ends of the canal, toward the center 
the water was shallow. The company built intermediate locks to maintain a constant 
water level, but Kearney found no more than eighteen to twenty inches of water collected 
in the intermediate stretches of the canal.83 The increased flow of water also carried 
sandy soil out of the canal into its outlets, forming shoals impeding navigation. In 
particular, the northern entrance at Deep Creek filled with sand for nearly a mile, 
prohibiting any vessel from passing at low tide. The company was forced either to
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remove the sand or to cut another channel to Deep Creek.84
Kearney did not limit his criticism to the Dismal Swamp Canal —  he also 
characterized the Currituck canal route as strategically flawed. He observed that 
Currituck Sound was separated from the ocean by nothing more than a sandy beach. 
Ships cruising the coast could easily view the sound, which was only four miles wide. 
Moreover, the sound was so close to Chesapeake Bay that ships participating in a 
blockade of the bay could also patrol the sound’s mouth. In fact, the British burned 
Currituck Court House, located on the northwestern coast of the sound during the War of 
1812.85
The glaring vulnerability of Currituck Sound led Kearney to choose the Dismal 
Canal as the superior inland route to Albemarle Sound. The Dismal Canal ran far from 
the coast and was surrounded by an all but impenetrable swamp. Kearney also noted the 
land around Lake Drummond offered positions so defensible that a small group could 
hold off a much larger force. Although the Currituck route was about fifteen miles 
shorter (as calculated from Norfolk to Roanoke Island in the southern branch of 
Albemarle Sound), the Dismal Canal route offered a shorter trip for goods passing 
between Norfolk and the Roanoke River system, including the Dan and Chowan Rivers. 
To avoid the falls of the Roanoke, Kearney endorsed the proposed canal from the falls of 
the Roanoke to Murfeesboro on the Meherrin River, which fed into Albemarle Sound.86
The gamble of the company to drain the Dismal Swamp Canal and widen it paid 
off. The Board of Public Works reported in 1817 the effort of the company had caused 
"the removal of all doubts as to [the canal’s] final completion and its bearing...upon other
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great public works, both national and state, between which it will form the channel of 
internal communication." Public confidence in the effort had grown significantly, as 
stock values evidenced. Company shares which had been selling for as low as forty cents 
on the dollar, were trading at par.87 In its 1818 report, the Board of Public Works 
continued to heap praise on the canal, and in terms hearkening back to Madison’s vision 
of commerce inspiring virtuous behavior. The report noted the canal would assist 
Norfolk’s development by conveying from the swamp great quantities of lumber and 
naval stores for ship building. In addition, the canal would benefit the lower parts of the 
state, which remained remote and lacked any other major internal improvement project. 
The ethical condition of farmers in the hinterlands would be improved “by giving them in 
the increase of Norfolk, a great and growing market for all their commodities, and thus 
affording a new stimulus to industry and enterprise."88
Work continued to progress through 1818, though not at the rate of the previous 
year. A wet spring did not permit sufficient draining of the canal until July when between 
one hundred fifty and two hundred hands were employed. By then the company had 
completed thirteen miles of the improvement. Where the widening remained unfinished, 
the company removed shallows to permit smaller craft to use the canal in the winter and 
spring before it was again drained.89 The stock value continued to sell at, or above, par. 
Company directors became so confident of their prospects they decided to secure loans 
for its continued operation rather than issue more stock — more shares would have 
diluted future dividends. They turned to the Board of Public Works for a 550,000 loan.90
The Board of Public Works responded only the General Assembly could authorize
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a loan. The company’s president replied that any "legal impediments" the board faced in
issuing a loan "may be readily removed by the mere suggestion of the Board of Public
Works itself, to the legislature, now in session."91 The assembly approved the loan in
February 1819, and by March of that year the Board of Public Works delivered the money
from the Internal Improvement Fund. The board noted by formally approving the loan it
furthered the mission of both the Board of Public Works and the Internal Improvement
Fund. The loan would hasten the completion of the canal, resulting in an increase in the
value of the Dismal Swamp Canal Company stock held in the fund, the proceeds from
which would be used to invest in other improvement projects.92
The federal government also continued to demonstrate interest in the project,
particularly after Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill in 1816. In April of 1818, Congress
directed the Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, to present a plan "by such means as are
within the power of Congress," for providing federal aid to those waterways and roads
that would prove of strategic value in time of war.93 By placing a military primacy on
these internal improvement projects, their advocates endeavored to assign a constitutional
justification for federal support.
Calhoun began his report with a broadside directed at Madison’s veto:
A judicious system of roads and canals constructed for the convenience of 
commerce and the transportation of the mail only, without any reference to 
military operations, is itself among the most efficient means for the more 
complete defence of the United States...the roads and canals that such a 
system would require are, with few exceptions, precisely those which 
would be required the operations of war..."94
Calhoun implied that by vetoing the Bonus Bill, which would have promoted the
development of internal improvements, Madison had put the country in harm’s way.
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After this initial assault, Calhoun strategically retreated and observed that, though the 
connection between commerce and common defense was fascinating, "I do not conceive 
that it constitutes the immediate object of this report."95
More to the point, Calhoun noted the considerable military capacity of the United 
States, in terms of population and resources, was actually quite small when compared to 
its geographic dimensions. The size of the nation, Calhoun stated, was a double-edged 
sword: it rendered the nation less vulnerable to invasion, but also rendered it more 
difficult for the government to afford protection to every part. That is why ”[t]here is no 
country to which a good system of military roads and canals is more indispensable than 
the U.S."96 The American opposition to a large standing army further complicated 
strategic considerations. Calhoun stressed the country relied on state militia for its 
primary defense. These militia might have to be called from a great distance during the 
crisis of an invasion. The W ar of 1812 offered an example of what could happen without 
a sufficient transportation system: "The experience of the late war,” he concluded, 
“amply proves, in the present state of our internal improvements, the delay, the 
uncertainty, the anxiety, and exhausting effect of such calls."97
Calhoun asserted the Atlantic coast was particularly vulnerable. Facing Europe, it 
would no doubt again bear the brunt of an attack. Of course a strong navy and set of 
strong fortifications were absolutely necessary, he explained, but so were internal 
improvements which could deliver forces to the point menaced. He recognized the states 
were already busy improving roads and waterways that could be used to bring troops and 
supplies east to the coast. But, recalling Gallatin's report of 1807, Calhoun recommended
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federal participation in the development o f a coastwise network. While ”[n]o one or two 
states have a sufficient interest" in developing the network in its entirety, Calhoun 
observed it cumulatively handled five hundred thousand tons of shipping annually. The 
nation would be crippled if a foreign naval power were able to cut the network which 
connected the agriculture of the south to the manufacturing of the north. Calhoun 
stressed that the Chesapeake Bay was one of the most important links in the Atlantic 
coast network and asserted that, if practicable, its defense against a naval force should be 
complete.98 As Kearney had already concluded, the Dismal Canal was an intimate part of 
this network, explaining federal interest in the venture.
On April 23, 1823, a sixty-five foot long schooner loaded with cotton, flour, 
tobacco and hogs from North Carolina reached Norfolk by the canal. The arrival of the 
Rebecca Edwards, according to a contemporary account, was "appropriately hailed with 
joy."99 Hearkening to his earlier report, Calhoun reported to Congress in 1825 the now- 
completed canal "would make it easy to transport forces to defend, in time of emergency, 
our naval and military establishments in the vicinity of Norfolk."100
As part of its commitment to the canal, the federal government in 1826 bought six 
hundred shares o f the Dismal Swamp Canal Company, which along with another loan 
authorized by the General Assembly, permitted sufficient improvements to allow the 
passage of all navy craft. One base in particular that benefitted was the Gosport Navy 
Yard in Norfolk Harbor. Predating the Revolutionary War, the Gosport Navy Yard was 
on the Elizabeth River a short distance from the northern outlet of the canal, access to 
which afforded the navy yard unlimited quantities of naval stores from the swamp.
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Pursuant to the federal "Act for the Gradual Improvement of the Navy of the United 
States," in March 1827, the federal government decided to build a stone dry dock at 
Gosport capable of accommodating the Navy’s largest ships. The excavation of the large 
basin which the dry dock would require was planned for November of that year.101 With 
the federal acquisition of stock and the construction of the Gosport stone dry dock, the 
Dismal Swamp Canal Company had become a successful combination of federal, state 
and private cooperation.102 The company was the only one of the four companies that 
have been the subject of this study to survive intact beyond the 1820s.
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The Dismal Swamp Canal Company was the only one of the waterways 
companies with origins in the 1780s to survive beyond the 1820s. Does that record mean 
the river companies that have been the subject of this study were failures? Previous 
authors have thought so. Rice emphasized the inadequacy of the navigation and the 
internecine regional competition resulting from those parts of the rivers that were 
improved. In reviewing the James River Company, Dunaway stressed that largely 
because of its own malfeasance the company failed to survive. Littlefield was even more 
critical of the Potowmack Company, holding it up as a model of a contemporary joint- 
stock company unable to successfully manage a large project.1
But this is to look at the companies only from the perspective of their lifespans as 
corporate entities and their capacity to produce dividends. Daniel B. Klein suggests the 
"direct benefits" paid to investors were not the only advantages conveyed by 
improvement companies such as these. Contemporaries were well aware of the "indirect 
benefits" of improvements, including better communication, lower transportation costs 
and stimulated commerce. In the case of turnpike companies, Klein asserts the 
probability of direct benefits was recognized to be so low that investments in them 
amounted to voluntary contributions intended to advance the indirect benefits of the new 
roads.2
Beginning with Washington’s letter to Governor Harrison in 1784, waterways 
improvement advocates rarely missed an opportunity to herald the indirect benefits of the
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projects. The Virginia Journal and Alexandria Advertiser characterized an improved 
Potomac as a work, "of more political than commercial consequence, as it will be one of 
the grandest chains for preserving the federal Union." Not that it was purely a political 
instrument. The newspaper goes on to describe the "commerce and riches that must flow 
down upon us” from the river.3 Klein notes shares in the turnpike companies were 
regionally owned by investors seeking to promote local development.4 The cities and 
towns in which subscription books were opened for the waterways improvement 
companies seem to have followed a similar pattern. The law creating the James River 
Company directed shares be sold in Richmond, Norfolk, Botetourt County Court House, 
Lewisburg, and Charles Irving’s store in Albemarle County. Similarly, the Potowmack 
Company sold shares in Alexandria, Winchester, Annapolis, Georgetown, and 
Fredericktown. However the Potowmack Company also sold shares in Richmond, a city 
far more interested in the fate of the James River. This very well could have been a 
political decision arising from a subscription book being opened in the capital of 
Maryland. But it hints at broader interest in the company. In fact, among the 
shareholders were those with no ties to the regions benefitting from the improvement. 
Outstanding shares in the Potowmack Company were bought by three firms in 
Amsterdam, Holland, likely at the urging of their American agent who presumedly knew 
a good investment when he saw one.5
Contrary to Klein’s observation regarding the turnpike companies, prospective 
shareholders in the waterways improvement companies also expected direct benefits to 
redound from their investments. An 1818 petition requesting legislation for a connection
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of the James River to the Ohio River was submitted by "the inhabitants of the country 
bordering on the James Rivers and its branches." The petitioners asserted it would be a 
worthy endeavor for the state government "to give impulse to the industry and enterprise 
of so large a section of the Republic, to open new markets for the rich and diversified 
production of agriculture...[and] to foster manufactories." The petition also notes the 
"[t]he good policy of cherishing these amiable dispositions, and of binding together the 
citizens of the most remote parts of this extensive country, by the strong fetters o f interest 
and affection is too plain to require illustration." This was not to be financed by 
voluntary contributions, however. The petitioners advised "allowing such tolls as may 
induce capitalists to make investment in the stock."6
The capacity to distribute direct benefits was conditioned by the cost of 
construction and the zeal with which the companies applied themselves to maintaining 
the improvements. It is useful to compare the experience of the the Potowmack and 
James River Companies. Both were founded on the same day with similar missions, yet 
the Potowmack Company floundered while the James River Company became one of the 
most successful internal improvements in the country.7
The Potowmack Company began its work on an extremely optimistic note. The 
company’s directors expected to clear navigation above the fall line to Fort Cumberland 
in three years, and clear the falls in ten years.8 But from almost the first day, the 
magnitude of the project all but overwhelmed those pursuing the improvements. The 
Virginians simply did not have anyone at their disposal familiar with the sophisticated 
technology necessary to build locks around the various falls on the river.9 The company
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ended up hiring a series of different managers with different approaches to construction, 
and a parade of foreign "advisers."10 In 1823, commissioners from Maryland and 
Virginia concluded the Potowmack Company’s difficulties in maintaining its canal, locks 
and general river improvements "may be fairly attributed to a want of information on the 
subject [of river improvements] at a very early period of our existence as a nation, when 
that company was formed."11
Nevertheless, the Potowmack Company directors persevered and in 1802 the 
canals and locks around the Great Falls were completed -- seventeen years after the 
company had been chartered. But they could be proud of their work, particularly at the 
Great Falls, where the canal and locks were cut through solid rock. More the product of 
persistence than technical expertise, the locks at the Great Falls were among the greatest 
engineering accomplishments of eighteen-century America, and were frequently visited 
by both domestic and foreign travellers.12
The indirect benefits to those transporting produce and goods on the Potomac 
improvements are beyond dispute. Tonnage passing through the Potowmack Company 
toll increased from 1,643 tons in 1800 to a high of 16,350 tons in 1811. And in the 
recovery after the War of 1812, tonnage increased every year but one in the period 1814 
to 1822, when volume amounted to 11,730 tons.13 However, the cost of the Potomac 
improvements was far above that anticipated by the company directors, and well beyond 
that which could be matched by revenues they would generate. Between 1785 and 1818, 
the Potowmack Company reported expenditures totaling $670,000. From stock 
subscriptions the company had collected $311,555 and it had borrowed $150,000. Most
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significantly, tolls amounted to only $185,202, just slightly more than one-quarter of total 
expenditures.14 The Potowmack Company was never able to confer direct benefits of the 
same magnitude as its indirect benefits.
The James River Company had no such fiscal problems. Between 1793 and 1816, 
the company incurred $329,290 in expenses, while collecting $390,060 in tolls and rents, 
to which was added $140,000 in capital stock and $64,000 which had been borrowed.
The company paid dividends every year, and sometimes twice a year, from 1802 to 1820. 
The experiences of the two companies in individual years bring their financial conditions 
into even sharper contrast. In 1811, the year the most tonnage and the largest number of 
boats passed through the Potowmack improvements, the company collected $22,542 in 
tolls. However, expenditures totaled $44,047. In 1820, the state government took over 
the James River Company, but clearly not for fiscal problems. In that year, the company 
collected $33,731 against the combined $26,577 cost of expenses and a 12% dividend 
distribution, leaving a surplus of $7,144.15
The state did not take over the James River Company because of its failure to be 
profitable, but because it was too profitable. The company’s directors placed so great a 
priority on dividends they neglected necessary, but expensive, maintenance of wing dams 
and locks and disregarded the costly dredging of shoals. An 1804 petition seeking a 
tidewater connection spoke of the James River Company’s failure to maintain a proper 
balance:
[T]he law incorporating a company for the purpose of clearing and 
improving the navigation of James River...was founded upon principles 
advantageous to the individual share-holders, and beneficial to that part of 
the community affected by its operation...but the method which has been
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pursued by the directors of that company, contrary to the original object of 
the law, tends to sacrifice the interest of the community, and to promote 
that only of the individual share-holders and the inhabitants of the city of 
Richmond.16
The tension between direct and indirect benefits was also apparent in the hostility 
both the James River Company and Potowmack Company expressed toward their 
providing access to the Ohio River. Throughout the period of this study, improvement 
advocates touted the many indirect benefits to be afforded Virginia by a communication 
to the Ohio River. But those associated with the James River Company and Potowmack 
Company (and most hopeful for dividend distributions) were quick to point out their 
charters focused on Piedmont improvements, which in themselves proved to be ambitious 
and expensive endeavors. The companies had no interest in taking on an even more 
difficult connection over the Blue Ridge, though the public and the General Assembly 
urged them to participate voluntarily in the effort. A water line to the Ohio River 
continued to be an object of interest, though it would not be fulfilled until the completion 
of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the James River and Kanawha Canal later in the 
nineteenth century.
Though the Potowmack Company and the James River Company could not have 
been more different in terms of their profitability, they both failed to strike a balance 
between the direct and indirect benefits they were was expected to confer. And their 
failure to do so resulted in a similar fate: the state government, which had set the terms 
for the balance of direct and indirect benefits, took over the company.
Despite the apparent failures of the companies, one must not overlook that
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transportation was dramatically improved, though perhaps not to the extent the companies 
promised and which prospective users of the river expected. The Dismal Swamp Canal 
Company did build a waterway where there had been none, and even expanded the 
canal’s dimensions beyond that originally required by its charter. While the James River 
Company might have padded its profits by neglecting maintenance, the heavy traffic on 
the river is proof of the importance o f what improvements did exist. The other two 
companies which improved existing rivers failed to generate the returns on investment the 
James River Company could boast. Nevertheless, toll receipt records indicate an overall 
increase in the use of the rivers, though the growth was not steady. The Potowmack 
Company paid only one dividend, but as we have seen the use of the river increased 
dramatically as a result of the company’s efforts. The first recorded year of toll revenues 
for the Upper Appomattox Company show receipts totaling £56_10_10. By 1816, tolls 
had increased to a high of £427_0_4.17
The numerous towns established along the rivers stood as testaments to the 
success of the experiment in waterways improvement. The emergence of such towns as 
Lynchburg, Columbia, Buchanan, and Milton on the James River, Matildaville on the 
Potomac and Farmville on the Appomattox were proof that improved rivers would, 
indeed, promote the western settlement and economic development Washington,
Jefferson, and Madison envisioned in the 1780s. While it is true these towns were not as 
populous and less scrubbed than their New England counterparts, the new settlements 
along the rivers provided farmers with access to the craftsmen and merchants who 
connected them to the greater trade network running through Virginia, along the
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American coast, and across the Atlantic.18 In turn, the town residents enjoyed a more 
prominent social status, particularly those who invested in the very improvements upon 
which they all depended.19
The sudden appearance of new towns along the rivers, which offered farmers the 
chance for a more comfortable existence and created opportunities for merchants and 
craftsmen to enhance their social status, also created new tensions in regions familiar only 
with a homogeneity of agrarian interests. Those associated with the traditional bases of 
political power centered around county courthouses sought to quell the emerging political 
prominence of town inhabitants. "A Freeholder and Inhabitant of Loudoun" warned in 
1787 that prominent individuals of Fairfax county, as well those from Prince William 
County, sought to "crush the town of Alexandria." The writer implores the voters not to 
"be the dupes of personal resentment," and elect Mr. Hooe, a merchant from Alexandria. 
By focusing on the importance of Alexandria as an entrepot for domestic shipping 
produce and importing consumer items, the writer connects the interests of farmers and 
town folk against the traditional political power: "As long as you unite with the town, you 
will defeat all their machinations [and] you will be invincible."20
River clearance also posed a serious threat to those whose livelihoods depended 
on traditional uses of the river, such as fisherman and millers. They frequently petitioned 
the State Legislature for relief from the exertions of the companies. Improved navigation 
also created political tensions between residents of newly settled or growing towns vying 
with each other for regional economic dominance. And for many along the river the 
growing prominence of black boatmen added a sinister aspect to the river improvements.
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But from the slaves’ perspective, the improvements provided new opportunities for slaves 
to mitigate the conditions of their servitude. Advertisements offering rewards for 
runaway slaves suggest river clearance considerably enhanced the mobility of runaways. 
An advertisement offering a twenty dollar reward for the return of "Moses," noted he 
might be in the vicinity of Cartersville, or "running the James River in some of the boats." 
If not in Cartersville, the improvements on the James River gave Moses the mobility to be 
anywhere between Lynchburg and Richmond.21
With increased mobility, slaves extended their family networks. An 1812 
runaway advertisement offers a reward for "Edmond" who it is noted has a brother in 
Orange, a sister living in Buckingham County, and another sister in Charlottesville. The 
advertisement notes it is likely he will visit these siblings -- all living in proximity to 
improved rivers. According to the advertisement, Edmond could try to get to Lynchburg, 
where he has acquaintances, no doubt resulting from his experience as a boatmen.22 
When "Katy" ran away, the James River afforded her access to an extensive network 
upon which to rely for evading capture. She had been hired out to work at the armory on 
the James River Company basin, during which time she made many acquaintances, that 
her owner believed might have harbored her. What is more, her husband was a boatmen 
running between Richmond and the coal pits above that city. Her owner suspected 
friendly slaves at the coal pits also might have harbored her.23
And river improvements gave slaves the chance to create new identities for 
themselves — as free. For three years "Daniel" ran boats between Lynchburg and 
Richmond, during which time he characterized himself as free. Knowing Daniel had
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already laid the groundwork for a new, free, identity, his owner suspected he would 
continue to run boats on the James River, a possibility made likely by boat owners 
desperate for men with Daniel’s skills. The owner also conjectured Daniel may "lurk 
about the vicinity of Lynchburg, or Richmond, as a free man." Not only did the river 
make Daniel difficult to locate, but wherever he did decide to "hide," the local inhabitants 
may very well accept him as a free man.24
Even more disturbing for whites was the possibility slaves would use the rivers to 
do more than just flee slavery; they might strike back. The owner of "Jerry" suspected his 
slave had participated in the robbery of his home by providing the diversion of a fire near 
the owner’s bam. While putting out the fire, the owner’s home was ransacked, and Jerry 
disappeared. His owner noted Jerry knew many of the James River boatmen, who would 
no doubt assist him in reaching friends in Manchester and Richmond, or a half-sister in 
Cumberland County. Even more traumatic was Gabriel’s Rebellion and the role boatmen 
played as recruiters and couriers. Ironically, Gabriel’s efforts to free his fellow slaves 
resulted only in the application of a more draconian servitude which deprived slaves of 
many of the indulgences granted them since the Revolution.25
Despite unexpected turbulence, waterways improvements proved to be potent 
tools for Virginia’s leaders who sought to fulfill their vision of an agrarian republic in the 
Old Dominion. In this effort they were not endeavoring to recreate Virginia. On the 
contrary, they hoped to retain Virginia's agrarian-based society by ensuring easy access to 
plentiful western lands. But access to land was not enough; there was no guarantee
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western farmers would become western republicans. The plan of Virginia’s leaders was 
to use commerce as a link between agrarianism and republicanism. The fanning life, 
being tied to the land, made it stable and ensured an interest in the future of the 
homestead. Republicanism stressed discipline, and civic-mindedness. Internal 
improvement advocates anticipated the burgeoning commercial network made possible 
by improved river navigation would present western settlers with the opportunity to 
acquire consumer items previously unavailable on the frontier, creating an incentive to 
work harder than mere subsistence demanded. By growing surplus crops for sale and 
saving their money, these settlers would manifest the same virtuous behavior the citizenry 
had demonstrated during the Revolution, and which individuals like Madison, Jefferson 
and Washington considered essential to the future of Virginian’s republican experiment. 
They knew quite well of the pernicious effects of commerce in Great Britain — huge 
factories, a chasm between the very rich and the very poor and a debilitating obsession 
with luxury — but hoped they would be held in check by the continued availability of 
western lands. No one in Virginia was doomed to a life in the factory for want of land to 
till. This perfectly circular plan was not without political calculus: the improved quality 
of life would give settlers reason to support the state government, and political leadership, 
which had made it possible.
Implicit in the Virginians’ plan was a delicate balance between classical 
republican ideals and the new economic liberalism. They clung to their belief that a 
healthy republican polity depended on the existence of a class of small land owners, but 
they recognized virtuous behavior was an individual act and had to be cultivated one
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citizen at a time. Waterways improvements extended commerce to the hinterlands at the 
same time it made undeveloped land an inviting option for those who had acquired 
wealth. As Banning observes, Jeffersonians, "derived from England’s seventeenth- 
century republicans both a belief that men engaged in commerce are capable of 
republican citizenship and an archetype of the landed man as the ideal, autonomous 
citizen." But, as Appleby notes, Virginians demonstrated a very untraditional willingness 
to look at their world in new ways, exercising a modem, scientific approach to achieve 
their ends.26
Before the Revolution had ended Virginians accepted the need to forego their 
long-held dream of a continental empire in favor of territorial concessions which assured 
the Old Dominion’s sovereignty. By ceding the Northwest Territory and providing for 
Kentucky statehood, Virginia’s leaders secured their state’s autonomy within the 
Confederation but still left the state with vast land holdings. However, unlike the ceded 
territory, Virginians perceived this land as administratively manageable, and capable of 
economic development. And it was no accident Virginia’s borders extended as far as its 
network of rivers.
In order to develop the potential of their waterways, Virginia’s leaders 
demonstrated a knack for devising innovative governmental mechanisms. The four 
companies that have been the subject of this study were unlike anything before attempted 
in Virginia, either the colony or the state. They were private, joint-stock companies for 
which the state government did more than abate taxes or grant land — it held a stake as 
one of the largest shareholders. Virginia's leaders developed a new understanding of the
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role of the government in the state’s economy, blurring the distinction between the 
"public" and "private" sectors. Investors like Washington who had lost money on 
colonial projects recognized the goal of waterways improvements was on such a scale 
that private resources alone would be insufficient to realize them. By establishing the 
new companies, the state government created a corporate structure which raised sufficient 
capital from shareholders across the state (including the state itself) to clear the rivers, 
create passages through falls, cut canals and generally maintain the navigation of the 
waterways. In return, shareholders were to earn dividends from tolls charged local users 
of the waterways who enjoyed the benefits of improved navigation.27
The improvements and the new emphasis on commerce might have been intended 
to secure traditional Virginia society, but Virginians responded to the new circumstances 
in new ways. With commercial expansion permitting more individuals access to a higher 
standard of living, the same desire for "luxuries" which Virginia’s leaders approached 
with trepidation in the 1780s had became inoffensive by the turn of the century. Buying 
power won over frugality as the measure of a good citizen. With the taboo against luxury 
toppled, even domestic manufacture could be considered beneficial for Virginia, given 
the right circumstances. Manufacturing societies sprung up in response to Jefferson’s 
Embargo and the War of 1812, heralding self-sufficiency as a bulwark against the actions 
of foreign states.
In order to broaden commercial opportunities and further secure self-sufficiency, 
the state government continued to expand its role in internal improvements. With the 
creation of the Board of Public Works and the Internal Improvement Fund in 1816,
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Virginia’s leaders significantly increased the state government’s role in the economic life 
o f its citizens. In their reviews of Jeffersonian Republicanism, both Banning and 
Appleby overlook this significant development, instead stressing the Jeffersonian 
Republicans’ inheritance of the Antifederalist tradition of small and limited central 
government. Banning asserts Jeffersonian Republicans were "uncomfortable with the 
notion that the role of the state is to facilitate the growth of capital and credit, hurrying 
the community into the marketplace.” The Internal Improvement Fund had that very 
effect. Appleby asserts: "In their depiction of America’s future, freedom was expanded 
by drastically limiting the scope of government so that individual citizens could be 
empowered to act on their own behalf."28 As is evident from their efforts in waterways 
improvements, Jeffersonian Republicans did not so much espouse limited government as 
they re-centered governmental authority in the state capitol. Even Patrick Henry, the 
most vociferous opponent of federally centralized power, was an enthusiastic supporter of 
the state government’s role in waterways improvements.29
As much as waterways improvements influenced how Virginians understood the 
role of government and the value of economic development, they did not dramatically 
alter its underlying social structure; nor were they intended to do so. Thanks in part to the 
success of the waterways improvement projects of the 1780s, Virginia remained an 
agrarian and hierarchical society, governed by a handful of men bound together by strong 
family connections and an allegiance to the planter gentry class. They gave substance to a 
vision of Virginia which persisted for the next fifty years.30
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